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Chapter 1
Introduction
Operations management is an area of management concerned with designing
and controlling the process of production, which converts material and labor
into goods and services, as eﬃciently as possible to maximize the proﬁt of an
organization (Stevenson and Hojati, 2007). Throughout the production pro-
cess, various types of decisions, such as process design, quality management,
capacity planning, facilities planning, production planning, inventory control,
and maintenance, are made at strategic, tactical and operational levels. These
decisions are complex since ﬁrms operate in a dynamic environment where the
future is uncertain. To cope with uncertainties, a ﬁrm's decisions should take
into account diﬀerent possible future events. In addition to the dynamic envi-
ronment, competition brings another layer of complexities to a ﬁrm's decision
making. In a competitive market, ﬁrms' decisions interact with each other.
For instance, a ﬁrm can invest in excessive capacity to bring down the price
of a common product, which will aﬀect the competitors' proﬁts. In order to
make the right decisions, a ﬁrm needs to consider the impact of its decisions
on the competitors, their possible responses, and the impact of their decisions
on the ﬁrm.
This dissertation studies the impact of uncertainty and competition on
a ﬁrm's decision making in the ﬁeld of operations management. First, I
investigate the dynamics of a ﬁrm's decisions. Second, I investigate how
13
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
competition changes the dynamics of a ﬁrm's decisions. Chapter 2 provides
an overview on dynamic and competitive strategies in operations management.
The remainder of this dissertation focuses on three speciﬁc decision areas of
operations management: (1) capacity planning at the strategic and tactic
levels (Chapters 3 and 4); (2) anti-counterfeiting strategies at the tactic
level (Chapter 5); and (3) risk management for long ﬁeld-life systems at the
operational level (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.
Research questions
The main generic research questions can be formulated as follows:
• how should a ﬁrm make its capacity investment decisions in a
competitive market, considering the changing demand?
• how can a ﬁrm compete against counterfeiters in a global sup-
ply chain?
• how should a ﬁrm that purchases parts manage end-of-supply
risk of these parts, considering the changing supply and de-
mand?
Below, I give a detailed description of each chapter (Chapters 3-6) in terms
of problem deﬁnition, methodology and ﬁndings.
Chapter 3 studies the research question "how should competing ﬁrms
make their long-term capacity investment strategies under demand
uncertainty?" We develop an algorithm to derive full optimal policies in
terms of investment timing and size for both the leader and follower ﬁrms.
Two ﬁrms move sequentially in the investment race and a ﬁrm's capacity de-
cision interacts with the competitor's current and future capacity. A ﬁrm can
either plan its investments proactively, taking into account the competitor's
possible responses, or respond reactively to the competition. We derive the
optimal policy of a ﬁrm in the form of an ISD (Invest, Stayput, Disinvest)
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policy, which is represented by stayput regions. If capacity falls inside such
a region, it is optimal to stay put. Otherwise, capacity should be adjusted
(either invest or disinvest) to an appropriate point on a region's boundary.
A reactive ISD policy contains a unique stayput region, whereas a proactive
ISD policy can contain multiple stayput regions, each of which represents a
competitive goal towards market share, i.e., a submissive, neutral or aggres-
sive goal. Thus, a proactive competitive strategy can also be called as an
SNA (Submissive, Neutral, Aggressive) strategy. We validate our model using
detailed data from the container shipping market (2000-2015). Although the
investments of shipping lines are often questioned to be irrational, our results
show that they are close to the optimal capacity choices determined by proac-
tive competitive strategies. By reviewing the underlying structures of various
strategies, we demonstrate that in nearly all cases competing ﬁrms can gain
more proﬁt and market share by adopting a proactive strategy rather than a
reactive one.
Chapter 4, studies the research question "how should ﬁrms launch
next-generation products (NGPs), which are quality upgrades to
an existing product, in a competitive market?" Using a game theoretic
model, we derive the optimal equilibrium strategy of a ﬁrm, which speciﬁes
the optimal investment timing in the NGP and also the optimal capacity
allocation to the NGP and the existing product. In a competitive market,
an early launch gives a ﬁrm a leadership position if the competitor chooses to
wait, but it also brings risk, since consumer taste is unknown at the early stage
and the competitor may launch a better quality product later. Therefore,
a ﬁrm's optimal investment timing considers the trade-oﬀ between demand
risk and competition. To measure the impact of demand risk in a market, a
ﬁrm should measure the correlation between the average consumer taste and
the heterogeneity in consumer taste: a strong correlation indicates a large
exposure to demand risk. We measure a ﬁrm's competitive advantage and
disadvantage on a two-dimensional scale, which includes the ﬁrm's capacity
investment cost advantage over its competitor and the competitor's gain from
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oﬀering the product quality upgrade. A ﬁrm has a competitive edge only if
its cost advantage exceeds a certain threshold related to its competitor's gain
from oﬀering the quality upgrade, and this edge can lead the ﬁrm to invest
earlier than its competitor. We distinguish two non-exclusive situations of a
ﬁrm: (1) a stand-still situation based on the competitive advantage of both
ﬁrms, and the exposure to demand risk, and (2) a risky situation based on the
ﬁrm's competitive advantage, the other ﬁrm's competitive disadvantage and
the exposure to demand risk. We derive the optimal investment strategy of a
ﬁrm in each scenario: in a stand-still situation, the ﬁrm should invest at the
same time as its competitor; in a risky situation, the ﬁrm should postpone
the investment; otherwise, the ﬁrm should invest early.
Chapter 5 studies the research question "how should legitimate OEMs
combat counterfeiting in a global supply chain? Should Customs
authority help and how?" To combat counterfeiting, the OEM can either
resort to pricing or building a public-private partnership (PPP) with Customs
in which the OEM shares supply chain data with Customs to help hinder
the entry of counterfeits. Besides detention of counterfeit goods, Customs
can be the one who initiates the PPP and thus the OEM can join it with
no cost, e.g., cost for building a platform to exchange data. Using a game
theoretic framework, we derive the optimal equilibrium strategies of Customs
and the OEM, based on their decisions towards the PPP. We consider two
types of counterfeiters: non-deceptive and deceptive, where the diﬀerence is
that consumers cannot distinguish deceptive counterfeits from authentic prod-
ucts at the time of purchase (e.g., counterfeit medications), while they can in
the other case (e.g., counterfeit designer bags). Our results show that when
combating non-deceptive counterfeiting, the PPP could enable the OEM to
increase the price of authentic products and to earn more proﬁt, compared to
that without any counterfeit. Compared to the non-deceptive case, we ﬁnd
that the OEM should play a bigger role in initiating the PPP to combat de-
ceptive counterfeiting. The OEM could increase its price when it initiates the
PPP and the market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter is decreasing in the
17
price of authentic products in such a situation. In the non-deceptive case,
we ﬁnd that the optimal equilibrium strategy of each player depends on the
level of penalty to the counterfeiter and the quality of counterfeits. When the
penalty exceeds a certain threshold or the quality of counterfeits drops below
a certain threshold, Customs does not have the incentive to initiate the PPP.
If the penalty is either too large or too small, the OEM will likely also choose
not to initiate the PPP when Customs does not initiate it. One of the rea-
sons why the OEM will likely not initiate the PPP when the penalty is very
large is that under such a condition, the counterfeiter will disguise even if the
PPP is formed. Lastly, we show that the entry of non-deceptive counterfeits
does not always improve consumer welfare. In particular, when the quality of
counterfeits exceeds a certain proportion of the quality of authentic products,
the OEM initiating the PPP to hinder the entry of counterfeits would actually
improve consumer welfare.
Chapter 6 studies the research question "how should ﬁrms of long
ﬁeld-life systems manage end-of-supply risk of parts of their sys-
tems?" Using the proportional hazard model and quantiﬁed supply chain
condition data, we develop a methodology for ﬁrms purchasing spare parts to
manage end-of-supply risk, i.e., the risk that the part is no longer supplied.
Long ﬁeld-life systems, such as airplanes, are faced with hazards in the supply
of spare parts. If the original manufacturers or suppliers of parts end their
supply, this may have large impact on operating costs of ﬁrms needing these
parts. Existing end-of-supply evaluation methods, e.g., life-cycle models, fo-
cus mostly on the downstream supply chain and utilize past sales data to
forecast the remaining sales trajectories of parts. These methods are of in-
terest mainly to spare part manufacturers, but not to ﬁrms purchasing parts
since they have limited information on sales. We focus on the upstream sup-
ply chain and propose to use supply chain conditions of parts as indicators
of end-of-supply risk. Our methodology is demonstrated using data on about
2,000 spare parts collected from a maintenance repair organization in the avi-
ation industry. Cross-validation results and out-of-sample risk assessments
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show good performance of the method to identify spare parts with high end-
of-supply risk. Further validation is provided by survey results obtained from
the maintenance repair organization, which show strong agreement between
the ﬁrms' and our model's identiﬁcation of high-risk spare parts.
Chapters 3 and 4 consider both the dynamic and competitive aspects and
study their impact on a ﬁrm's capacity strategy. In Chapter 3, we ﬁnd that
competition isn't always bad for ﬁrms. A competitive capacity strategy, which
proactively takes into account the possible responses of the competitor as both
ﬁrms proceed in the investment race, can beneﬁt a ﬁrm in the long term.
The beneﬁt of competition is also shown in other decision areas, such as new
product development. In Chapter 5, we ﬁnd that under certain conditions,
the legitimate OEM prefers to compete with the counterfeiter in the market,
rather than helping Customs detain counterfeits at the border, since the OEM
can beneﬁt from the price and quality competition. It possibly explains why
some legitimate manufacturers do not join a public-private partnership with
the government to combat counterfeiting. For instance, while there are almost
two million active federal trademark registrations and many more copyright
registrations that are eligible for enhanced protection against illicit imports,
only 32,000 or so have been recorded with US Customs and Border Protection
for border enforcement.
In Chapter 4, we ﬁnd that when a ﬁrm's competitive advantage over
its competitor is not enough to hedge demand risk, it should postpone the
investment and invest at the same time as the competitor. Demand risk is
only one of many types of risk. In sectors like aerospace, shipping, and defense
where ﬁrms are focused on sustaining their products for a prolonged period,
supply risk of parts of their system components is prominent. In Chapter
6, we conduct an applied research on this topic. Although speciﬁc end-of-
supply risk environments will diﬀer among ﬁrms, the methodology can serve
all. The crucial condition is to monitor the supply chain and keep track of the
relevant supply chain indicators, such as price, lead-time, order cycle time,
and throughput, for each part of interest. At any proposed analysis date, the
19
big database can be used to construct a set of end-of-supply risk indicators
and calculate risk scores for each part. These scores can be scanned to identify
parts at risk and to support proactive order and inventory policies.
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Chapter 2
Background on Dynamic &
Competitive Strategies
In this chapter, I ﬁrst provide an overview on dynamic strategies in operations
management (OM) (Section 2.1), and then review studies on the impact of
competition on dynamic decision making (Section 2.2). Here I focus on survey
and literature review papers and give some examples to illustrate a concept
or demonstrating the complexity of a problem.
2.1 Dynamic strategies in operations management
One of the most important tasks for any organization is to cope with uncer-
tainties, failing which will result in great losses for a ﬁrm. Although a ﬁrm
cannot always acquire full information required to perform a task, the consid-
eration of uncertainty in decision making may bring a great advance. At the
strategic and tactic levels, decisions such as capital investment, facility selec-
tion for manufacturing, and new product development should consider possi-
ble demand and supply scenarios in the future (Eppen et al., 1989; Karabuk
and Wu, 2003; Gupta and Maranas, 2003). Van Mieghem (2003) reviewed
the literature on strategic capacity management concerned with determining
21
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the sizes, types and timing of capacity adjustments under uncertainty. The
objective of dynamic capacity strategies is usually to maximize the expected
net present value of the ﬁrm, while some recent capacity models incorporate
the risk aversion of decision makers and thus the goal is to mitigate risk and
improve performance. Snyder (2006) reviewed facility selection models in two
types of uncertain decision-making environments: (i) parameters are uncer-
tain, but values are governed by probability distributions that are known by
the decision maker; and (ii) parameters are uncertain and no information
about probabilities is known. In both environments, the goal of a facility se-
lection model is to ﬁnd a solution that will perform well under any possible
realization of the random parameters. Incorporating uncertainty into decision
making at the strategic and tactical levels typically changes decisions and can
improve performance and mitigate incentive conﬂicts e.g., cost-eﬃciency of
production and revenue maximization of sales (Harrison and Van Mieghem,
1999).
At the operational level, decisions such as production and transportation
planning, deal with dynamics and stochasticity that are not explicitly ad-
dressed at strategic and tactical levels. Mula et al. (2006) provided a detailed
review on models for production planning under uncertainty. In addition to
demand uncertainty, dynamic production planning models consider system un-
certainty, e.g., operation yield uncertainty, production lead time uncertainty,
and failure of product systems (Bertrand and Rutten, 1999; Ould-Louly and
Dolgui, 2004; Guhlich et al., 2018). SteadieSeiﬁ et al. (2014) reviewed mul-
timodal transportation planning models, in which uncertainties in demand,
travel times, and disruption at location or on the routes are crucial elements.
These models are remarkably complex since they involve balancing a compli-
cated set of often conﬂicting objectives of all multimodal operators, carriers
and shippers, and the synchronization of operations might fall if uncertainty
is ignored. Traditionally, production and transportation planning decisions
are made sequentially and independently. However, in today's competitive
market, ﬁrms have to guarantee the eﬃciency of their resources and may need
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to consider production and transportation planning simultaneously (Chan-
dra and Fisher, 1994; Degbotse et al., 2013; Katircioglu et al., 2014). Díaz-
Madroñero et al. (2015) reviewed tactical optimization models for integrated
production and transport routing planning decisions. Dynamic production
routing models integrate all diﬀerent types of uncertainty inherent to pro-
duction and routing planning processes and give ﬂexible and valid plans in
uncertain environments.
In recent years, postponement strategies have attracted increasing atten-
tion as an answer to how ﬁrms cope with changing environments (Yang et al.,
2004b; Boone et al., 2007). The concept of postponement suggests ﬁrms de-
lay activities until the latest possible point in time when more information
is available and thus the risk and uncertainty of those activities can be re-
duced or even eliminated. Activities can be postponed at all phases of a ﬁrm's
operations (Yang et al., 2004b): at the product development phase, design de-
cisions about less stable portions of the product can be postponed until better
information about customer preference is available (Yang et al., 2004a); at the
production phase, the point of product diﬀerentiation can be postponed un-
til the latest possible point in the supply network (Feitzinger and Lee, 1997;
Anupindi and Jiang, 2008); at the logistics phase, the last-leg delivery de-
cisions can also be postponed until a customer places an order (Van Hoek,
2001).
There is an extensive literature on dynamic strategies in operations man-
agement and the view on uncertainty has changed from seeing it as a problem
to seeing it as an opportunity. For instance, product development postpone-
ment provides an opportunity to reduce design lead times and costly redesigns.
Production postponement improves forecasting accuracy by shortening the
forecasting time horizon and enhances a ﬁrm's ﬂexibility and responsiveness
in a changing market. Eﬀective dynamic strategies give ﬁrms competitive
advantages in many aspects such as price/cost, quality, and time to market.
Hewlett Packard has reported double-digit savings in supply chain costs by
applying postponement in manufacturing and distribution. Similarly, a sig-
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niﬁcant share of the competitive advantage of Dell computers is based on
its strategy of mass customization and on the direct-delivery capabilities of
postponement. In addition to the consideration of uncertainty, ﬁrms should
consider competition in their decision making (Van Hoek, 2001). In a compet-
itive market, ﬁrms' decisions interact with each other. In order to determine
optimal strategies, ﬁrms should consider the impact of other ﬁrms' decisions
on their decisions. Next, we will review literature on the impact of compe-
tition on dynamic decision making, with a focus on capacity investment and
new product development decisions.
2.2 Impact of competition on dynamic decision mak-
ing
Competition has been consistently identiﬁed as an important force in ﬁrms'
capacity strategies (Spence, 1977; Porter, 1989; Bashyam, 1996; Smit and
Trigeorgis, 2012). Due to the existence of time-to-build, ﬁrms usually build
their capacity before the demand is known and enter a capacity constrained
price competition once the demand is revealed (Bashyam, 1996; Anupindi
and Jiang, 2008). Bashyam (1996) found that if the market outlook is either
highly optimistic or highly pessimistic, preempting expansion by the rival is
a good strategy in the competition. After a preemption race which leads to
overcapacity in the industry, ﬁrms may coordinate their capacity in the long
run through disinvestments, thus there will be little (if any) excess capacity
relative to the benchmark of a capacity cartel (Besanko et al., 2010).
In a competitive capacity investment problem where ﬁrms may invest ei-
ther before or after demand is realized at diﬀerent costs, investment timing
trades oﬀ ﬂexibility and commitment, and competitive investment strategies
focus on interactions between ﬁrms and strategic implications of a ﬁrm's tim-
ing decision. In general, there are two equilibria: in the delay equilibrium,
both ﬁrms wait to invest until uncertainty is resolved; in the commit-delay
equilibrium, one ﬁrm acts as a leader and makes a preemptive investment,
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while the other acts as a follower and waits to invest (Pacheco-de Almeida
and Zemsky, 2003). Anderson and Sunny Yang (2015) found that when ﬁrms
do not have volume ﬂexibility in production, they are most likely to invest at
the same time. If there is volume ﬂexibility, then it is more likely that one ﬁrm
will invest earlier than the other. Capacity and other forms of investment are
eﬀective entry deterring variables (Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980). Huisman and
Kort (2015) found that when applying an entry deterrence policy, the incum-
bent over-invests in capacity in order to delay the investment of the entrant
and to suppress the investment size of the entrant. They also showed that
when uncertainty increases, the likelihood of deterrence raises.
In addition to capacity investment, new product development should also
consider the impact of competition. The choice of product launch time is one
of the major reasons for new product success or failure in the competition
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1994; Rogers, 2010). A general premise on the
new product launch is that the decision to enter the market should be timed
to balance the risks of premature entry against the problems of missed op-
portunity (Cohen et al., 1996). Lilien and Yoon (1990) empirically tested a
set of relationship between the market-entry time and the likelihood of suc-
cess for new industrial products. Based on their results, a potential pioneer
in the industry should spend time to build its expertise in R&D, instead of
to accelerate its new product entry; a ﬁrm who intends to enter the market
during the growth stage of the product life cycle should hasten its entry, un-
less its expertise in R&D can be signiﬁcantly enhanced by a short delay of
entry time; a ﬁrm who intends to enter the market during the maturity stage
of the product life cycle should enter the market as early as possible. Savin
and Terwiesch (2005) developed a model describing the sales trajectories of
two new products competing for a limited target market. They found that
a ﬁrm facing a launch time delay from a competing product might beneﬁt
from accelerating its own product launch, as opposed to using the situation
to further improve its cost position.
In general, competitive investment strategy under uncertainty involves a
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trade-oﬀ between acting early, beneﬁting from preemption, and acting late,
beneﬁting from complete information. Firms should analyze this trade-oﬀ,
taking into consideration the nature of uncertainty, economics in the industry,
intensity of competition and a ﬁrm's position relative to its competitors. In
this thesis, I investigate the dynamics of a ﬁrm's competitive strategies in three
decision areas: capacity (Chapters 3 and 4), anti-counterfeiting (Chapter
5), and risk management (Chapter 6). In Chapters 3-6, I provide detailed
literature review on each speciﬁc topic.
Chapter 3
Dynamic Capacity Investment
under Competition
This chapter is available at SSRN; see Li et al. (2016b).
3.1 Introduction
Capacity investment refers to the change in a ﬁrm's stocks of various pro-
cessing resources over time (Van Mieghem, 2003). Firms face a number of
challenges in such decisions, since capital assets are costly, an investment is
usually irreversible, and future rewards are uncertain. Since a discrepancy
between a ﬁrm's capacity and demand results in ineﬃciency and losses, either
through under-utilized resources or unfulﬁlled demand, the goal of capacity
planning is often to minimize this discrepancy in a proﬁtable way. However,
doing this is not always possible when ﬁrms compete in quantity and in the
long run (Del Sol and Ghemawat, 1999). In a competitive market where
dominant ﬁrms exist and product price ﬂuctuates with these ﬁrms' capacity,
decisions of one ﬁrm directly impact those of the other ﬁrms, currently and
in the future. Investment strategies that ignore competition can have funda-
mental problems, as they either tend to recommend waiting too long before
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making an investment, or underestimate the likely countermoves of the other
dominant ﬁrms towards the ﬁrm's investment decision. Without a proper
theory, investment decisions in a competitive market can lack guidance.
The container shipping market, where the shipping service price is con-
trolled by a small number of liner operators through their capacity1, is a good
example of a competitive market. Over the past few years, we have observed
a striking investment race among shipping ﬁrms for ﬂeet capacity: the world
ﬂeet capacity in fully cellular containerships increased by over 56.9% between
2010 and 2017 (Barnard, 2010; Alphaliner, 2017). However, in stark contrast
to the enormous increase in ﬂeet capacity, the shipping industry has had a
diﬃcult ride since the 2008 global recession (Barnato, 2015). The battle of
survival for shipping ﬁrms can only be partially attributed to the crisis or to
buying too many ships before the crisis started, in anticipation of continued
growth. The situtation was aggrevated by post-crisis investment cascades.
Except Maersk's Emma, all Ultra Large Container Vessels2 were ordered af-
ter 2008 (Wikipedia, 2016b). For example, in 2011 CMA-CGM increased the
capacity option of its three on-order vessels by 15.7% (CMA-CGM, 2011) and
this capacity record only stood for a short while. In the same year, Maersk
spent $3.8 billion to build 20 Triple-E-class vessels, causing the size of the
largest containership to instantly rise by another 14.2% (Macguire, 2013).
These large investments during the market downturn cannot be explained
by generic investment frameworks. First, the investments are not supported
by demand. Market economy theories recommend ﬁrms to order more new
ships when they expect demand to outpace supply growth (Olhager et al.,
2001; Van Mieghem, 2003). However, the continuing recession in Europe and
the slowdown in China led ﬁrms to downgrade their demand growth forecast
from 9%-13% before the crisis to 3%-5% afterwards (Drewry, 2005, 2014).
1By June 2017, the top 10 shipping lines controlled over 73.8% of the world container
ﬂeet (Alphaliner, 2017).
2Container vessels are distinguished into seven major size categories and the category of
Ultra Large Container Vessel includes container vessels with a capacity of 14,501 TEU and
higher (Wikipedia, 2016a).
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Second, the competition for vessel size cannot be justiﬁed by economies of
scale. Larger vessels are more cost eﬃcient as they result in lower unit costs in
many categories, e.g., operating cost and building cost (Cullinane and Khanna,
2000). However, as the gap between world ﬂeet capacity and trade volume
increased to over 144% between 2005 and 2014 (Søndergaard and Eismark,
2012), the advantage of economy-of-scale cannot always be realized. In fact,
carriers face more losses if they sail large vessels with insuﬃcient cargo. Third,
the outcome of these investments in the container shipping market does not
meet the general investment expectation, which is to boost proﬁt. Instead,
these investments cause high volatility in freight rate and losses in proﬁts
(UNCTAD, 2012, 2013, 2014). For instance, after CMA-CGM's Marco Polo
vessels and Maersk's Triple-E-class were ordered, the spot rates in the Asia-
Europe market hit rock bottom, dropping from an average value of $1789 per
TEU in 2010 to $450 per TEU in December 2011 (Odell, 2012; UNCTAD,
2013). Consequently, in 2011 many carriers suﬀered huge losses and depleted
their cash reserves (Sanders, 2012).
However, these post-crisis investments clearly have a competitive feature.
Having faced a market downturn since 2008, leading carriers chose not to lay
oﬀ capacity in order to mitigate declining freight rates. Instead, they further
deﬂated rates by ordering more vessels, resulting in lower proﬁts and sup-
pressed capacity for competitors (Søndergaard and Eismark, 2012). Without
careful planning, even ﬁrms with a strong ﬁnancial position had diﬃculties
surviving. Hanjin, the world's seventh-largest shipping line, which had in-
creased its ﬂeet size nearly twofold between 2009 and 2013, but in turn had
caused its debt-to-equity ratio to rise from 155% to 452%, ﬁled for bankruptcy
in 2016 (Wei, 2017). Besides the shipping industry, other oligopolistic markets
have also shown similar investment races. For instance, in the semiconductor
industry, manufacturers invest aggressively in capacity during market down-
turns (Ghemawat, 2009).
Obviously, competitive capacity investment is risky for any ﬁrm as the
future is uncertain. One way to reduce the risk is to divide the investment
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project into several sub-projects and execute them in phases. This allows ﬁrms
to respond to market changes more easily. Because capital assets have long
lifetimes, investment decisions that are made in earlier phases inﬂuence deci-
sion making in the future. A long-term investment strategy should address
the optimal timing and size of capacity adjustments. Capturing the optimal
investment timing in a competitive market requires ﬁrms to balance the ﬁnan-
cial risk of investing and the competitive risk of not investing. Once-in-a-cycle
delays can create a lasting competitive disadvantage in a multi-round invest-
ment race. Moreover, competition does not necessarily drive a ﬁrm to build
the maximum possible capacity. More is not always better, which has been
demonstrated, for example, by the lack of success of the Airbus 380.
An investment strategy, which helps ﬁrms survive and thrive in the com-
petition, should achieve an "elusive" balance between being too defensive and
being too aggressive (Gulati et al., 2010). However, little research has focused
on the optimal structure of such a competitive investment strategy, in which
ﬁrms' investment decisions timely respond to each other and to demand. Our
study ﬁlls this gap by investigating optimal long-term investment strategies of
two ﬁrms moving sequentially in a competitive market where 1) uncertainty
exists in the exogenous demand growth; 2) a ﬁrm's decision interacts with
the opponent's current and future decisions; and 3) a ﬁrm's objective in each
period is to maximize the expected value of its long-term plan by adapting it
to the evolving market.
We contribute to research and practice as follows. First, we contribute to
the literature by providing a theory that can explain the competitive invest-
ment phenomena observed in practice. Current models do not fully explain
these phenomena. Second, we explicitly take the competition eﬀect into ac-
count by developing an algorithm which derives all stayput intervals for both
the leader and the follower in their optimal policies. Each interval is part of
the optimal solution set of a ﬁrm and has a competitive meaning, taking into
account the impact of the competitor's responses on the ﬁrm's current and
future rewards. Third, we allow a ﬁrm to choose either a proactive or a reac-
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tive strategy, and develop methods to eﬃciently derive the optimal policy in
each case. By revealing the underlying structures of capacity strategies, our
methods show the advantages of adopting a proactive strategy. Fourth, we
derive full optimal policies in terms of investment timing and size. Existing
research either focuses on timing only or studies investment in a single-shot
game. Fifth, we validate our model using detailed data from the container
shipping market over a timespan of 16 years (2000-2015) and show that the
investment decisions computed by our model are consistent with what hap-
pened in practice. Thus, the investments of the leading liner operators, which
are often questioned to be irrational, follow a competitive structure. Last, we
provide a practical guideline with four steps on how to achieve an eﬀective
competitive investment strategy.
3.2 Related literature
The literature on strategic capacity investment is mostly concerned with strate-
gically determining the timing and size of buying or selling additional capac-
ity under uncertainty (see Van Mieghem, 2003 and Chevalier-Roignant et al.,
2011 for a detailed literature review). Models that study the optimal capacity
type often consider a single-period problem where a ﬁrm sells two products
and has the option to invest in two types of resources: ﬂexible vs dedicated
(Van Mieghem, 1998; Goyal and Netessine, 2007). A ﬂexible resource can
produce either product, but require higher investment costs compared to ded-
icated resources. These models study the impact of capacity characteristics
and demand correction of the two products on the optimal capacity strategy.
Since our focus is on the competition eﬀect on a long-term investment strat-
egy, we limit this review to models that consider only a single type of capacity
resources.
Brennan et al. (2000) address the three stages in the development of capac-
ity models: (1) static models, (2) dynamic models, and (3) combined real op-
tions and game-theoretic models. As combined real options and game-theoretic
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models also study investment dynamics, they can be considered as a stream
within dynamic models. Static models investigate the optimal locations and
sizes of capacity in a processing network for a single or for multiple decision
makers in a stationary environment where there is no managerial ﬂexibility
to cope with market changes (Bish and Wang, 2004; Van Mieghem, 2007). It
collapses the problem to a single initial capacity investment where the optimal
capacity remains constant over time. This category of capacity models adopts
queuing (Lederer and Li, 1997; Cachon and Harker, 2002) and newsvendor
network formulations (Van Mieghem and Rudi, 2002; Netessine et al., 2002;
Kulkarni et al., 2004). While losing dynamics in capacity decisions, some mod-
els extend the single-period solution to a situation with dynamic independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) demand and hence investigate dynamics in
inventory (Van Mieghem and Rudi, 2002). Static models that involve multiple
players often study coordination between "vertical" players such as manufac-
turers and retailers (Cachon and Lariviere, 1999; Armony and Plambeck, 2005;
Plambeck and Taylor, 2005; Caldentey and Haugh, 2006), or competition be-
tween "horizontal" players (Lederer and Li, 1997; Van Mieghem and Dada,
1999) who supply a common market. Two main aspects considered in these
multi-player static models are supply network partitioning and information
asymmetry. Although these models consider ﬁrm interaction, they are still
restricted to a stationary setting, emphasizing the optimal capacity size.
Dynamic models allow time-dependent investments to respond to the res-
olution of uncertainty. They emphasize the timing of capacity adjustment in a
single-shot or a long-term game and derive a structured policy for investments
at diﬀerent time points (Burnetas and Gilbert, 2001; Angelus and Porteus,
2002; Narongwanich et al., 2002; Ryan, 2004; Huh and Roundy, 2005; Huh
et al., 2006). Some noted approaches in this category are decision-tree analy-
sis, dynamic programming, control theory, and real options approach. Often,
optimal investment dynamics follow an ISD (invest, stayput and disinvest)
policy, which is characterized by a continuation region: if current capacity
falls in this region, it is optimal to stay put; otherwise, it should be adjusted
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to an appropriate point on the region's boundary (Eberly and Van Mieghem,
1997). Although traditional dynamic models have been reﬁned over time to
incorporate many real-world features, such as hedging, they fail to consider
competitive interactions between ﬁrms' capacity, which limits their applica-
tions in a competitive setting. Our work is built on Eberly and Van Mieghem
(1997)'s ISD method, and we extend their method to incorporate the compe-
tition eﬀect on investments.
Our model belongs to the most recent development of dynamic models, i.e.,
combined real options and game-theoretic models (Chevalier-Roignant et al.,
2011), which involve several decision makers and an uncertain market. In
these models, ﬁrms condition their decisions not only on the resolution of ex-
ogenous uncertainty, but also on the (re)actions of competitors. The focus is
on determining the investment timing of players and explaining competitive
behavior. The most widely used method is the "option games" approach (Fer-
reira et al., 2009). Most models consider two types of players only (i.e., leader
vs. follower) or n players moving simultaneously, while only a few incorporate
a third player (Bouis et al., 2009). There are two major types of combined
real options and game-theoretic models. The ﬁrst studies a single-shot invest-
ment with lumpy capacity (Dixit, 1994; Hoppe, 2000; Murto, 2004; Pawlina
and Kort, 2006; Thijssen et al., 2006; Swinney et al., 2011). Investment is
viewed as an optimal stopping problem, focusing on ﬁnding the demand val-
ues at which capacity should be adjusted to maximize the expected reward.
The second allows multiple rounds of investments and explores an optimal
capacity strategy that contains a sequence of decisions. Most models in this
category focus on incremental capacity expansion (Grenadier, 2002; Aguerre-
vere, 2003, 2009), while a few investigate repeated lumpy investment decisions
(Novy-Marx, 2007). Numerical results of a multi-round investment problem
can be derived using stochastic dynamic programming and Monte Carlo sim-
ulation (Murto et al., 2004). For analytical results, control theory is used to
derive equilibrium investment strategies in a Nash framework. The key fea-
ture is that each ﬁrm determines its optimal capacity strategy while taking
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its competitors' strategies as given.
Research that examines dynamic competitive investments is an emerging
trend in the literature of capacity models. So far they have been applied mostly
in ﬁnancial studies and have some limitations. First, most studies specify a
ﬁxed capacity size as the action available to a ﬁrm and use the real options
approach to determine only the timing of taking this particular action. Second,
current studies have been limited to simultaneous investment strategies and
are considered as "open-loop" strategies in the sense that there is no feedback
from the investment of any ﬁrm to the investment of any other ﬁrm, neither
in the same period nor in the next ones (Back and Paulsen, 2009). Although
"open-loop" strategies are mathematically tractable, they are dynamically
inconsistent as decisions are derived at the initial time, without accounting for
the state evolution beyond that time. We contribute to the extant literature
by introducing sequential feedback strategies, modeled by a Stackelberg game,
where all ﬁrms respond to the investment of any other ﬁrm like a Stackelberg
follower. When using feedback strategies, ﬁrms have information on their
competitors' current capacity and react to capacity perturbations through
their own investments. Moreover, we allow the size of an investment to be
determined by the optimal policy and hence study more complete features of
a capacity strategy, i.e., timing and size. Table 3.1 gives an overview of some
existing capacity models and our model.
3.3 The model
The notations used in our model are listed in Table 3.2. To illustrate the
model, consider the following example: two ﬁrms (l and f) sell a homogeneous
product (e.g., shipping service) in an oligopolistic market within a ﬁnite time
horizon Γ = {1, · · · , T}, assuming capacity is instantaneously adjustable and
investment is partially irreversible. Throughout the entire timespan, ﬁrm l is
the leader and ﬁrm f is the follower. For t ∈ Γ and j ∈ {l, f}, let ktj represent
ﬁrm j's capacity level in period t and let the ﬁnite set Ktj ⊆ R≥0 denote the
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set of available capacity choices, i.e., ktj ∈ Ktj . The origin and the end of Ktj
are denoted as ktjo and ktje : ktjo = infKtj and ktje = supKtj . The initial
capacity of the two players are k0l and k0f . At the beginning of each period
t ∈ Γ, the leader ﬁrst changes its capacity from kt−1l to ktl. The follower then
observes ktl and changes its capacity from kt−1f to ktf .
The optimal capacity in each period is determined such that the value of a
ﬁrm's long-term strategy, which is a sequence of actions from the current one
to the one at the end of Γ, is maximized. Therefore, the capacity decision is
based on the demand, supply, and investment cost information then available
to the ﬁrm and on its assessment of the uncertain future. Let ωτ ∈ Θ represent
the (expected) demand at the beginning of period τ , where Θ ⊆ R is the
set of demand values. Exogenous uncertainty exists in ωτ , ∀τ > t, and it
possesses a Markov property. We denote the transition probability function
of demand as Pr : Θ×Θ×Γ→ [0, 1]. The conditional transition probability
is Pr{ωt+1 = xt+1 | ωt = xt} = Pr(xt, xt+1, t), independent of xt0 ∀t0 < t.
Thus, the demand information relevant to the capacity decision in period t
contains the current demand, i.e., ωt, and the transition probability.
The supply information comprises both ﬁrms' capacity levels, available
capacity choices, capacity utilization parameters, and utilization cost functions
in the current period. Let time t, demand value ωt, and ﬁrms' capacity ktj
(or kt−1j) deﬁne the state of the system. Denote the state space by Ω =
Ktl(orKt−1f )×Ktf (orKt−1l)×Θ×Γ. At the beginning of period t, the leader
observes state Ytl = (kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt, t) ∈ Ω and decides ktl. The follower then
observes state Ytf = (ktl, kt−1f , ωt, t) ∈ Ω and decides ktf . Hereinafter, we
omit the time variable t in state vectors. After capacity decisions, the two
ﬁrms engage in a single-period production competition which takes the form
of a Cournot competition. Thus, the optimal production quantities can be
found by allowing ﬁrms to set their production simultaneously to maximize
their own operating proﬁt of the current period. It is worth mentioning that
production decisions only aﬀect the current period, whereas capacity decisions
inﬂuence ﬁrms permanently (see also Murto et al., 2004).
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We denote ﬁrm j's production quantity in period t as qtj and it is deter-
mined by a function of the state (ktl, ktf , ωt), i.e., qtj = Qtj(ktl, ktf , ωt). The
total production quantity in period t is qt =
∑
j∈{l,f}Qtj(ktl, ktf , ωt). Given
the total production quantity and the demand of period t, the price of the
homogeneous product is given by an inverse demand function: pt = Pt(qt, ωt).
As qt can be represented as a function of the state (ktl, ktf , ωt), we can write
the price function in the same manner, i.e., Pt(ktl, ktf , ωt). Given the pro-
duction quantity and capacity, the production cost of ﬁrm j in period t is
denoted as htj and is given by a cost function: htj = Htj(qtj , ktj). Let atj
denote the capacity utilization parameter, which represents the capacity usage
per produced unit of ﬁrm j in period t. Firm j's operating proﬁt in period t is
given in equation (3.1). Since the marginal proﬁt of an investment is usually
non-increasing, we assume that a ﬁrm's operating proﬁt is concave in its ca-
pacity decision, given a ﬁxed capacity of the opponent (see Assumption 3.1).
Examples of operating proﬁt functions that satisfy Assumption 3.1 include
those associated with the market-clearing price or isoelastic prices.
pitj(ktl, ktf , ωt) = ptqtj − htj , ∀t ∈ Γ
s.t. atjqtj ≤ ktj
(3.1)
Assumption 3.1. For any given and ﬁxed capacity of the opponent kti ∈
Kti (i 6= j) and for each ωt ∈ Θ, ﬁrm j's operating proﬁt function pitj(kti, ·, ωt)
is concave in its own decision ktj.
In addition to the demand and supply information, which are used for
determining the proﬁt of each period, the investment cost information is also
used in the capacity decision. This includes the discount rate δ and both
ﬁrms' marginal investment costs and marginal disinvestment revenues in pe-
riod t, i.e., ctj and rtj . It may seem strict to assume that ﬁrms know each
other's cost parameters, and above-mentioned capacity choices, capacity uti-
lization parameters, and utilization cost functions. However, in the shipping
industry, such parameters are published by market observers such as Drewry
in their annual reports on container census and on carrier ﬁnancials (Drewry,
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2015a,b). Since shipping ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms in other industries often use
current investment costs for future planning, we assume that both players
consider Kτj = Ktj , aτj = atj , Hτj = Htj , cτj = ctj , and rτj = rtj , ∀τ > t.
This assumption is also in line with existing dynamic capacity models, which
only allow univariate uncertainty (e.g., demand uncertainty). We deﬁne the
investment cost function of ﬁrm j in period t as a kinked piece-wise linear
function: Ctj(ktj) = ctj × (ktj − kt−1j)+ − rtj × (kt−1j − ktj)+, where (x)+
denotes max{0, x}. As purchasing capital assets or technology is partially irre-
versible, we make the following assumption on the investment cost parameters
ctj , rtj and δ:
Assumption 3.2. Capacity investment is costly to reverse as ctj > rtj. In
addition, the present value of a unit of used capacity cannot be higher than
a new unit, i.e., ctj > δτ−trτj for each τ ∈ {t, · · · , T}, where δ > 0 is the
single-period discount factor.
At the end of Γ, the salvage value of ﬁrm j is determined by the function
Fj(kT l, kTf , ωT+1). Analogous to the operating proﬁt function, we assume
that a ﬁrm's salvage value is concave in its ﬁnal capacity, given a ﬁxed ﬁnal
capacity of the opponent (see Assumption 3.3).
Assumption 3.3. For any given and ﬁxed capacity of the opponent kT i ∈
KT i(i 6= j) and for each ωT+1 ∈ Θ, ﬁrm j's salvage value function Fj(kT i, ·, ωT+1)
is concave in its own capacity kTj.
3.4 Optimal value functions
3.4.1 Follower's value function
Let Ktj = (ktj , kt+1j , · · · , kTj) denote ﬁrm j's investment strategy vector
from period t to the end of Γ and Ktj denote the set of all investment strategy
vectors, i.e., Ktj ∈ Ktj . Given the state Ytf = (ktl, kt−1f , ωt), Kt+1l and Ktf ,
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Parameter Description
Γ set of time periods
ktj ﬁrm j's capacity in period t
Ktj set of capacity choices available to ﬁrm j in period t
ktjo , ktje origin and end of the capacity space Ktj
Ktj ﬁrm j's investment strategy vector from period t to the end of Γ
Ktj set of all investment strategy vectors Ktj
ωt demand indicator of period t
Θ set of demand realizations
Pr transition probability function of the demand
Ytj state vector observed by ﬁrm j at the beginning of period t
qtj , Qtj ﬁrm j's production quantity and production quantity function in period t
qt total production quantity of the product in period t
pt, Pt product price and price function in period t
htj , Htj ﬁrm j's production cost and production cost function in period t
atj ﬁrm j's capacity utilization parameter in period t
pitj ﬁrm j's operating proﬁt function in period t
ctj , rtj ﬁrm j's marginal investment cost and marginal disinvestment revenue in period t
Ctj ﬁrm j's investment cost function in period t
δ single-period discount factor
Fj ﬁrm j's salvage value function
Vtj , V
∗
tj ﬁrm j's value function and optimal value function at the beginning of period t
Stj ﬁrm j's stayput region in period t
kLtj , K
L
tj lowerbound and lowerbound function of ﬁrm j's stayput region in period t
kHtj , K
H
tj upperbound and upperbound function of ﬁrm j's stayput region in period t
Table 3.2: Model parameters
the follower's expected net present value (NPV), conditioned on the demand
at the beginning of period t, is:
Vtf (ktl, kt−1f , ωt,Kt+1l,Ktf ) =
E
[ T∑
τ=t
δτ−t(piτf (kτl, kτf , ωτ )− Cτf (kτf )) + δT+1−tFf (kT l, kTf , ωT+1) | ωt
]
(3.2)
Here Kt+1l is the follower's opinion of the leader's future strategy. In order
to derive a structured optimal strategy, we assume that for each kτf in Ktf ,
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a value of kτ+1l is decided according to a rule and this rule is consistent
for each τ ∈ {t, · · · , T − 1}. The follower can either have a reactive rule,
assuming kτ+1l = ktl, or proactively calculate kτ+1l as a response of the leader
to the follower's action, kτf . All existing oligopoly capacity models that study
interaction between two ﬁrms' investments (e.g., Grenadier (2002); Novy-Marx
(2007)) implicitly assume that both players know ex ante the opponent's exact
response to the player's own strategy. This assumption may hold true for
the leader, as it can exert some control over the market and thus knows the
follower's possible responses. However, the same assumption is not always
applicable to the follower in a multi-round game. We relax the optimality
assumption and consider two situations where the follower's proactive thinking
is eﬀective and ineﬀective, respectively. These two situations can also be
thought of as: the follower has full information or has incorrect information
on the leader's future strategy.
After specifying the rule, we can omit Kt+1l in the follower's value func-
tion, i.e., Vtf (ktl, kt−1f , ωt,Ktf ). The follower's optimal value function at the
beginning of period t is:
V ∗tf (ktl, kt−1f , ωt) = sup
Ktf∈Ktf
Vtf (ktl, kt−1f , ωt,Ktf ) (3.3)
3.4.2 Leader's value function
The leader can either adopt a reactive strategy or plan its investments proac-
tively, considering the follower's responses. We assume that in the proactive
cases, the leader has full information on the follower's responses as part of the
ﬁrst mover advantage. Full information includes the follower's opinion of the
leader's future strategy. Given the state Ytl = (kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt), Ktl and Ktf ,
the leader's expected NPV, conditioned on the demand at the beginning of
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period t, is:
Vtl(kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt,Ktl,Ktf ) =
E
[ T∑
τ=t
δτ−t(piτl(kτl, kτf , ωτ )− Cτl(kτl)) + δT+1−tFl(kT l, kTf , ωT+1) | ωt
]
(3.4)
If the leader adopts the reactive strategy, it assumes Ktf = Kt−1f and
kτf = kt−1f ∈ Kt−1f , ∀τ ∈ {t, · · · , T} in Ktf . A proactive leader knows
the exact response of the follower, obtaining kτf from the vector K
∗
τ f which is
determined by V ∗τf (kτl, kτ−1f , ωτ ). After specifying the strategy, we can omit
Ktf in the leader's value function. The leader's optimal value function at the
beginning of period t is:
V ∗tl (kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt) = sup
Ktl∈Ktl
Vtl(kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt,Ktl) (3.5)
Mixing the two players' proactive or reactive strategies, as well as the eﬀec-
tiveness of a proactive strategy, we consider four cases. Case (a) stayput : the
leader is proactive, while the follower reacts to the competition by assuming
that the leader will stay put in the next period, i.e., kτl = ktl, for all τ ∈ {t+
1, · · · , T} in equation (3.2). Case (b) adversarial : both players are proactive,
however, the follower has incorrect information on the leader's strategy and as-
sumes that the leader is adversarial, i.e., kτl = arg mink∈Kτl V
∗
τf (k, kτ−1f , ωτ ),
for all τ ∈ {t+1, · · · , T} in equation (3.2). Case (c) optimal : both players are
proactive, and the follower has full information on the leader's optimal strat-
egy, i.e., kτl = arg maxk∈Kτl V
∗
τl(kτ−1l, kτ−1f , ωτ ), for all τ ∈ {t+ 1, · · · , T} in
equation (3.2). Case (d) reactive: both players are reactive by assuming that
the other player will stay put in the next period. A case in which the leader is
reactive and the follower is proactive is not mentioned here, as it is identical
to case (a) with a delayed starting point (i.e., the follower moves ﬁrst). We
denote cases (c) and (d) as symmetric cases since both players adopt the same
approach and have the same amount of information on each other's strategy,
whereas cases (a) and (b) are asymmetric as the situations are diﬀerent for the
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two players. In any proactive case, equations (3.3) and (3.5) suﬀer the curse
of dimensionality. Below, we use recursive optimality equations to get the
optimal value and derive an ISD policy which determines the optimal action
of each period.
3.4.3 Recursive optimality equations
The value of a long-term strategy comprises the value of the current action and
the value of future actions. According to Bellman's principle of optimality, Vtj
(equations (3.3) and (3.5)) satisfy the recursive optimality equations below.
At the end of the time horizon Γ (or at the beginning of period T + 1), ﬁrm
j's salvage value associated with the state YT+1j = (kT l, kTf , ωT+1) is:
V ∗T+1j(kT l, kTf , ωT+1) = Fj(kT l, kTf , ωT+1) (3.6)
At the beginning of each period t ∈ Γ, the follower's optimal value function
associated with the state Ytf = (ktl, kt−1f , ωt) is:
V ∗tf (ktl, kt−1f , ωt) = sup
ktf∈Ktf
{
pitf (ktl, ktf , ωt)−Ctf (ktf )+δE[V ∗t+1f (kt+1l, ktf , ωt+1) | ωt]
}
(3.7)
where kt+1l depends on the follower's strategy, for example, whether it is case
(a) or (c).
At the beginning of each period t ∈ Γ, the leader's optimal value function
associated with the state Ytl = (kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt) is:
V ∗tl (kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt) = sup
ktl∈Ktl
{
pitl(ktl, ktf , ωt)−Ctl(ktl)+δE[V ∗t+1l(ktl, ktf , ωt+1) | ωt]
}
(3.8)
where ktf depends on the type of the leader's strategy, for example, whether
it is case (c) or (d).
Without specifying the case here, we deﬁne a function Gtj (see equations
(3.9) and (3.10)) as ﬁrm j's expected NPV evaluated in period t, given that
its capacity has been adjusted to ktj and an optimal follow-up investment
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strategy will be implemented (i.e., V ∗t+1j(·)).
Gtf (ktl, ktf , ωt) = pitf (ktl, ktf , ωt) + δE[V
∗
t+1f (kt+1l, ktf , ωt+1) | ωt] (3.9)
Gtl(ktl, kt−1f , ωt) = pitl(ktl, ktf , ωt) + δE[V ∗t+1l(ktl, ktf , ωt+1) | ωt] (3.10)
Substituting Gtf into equation (3.7) and Gtl into equation (3.8), the opti-
mization problems of the follower and the leader in period t equal the ones in
equations (3.11) and (3.12), respectively.
V ∗tf (ktl, kt−1f , ωt) = sup
ktf∈Ktf
{
Gtf (ktl, ktf , ωt)+rtf×(kt−1f−ktf )+−ctf×(ktf−kt−1f )+
}
(3.11)
V ∗tl (kt−1l, kt−1f , ωt) = sup
ktl∈Ktl
{
Gtl(ktl, kt−1f , ωt)+rtl×(kt−1l−ktl)+−ctl×(ktl−kt−1l)+
}
(3.12)
Eberly and Van Mieghem (1997) solve the optimization problem for a
single-ﬁrm case. They show that if the optimal value function V ∗ is strictly
concave, the optimal policy (also called ISD policy) can be represented in the
form of a unique stayput region, which is a continuum of optimal solutions to
the investment problem. The boundaries of the stayput region deﬁne the deci-
sion rule for investments in each period: if capacity falls within the boundaries
(i.e., inside the stayput region), it is optimal not to adjust capacity; otherwise,
capacity should be adjusted to an appropriate point on the region's bound-
ary. Extending their method to a two-ﬁrm setting, we derive the reactive and
proactive ISD policies, respectively, for a ﬁrm in the competition.
3.5 Reactive ISD policy
If a ﬁrm adopts a reactive strategy, it observes the latest action of the opponent
and plans its capacity accordingly, assuming that its opponent will stay at the
current capacity for the rest of the timespan. Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2,
and 3.3, we show in Proposition 3.1 that a player's optimal value function in
each period is concave in its capacity decision if it adopts the reactive strategy
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(e.g., the follower in case (a) and both players in case (d)). This allows us to
eﬃciently ﬁnd an optimal solution to the investment problem. Proofs to all
Corollaries, Propositions, and Theorems are listed in Appendix A. In Theorem
3.1, we present ﬁrm j's ISD policy in period t in the case where the optimal
value function V ∗tj is jointly concave in (kt−1j , ktj) for any given kti ∈ Kti and
for each ωt ∈ Θ. Thus, a ﬁrm's reactive ISD policy takes the same form as in
Theorem 3.1 and is a function of the opponent's latest observed action.
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, if ﬁrm j adopts the
reactive strategy, the optimal value function V ∗tj is jointly concave in (kt−1j , ktj)
for any given current capacity of the opponent kti ∈ Kti or kt−1i ∈ Kt−1i
(i 6= j) and for each ωt ∈ Θ.
Theorem 3.1. Given the current capacity of the opponent kti ∈ Kti (i 6=
j) and ωt ∈ Θ, if ﬁrm j's optimal value function V ∗tj is jointly concave in
(kt−1j , ktj) and there exists a unique solution to the optimization problem in
equation (3.11) if j = f or in equation (3.12) if j = l, then the solution is an
ISD policy that is characterized by the following lowerbound and upperbound
functions:
KLtj(kti, ωt) = sup
{
{ktjo} ∪ {ktj :
∇−Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt)
∇ktj ≥ ctj , ktj ∈ Ktj}
}
(3.13)
KHtj (kti, ωt) = inf
{
{ktje} ∪ {ktj :
∇+Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt)
∇ktj ≤ rtj , ktj ∈ Ktj}
}
(3.14)
Corollary 3.1. Let kLtj and k
H
tj denote the lowerbound and upperbound com-
puted by the two boundary functions in Theorem 3.1, i.e., kLtj = K
L
tj(kti, ωt)
and kHtj = K
H
tj (kti, ωt): k
L
tj ≤ kHtj .
In Theorem 3.1,
∇−Gtj(kti,ktj ,ωt)
∇ktj is the inﬁmum of all left-sided diﬀerence
quotients of the function Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt) at the point ktj , and
∇+Gtj(kti,ktj ,ωt)
∇ktj is
the supremum of all right-sided diﬀerence quotients of the functionGtj(kti, ktj , ωt)
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at the point ktj , i.e.,
G(kti,x,ωt)−G(kti,ktj ,ωt)
x−ktj ≥
∇−G(kti,ktj ,ωt)
∇ktj for all x < ktj , and
G(kti,y,ωt)−G(kti,ktj ,ωt)
y−ktj ≤
∇+G(kti,ktj ,ωt)
∇ktj for all y > ktj , where x, y and ktj are
in the domain of G. Thus,
∇−Gtj(kti,ktj ,ωt)
∇ktj and
∇+Gtj(kti,ktj ,ωt)
∇ktj can be seen as
ﬁrm j's (minimal) marginal value of investment and (maximal) marginal value
of disinvestment at capacity ktj . The ISD policy deﬁned in Theorem 3.1 is
characterized by two boundaries which are determined by marginal values of
investment and disinvestment. In Corollary 3.1, we prove that one boundary
is always lower than or equal to the other boundary. Therefore, such an ISD
policy can be presented as a stayput region Stj(kti, ωt) ⊂ R≥0, of which the
(minimal) marginal value of investment equals ctj at the lowerbound k
L
tj and
the (maximal) marginal value of disinvestment equals rtj at the upperbound
kHtj (see Property 3.1). With a discrete capacity space, the stayput region is
a subset containing a ﬁnite number of values in the interval [kLtj , k
H
tj ]. The
concavity of V ∗tj indicates that capacity which is outside of Stj(kti, ωt) should
be adjusted to the closest boundary of Stj(kti, ωt).
Property 3.1. For each kti ∈ Kti (i 6= j) and for each ωt ∈ Θ, the ISD policy
deﬁned in Theorem 3.1 can be written as a stayput region Stj(kti, ωt) ⊂ R≥0,
where:
Stj(kti, ωt) = [k
L
tj , k
H
tj ] ={
ktj : rtj ≤ ∇+Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt)∇ktj ∧
∇−Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt)
∇ktj ≤ ctj , ktj ∈ Ktj
}
(3.15)
In period t, ﬁrm j's decision rule indicated by the reactive ISD policy Stj(kti, ωt)
is as follows:
• if kt−1j ∈ Stj(kti, ωt), no adjustment should be made, i.e., ktj = kt−1j;
• if kt−1j /∈ Stj(kti, ωt) and kt−1j < KLtj(kti, ωt), an investment should be
made such that the new capacity hits the boundary of Stj(kti, ωt) at the
lower side, i.e., ktj = K
L
tj(kti, ωt);
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• if kt−1j /∈ Stj(kti, ωt) and kt−1j > KHtj (kti, ωt), a disinvestment should
be made such that the new capacity hits the boundary of Stj(kti, ωt) at
the higher side, i.e., ktj = K
H
tj (kti, ωt).
3.6 Proactive ISD policy
If ﬁrm j adopts a proactive strategy, the optimal value function V ∗tj , as well
as the expected NPV function Gtj , may not be concave in ktj . Non-concavity
of the optimization problem arises from the fact that a proactive ﬁrm strate-
gically plans its investments, considering the opponent's potential response
strategy, which non-monotonously inﬂuences the ﬁrm's own present and fu-
ture value. A ﬁrm's proactive ISD policy considers multiple competitive goals
towards the opponent's future capacity growth and thus contains multiple dis-
joint stayput intervals. The number and size of stayput intervals determine
the strategic responsiveness of a ﬁrm's ISD policy to the opponent's strategy:
the more intervals and the shorter each interval is, the more responsive an
ISD policy is. We ﬁrst reduce the dynamic long-term problem to a single-shot
investment and derive the leader's proactive ISD policy in closed form. Using
similar logic, we then develop an algorithm to derive the proactive ISD policy
for a long-term setting and a discrete capacity space.
3.6.1 Single-shot proactive investment
In the single-shot setting, the leader has full information on the follower's
response strategy and proactively plans its investment, while the follower re-
sponds reactively. Satisfying Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3, we use a linear form
for the price function and for the salvage value function: pt = αωt− ktl − ktf ,
and Fj(kT l, kTf , ωT+1) = (αωT+1−kT l−kTf )×kTj . For simplicity, we set the
capacity utilization parameter atj = 1 and the production cost htj = 0. In ad-
dition, we use the same cost parameters values for both players: ctl = ctf = c
and rtl = rtf = r. We set c > r, which satisﬁes Assumption 3.2, and set the
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capacity space as Ktj = R≥0.
According to Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 3.1, the follower's value func-
tion is concave in k1f and the follower's ISD policy contains a single stayput
interval, of which the boundaries are determined by functions of k1l. Set
ω = α(ω1+δE[ω2])2(1+δ) , the follower's optimal action is given in equation (3.16) and
can also be simply seen as a function of the leader's ﬁrst move:
k1f = K1f (k1l) =
kL1f = ω − c2(1+δ) − k1l2 if k0f < ω − c2(1+δ) − k1l2
k0f if ω − c2(1+δ) − k1l2 ≤ kof ≤ ω − r2(1+δ) − k1l2
kH1f = ω − r2(1+δ) − k1l2 if kof > ω − r2(1+δ) − k1l2
(3.16)
The leader takes three steps in the decision making process to maximize its
value function V1l = k1l× (αω1 +δαE[ω2]−k1l(1+δ)−k1f (1+δ))− c× (k1l−
k0l)
++r×(k0l−k1l)+. First, the leader identiﬁes its available capacity choices
for diﬀerent competitive goals based on the follower's response. According to
equation (3.16), the leader's decision k1l belongs to one of the three mutually
exclusive and complementary ranges: (1) k1l ≤ 2ω − c1+δ − 2k0f ; (2) k1l :
2ω − c1+δ − 2k0f ≤ k1l ≤ 2ω − r1+δ − 2k0f ; (3) k1l ≥ 2ω − r1+δ − 2k0f . If the
leader chooses any action from each of the three ranges, the follower's reaction
is to invest, stay put, and disinvest, respectively, while the magnitude of the
follower's decision depends on the exact value of k1l. We refer to these ranges
as the capacity range for a submissive, neutral, or aggressive competitive goal.
We call this an SNA (Submissive, Neutral, Aggresive) strategy.
After dividing the capacity space, the leader's second step is to deter-
mine the optimal decision interval for each competitive goal. Substituting the
corresponding response of the follower into the leader's value function in each
competitive goal range, V1l in that capacity range is concave in k1l. Thus, the
leader's stayput interval associated with a ﬁxed response of the follower can
be derived using Theorem 3.1 and by comparing the interval boundaries and
the capacity range boundaries. A stayput interval exists for a competitive goal
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if at least one interval boundary is within the range. We denote the stayput
interval for competitive goal x as Sx and the interval boundaries as k
Sx
o and
kSxe , i.e., Sx = [k
Sx
o , k
Sx
e ]. The detailed stayput interval for each competitive
goal is given below:
1. In the submissive goal range (S ) with k1l ≤ 2ω− c1+δ−2k0f , the follower's
response is to invest k1f = k
L
1f = ω− c2(1+δ)− k1l2 . If k0f ≤ ω2 − c4(1+δ) , the
stayput interval for this goal is SS = [k
SS
o , k
SS
e ] =
[
ω − c2(1+δ) ,min{ω +
c−2r
2(1+δ) , 2ω− c1+δ − 2k0f}
]
. If k0f >
ω
2 − c4(1+δ) , no stayput interval exists
for this goal. This means that the leader's SNA strategy may not trigger
the follower to invest, if the follower's current capacity is large or the
investment unit cost is high.
2. In the neutral goal range (N ) with k1l : 2ω − c1+δ − 2k0f ≤ k1l ≤
2ω − r1+δ − 2k0f , the follower's response is to stay put k1f = k0f . If
2ω
3 +
r−2c
3(1+δ) ≤ k0f ≤ 2ω3 + c−2r3(1+δ) , the stayput interval for this goal is
SN = [k
SN
o , k
SN
e ] =
[
max{ω − c2(1+δ) −
k0f
2 , 2ω − c1+δ − 2k0f},min{ω −
r
2(1+δ)−
k0f
2 , 2ω− r1+δ−2k0f}
]
. If k0f >
2ω
3 +
c−2r
3(1+δ) or k0f <
2ω
3 +
r−2c
3(1+δ) ,
then no stayput interval exists for this goal. This means that the leader's
SNA strategy will keep the follower stay at its current capacity, only if
the follower's current capacity is within a certain range, determined by
the level of investment irreversibility.
3. In the aggressive goal range (A) with k1l ≥ 2ω− r1+δ−2k0f , the follower's
response is to disinvest k1f = ω − r2(1+δ) − k1l2 . If k0f ≥ ω2 − r4(1+δ) , the
stayput interval for this goal is SA = [k
SA
o , k
SA
e ] =
[
max{ω+ r−2c2(1+δ) , 2ω−
r
1+δ − 2k0f}, ω − r2(1+δ)
]
. If k0f <
ω
2 − r4(1+δ) , then no stayput interval
exists for this goal. This means that the leader's SNA strategy may not
trigger the follower to disinvest, if the follower's current capacity is small
or the disinvestment unit price is low.
If the leader's current capacity k0l is within SS , SN or SA, the value of
adjusting to another competitive goal range may be higher than the value of
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staying put, considering that the follower may respond diﬀerently. Therefore,
the leader's third step is to obtain the decision intervals that are optimal
for all competitive goals by comparing the values of switching to diﬀerent
competitive goals. Based on Theorem 3.1, the leader has more value staying
put than adjusting to any other point within the interval if the current capacity
is in a stayput interval. Therefore, we can compare two competitive goals by
comparing the value of staying at one interval and the value of adjusting
to either the lowerbound or upperbound of the other interval. Using the
lowerbound as an example, the minimal diﬀerence between the value of sticking
to a competitive goal and the value of adjusting to any other goal is J(k) =
k(αω1 +δαE[ω2]−k(1+δ)−K1f (k) · (1+δ))−maxy 6=x
{
k
Sy
o (αω1 +δαE[ω2]−
k
Sy
o (1+δ)−K1f (kSyo ) · (1+δ))+c× (kSyo −k)+−r× (k−kSyo )+
}
. The value of
staying at a ﬁnal optimal point should be larger than the value of adjusting,
i.e., J(k) > 0 if k is a ﬁnal optimal point. It is easy to prove that J(k) is
concave in k, ∀k ∈ Sx. Hence, there exists a single interval S′x ⊂ Sx satisfying
J(k) > 0, ∀k ∈ S′x. S
′
x is the ﬁnal stayput interval in competitive goal range
x, which is optimal for all goals.
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Figure 3.1: Example of the leader's ISD policy in the single-shot game
Depending on the parameters values, some competitive goals may not have
a stayput interval, or intervals for two adjacent goals may be connected to each
other. For this single-shot investment, the leader's ISD policy has up to three
separate stayput intervals. After the three steps, the value of staying outside
any ﬁnal stayput interval is smaller than the value of adjusting to an interval
boundary. If the current capacity falls within a stayput interval, the value of
staying put is larger than the value of adjusting to any other point. Therefore,
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a proactive ISD policy with multiple stayput intervals assigns a non-stayput
capacity value to the closest boundary of a close-by stayput interval. We call
this a Multi-ISD decision rule.
For capacity values that are on one side of all stayput intervals, there
is only one close-by interval, thus the optimal decision is to either invest or
disinvest to hit the closest interval boundary. For non-stayput capacity values
that fall between two consecutive intervals, the decision to which interval the
current capacity should be adjusted depends on the investment costs and the
values of two adjacent competitive goals. The diﬀerence between the values of
adjusting a non-stayput point k ∈ (kS
′
x
e , k
S
′
y
o ) to one of the two adjacent goals
(x and y) is monotonously decreasing (or increasing) in k. Thus, there exists
an investment threshold kxy0l ∈ [kS
′
x
e , k
S
′
y
o ] such that the optimal decision for all
k0l ∈ (kS
′
x
o , k
xy
0l ) is to disinvest to hit the upperbound of S
′
x, and the optimal
decision for all k0l ∈ (kxy0l , k
S
′
y
e ) is to invest to hit the lowerbound of S
′
y. If
kxy0l ∈ (kS
′
x
e , k
S
′
y
o ) and k0l = k
xy
0l , adjusting k0l to either boundary yields the
same value. Figure 3.1 gives an example of the leader's ISD policy, where the
ﬁrst, second, and third stayput intervals are marked in black, green, and blue,
respectively, and the investment thresholds are presented by purple crosses.
The black lines with an arrow on one side indicate the optimal action for a
non-stayput point.
The leader's ISD policy is illustrated by the number, sizes, and positions of
stayput intervals, as well as the investment threshold between two consecutive
intervals. The number of intervals indicates the availability of various com-
petitive goals: the more intervals, the more goals the leader's policy contains.
A small interval indicates a small range of optimal decisions, considering a
speciﬁc goal and the follower's response, and suggests a high probability that
the current capacity will be outside the interval and should be adjusted to an
interval boundary, i.e., it is beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to change its capacity to trig-
ger a speciﬁc response of the opponent. Therefore, an ISD policy with many
small intervals implies that the investment strategy is highly responsive to the
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opponent's strategy. In the single-shot game, the leader has at most seven
decisions: investment and disinvestment for each competitive goal (2× 3) and
stayput at the current capacity. Extending the game to a two-period setting,
a proactive follower decides its optimal action in the ﬁrst period taking into
account the leader's reaction k2l, which is decided based on the follower's re-
sponse k2f . By backwards induction, the leader's decision k2l takes the same
form as k1l in the single-shot game. Therefore, there are seven diﬀerent values
of k2l, and the follower can have seven competitive goals in the ﬁrst period,
thus potentially having seven stayput intervals. In a long-term setting, the
number of stayput intervals increases exponentially, and the computation is in-
tensive since an interval can exist for each ﬁxed sequence of the other player's
responses. Below, we develop an eﬃcient algorithm to derive the optimal
long-term proactive ISD policy.
3.6.2 Long-term proactive investment
In a long-term investment, a proactive player j expects its action ktj to inﬂu-
ence the other player i's optimal value V ∗ti(ktj , kt−1i, ωt), i.e.,
∇V ∗ti(ktj ,kt−1i,ωt)
∇ktj 6=
0. Therefore, it strategically chooses ktj to inﬂuence the opponent's upcom-
ing investments, kti, · · · , kT i, with the purpose of maximizing its own value
Vtj . Note that a proactive follower (j = f) perceives
∇V ∗t+1l(ktl,ktf ,ωt+1)
∇ktf 6= 0,
and thus its action ktf inﬂuences the leader's future capacity that starts from
the next period, kt+1l, · · · , kT l. For simplicity, we do not distinguish the no-
tations for the two players. In a long-term setting, the follower in period t
can be considered as the "leader" in period t + 1. Two proactive players can
be diﬀerent in the eﬀectiveness of their proactive strategies. For example, a
player may not have complete information on the other player's strategy, and
thus its proactive strategy may be less eﬀective than that of the player who
has full information.
We develop a Decomposition Algorithm to compute ﬁrm j's proactive ISD
policy in period t. The mechanism of this type of algorithm is to "divide and
conquer" (see also Groenevelt (1991)). Following similar logic as in Section
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3.6.1, our Decomposition Algorithm contains three steps. The ﬁrst step iden-
tiﬁes a unique range that contains the stayput region. We exclude capacity
values that fall outside this range from the ﬁnal solution set. Next, we identify
all terminals, which are the transition points between two diﬀerent immedi-
ate responses of the opponent either in the current period t or in the next
period t+ 1. Then we divide the range into separate terminal intervals, each
of which ends at a terminal, and thus each terminal interval corresponds to a
ﬁxed immediate response of the other player. Within the same interval, ﬁrm
j can still inﬂuence the opponent's later capacity by choosing diﬀerent ktj .
The second step determines the stayput intervals in each terminal interval
separately through two sequential rolling capacity procedures. The third step
eliminates the capacity values that are not optimal to the optimization prob-
lem from each stayput interval, considering actions in other terminal intervals.
Below, we elaborate on the three steps.
Step 1. Given the capacity space Ktj = [ktjo , ktje ], the range of the stay-
put region computed in the ﬁrst step is denoted as Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]
, and the ﬁnal
stayput region in the third step is denoted as S[ktjo ,ktje ]. To solve ﬁrm j's
optimization problem in equation (3.11) or (3.12), we use the two boundary
functions (equations (3.13) and (3.14)) in Theorem 3.1 to identify the range:
Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]
= [kLtj , k
H
tj ]. Since Gtj is not necessarily concave, k
L
tj is not guar-
anteed to be smaller than or equal to kHtj . In Proposition 3.2, we show that
the stayput region S[ktjo ,ktje ] is completely contained in the range S
r
[ktjo ,ktje ]
.
Therefore, if there exists a solution to the optimization problem, then kLtj ≤ kHtj
(i.e., S[ktjo ,ktje ] ⊆ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ] 6= ∅). Such a condition is guaranteed if the capac-
ity space Ktj is nonempty and closed. Hereinafter, we assume the existence
of an optimal solution ktj (not necessarily unique). In Proposition 3, we show
that the boundaries of the range Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]
are contained in the ﬁnal solution
set: kLtj , k
H
tj ∈ S[ktjo ,ktje ].
Proposition 3.2. S[ktjo ,ktje ] ⊆ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ] = [k
L
tj , k
H
tj ].
Proposition 3.3. kLtj and k
H
tj are the lowerbound and the upperbound of
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S[ktjo ,ktje ].
Let the function Kti(ktj) represent the opponent ﬁrm i's optimal action
kti, which depends on its stayput region Sti that is a function of ktj . We
identify all terminals in Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]
sequentially. Denote the start of the nth
terminal interval as Ino and the nth terminal as I
n
e . The nth terminal interval
is then [Ino , I
n
e ]. The ﬁrst terminal interval starts with the origin of S
r
[ktjo ,ktje ]
,
i.e., I1o = k
L
tj . For n ≥ 1 and k ∈ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]: if there exists 4k = inf{k
′
:
k < k
′ ∈ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]} satisfying Kti(k) 6= Kti(4k), the nth terminal is set as
Ine = inf{k : Kti(k) 6= Kti(4k), Ino ≤ k ∈ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]}; Otherwise, I
n
e = k
H
tj .
If I1e 6= kHtj , the n + 1th terminal interval starts with the smallest possible
value after Ine in S
r
[ktjo ,ktje ]
: In+1o = 4Ine = inf{k : Ine < k ∈ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]}. The
searching process for terminals is continued until Ine = k
H
tj . In the ﬁrst step,
we assume that N terminals are identiﬁed in Sr[klo,kle] and the range is thus
divided into N terminal intervals.
Step 2. Given a subset K = [ko, ke], where ko and ke are the origin and
the end, and ki ∈ K , denote 4ki as the smallest possible value after ki in
K and 4−ki as the largest possible value before ki in K : 4ki = inf{k :
ki < k ∈ K } and 4−ki = sup{k : ki > k ∈ K }. If ki = ke, set 4ki = ke,
and if ki = ko, set 4−ki = ko. The two rolling capacity procedures eliminate
non-optimal values in an interval through sequentially iterations. Below, we
deﬁne the two rolling procedures in K :
Rolling up procedure in K Starting with the origin ko, the ﬁrst iteration
interval is set as K1 := [ko, ko]. Denote the ith iteration interval as
Ki = [ko, ki], ∀i ≥ 1. At the i + 1th iteration, we extend the previous
intervalKi by adding the smallest possible value after ki to the right end
of the iteration interval, i.e., ki+1 = 4ki, until ki+1 = ke. Given each
iteration interval Ki = [ko, ki], we identify the upperbound of the range
Sr[ko,ki] using the upperbound function (equation (3.14)) in Theorem 3.1:
if ki is not the upperbound of S
r
[ko,ki]
, eliminate ki from K ; otherwise,
keep ki.
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Rolling down procedure in K Starting with the end ke, the ﬁrst iteration
interval is set as K1 := [ke, ke]. Denote the ith iteration interval as
Ki = [ki, ke], ∀i ≥ 1. At the i + 1th iteration, we extend the previous
iteration intervalKi by adding the largest possible value before ki to the
left end of the iteration interval, i.e., ki+1 = 4−ki, until ki+1 = ko.??
Given each iteration interval Ki = [ki, ke], we identify the lowerbound
of the range Sr[ki,ke] using the lowerbound function (equation (3.13)) in
Theorem 3.1: if ki is not the lowerbound of S
r
[ki,ke]
, eliminate ki from
K ; otherwise, keep ki.
In each terminal interval [Ino , I
n
e ] obtained from Step 1, we ﬁrst imple-
ment the rolling up procedure. Starting with the origin Ino , this procedure is
ﬁnished once the iteration reaches the end Ine . Next, we implement the rolling
down procedure in the remaining set. Starting with the end point in the set,
this procedure is ﬁnished once the iteration reaches the origin of the set. In
Proposition 3.4, we show that the remaining capacity values after the two
sequential rolling capacity procedures compose the stayput region in the nth
terminal interval [Ino , I
n
e ]. We denote it as Sn and denote the origin and the
end of Sn as k
sn
o and k
sn
e : Sn = [k
sn
o , k
sn
e ].
Proposition 3.4. The rolling up and rolling down procedures eliminate all
non-stayput capacity values from the interval [Ino , I
n
e ].
Step 3. For a capacity k ∈ Sn, if the value of the objective func-
tion in equation (3.11) or (3.12) can be improved by adjusting k to an-
other stayput region Si 6=n, then k is a non-stayput value in the leader's
capacity space [ktjo , ktje ], i.e., k /∈ S[ktjo ,ktje ]. Proposition 3.5 shows that
whether k ∈ S[ktjo ,ktje ] can be eﬃciently determined by comparing k with
the upperbounds of Si, ∀i = 1, · · · , n − 1, and with the lowerbounds of Si,
∀i = n+1, · · · , N . Thus, in order to eliminate all non-stayput values from Sn,
∀n = 1, · · · , N , we apply the rolling up procedure in [ksie , ksne ], ∀i = 1, · · · , n−1
(see black solid lines in Figure 3.2), and apply the rolling down procedure in
[ksno , k
si
o ], ∀i = n + 1, · · · , N (see black dashed lines in Figure 3.2). For each
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i = 1, · · · , n − 1, the ith rolling up procedure starts with the ﬁrst iteration
interval [ksie , k
sn
o ] and stops at the jth iteration if kj ∈ Sr[ksie ,kj ], where [k
si
e , kj ]
is the jth iteration interval. For each i = n + 1, · · · , N , the (i − n)th rolling
down procedure starts with the ﬁrst iteration interval as [ksne , k
si
o ] and stops at
the jth iteration if kj ∈ Sr[kj ,ksio ], where [kj , k
si
o ] is the jth iteration interval.
Proposition 3.6 shows that these two stopping rules are suﬃcient for elim-
inating all non-stayput points in Sn. After cross-interval comparisons, the
remaining capacity values in each Sn compose the ﬁnal stayput region. We
represent the stayput region in ﬁrm j's ISD policy in period t as a function of
the opponent's immediate response policy, which is determined by its stayput
region in period t. In Theorem 3.2, we outline the decomposition method for
computing proactive ISD policies.
I
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o I
n−1
e
Ino I
n
e I
n+1
o I
n+1
e
n − 1th
terminal interval
nth
terminal interval
n + 1th
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o k
sn−1
e k
sn
o k
sn
e k
sn+1
o k
sn+1
e
Sn−1 Sn Sn+1 Sn+2
kLtl k
H
tl
(n − 1)st rolling up 1st rolling down
n + 2th
terminal interval
k
sn+2
o k
sn+2
e
I
n+2
o I
n+2
e
2nd rolling down
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the cross-interval comparison
Proposition 3.5. Given the stayput region in the ith terminal interval, Si =
[ksio , k
si
e ], if there exists a capacity value k1 > k
si
e satisfying k1 ∈ Sr[ksie ,k1] (or
k1 < k
si
o satisfying k1 ∈ Sr[k1,ksio ]), then k1 ∈ S[k2,k1] (or k1 ∈ S[k1,k2]), ∀k2 ∈ Si.
Proposition 3.6. Given the stayput region in the ith terminal interval, Si,
if there exists k1 ∈ Si and k0 < k1 such that k1 ∈ Sr[k0,k1] (or exists k0 > k1
such that k1 ∈ Sr[k1,k0]), then k2 ∈ S[k0,k2], ∀k2 : k1 < k2 ∈ Si (or k2 ∈ S[k2,k0],
∀k2 : k1 > k2 ∈ Si).
Theorem 3.2. Given Sti, kt−1i ∈ Kt−1i (i 6= j), and ωt ∈ Θ, the solution to
ﬁrm j's optimization problem in period t (see equation (3.11) or (3.12)) can be
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represented in the form of an ISD policy. The stayput region Stj(Sti, kt−i, ωt),
can be derived by the Decomposition Algorithm.
Decomposition Alg. for computing ﬁrm j's stayput region in period t
1. Compute the range of the stayput region using equations (3.13) and
(3.14): Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]
= [kLtj , k
H
tj ]. Next, identify terminals in the range
Sr[ktjo ,ktje ]
and divide the range into separate terminal intervals. Assume
that there are N terminals and the range is divided into N terminal
intervals.
2. Use two sequential rolling capacity procedures to search for the optimal
solution set in each terminal interval. Denote the stayput region in the
nth terminal interval as Sn.
3. Eliminate all non-stayput values from Sn, ∀n = 1, · · · , N , through cross-
interval comparisons.
The remaining capacity values constitute ﬁrm j's stayput region in period t,
which is denoted as Stj(Sti, ωt) (i 6= j).
In Proposition 3.7, we prove that the decision rule indicated by an ISD
policy with multiple separate stayput intervals assigns a non-stayput capacity
value to the closest boundary of a close-by stayput interval. For a non-stayput
capacity that falls between two consecutive stayput intervals, Corollary 3.2
presents a decision rule which uses an investment threshold. This investment
threshold can be identiﬁed through a binary search.
Proposition 3.7. Given kt−1j = k and k /∈ Stj(Sti, kt−1i, ωt) (i 6= j), if the
optimal investment policy indicated by Stj(Sti, ωt) assigns ktj = b, then no
stayput values exist in the interval [k, b), ∀k < b, or in the interval (b, k],
∀k > b. In other words, the interval [k, b) or (b, k] * Stj(Sti, kt−1i, ωt).
Corollary 3.2. Given two consecutive stayput intervals, [kL1, kH1] and [kL2, kH2],
there exists an investment threshold k, kH1 ≤ k ≤ kL2, such that the optimal
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investment policy assigns all capacity in (kH1, k) to be adjusted downwards to
the upperbound of the lower stayput interval (i.e., kH1) and assigns all capac-
ity in (k, kL2) to be adjusted upwards to the lowerbound of the higher stayput
interval (i.e., kL2). If kH1 < k < kL2, there is no diﬀerence between adjusting
k to the closet boundary of either close-by interval.
3.7 Case study on the container shipping market
We ﬁrst use data from the container shipping market to determine the optimal
ISD investment strategies for a leader and a follower in all four cases, i.e., (a)
stayput, (b) adversarial, (c) optimal, and (d) reactive. We then compare the
results with the two players' capacity investments in practice. Second, we
reveal the underlying structures of the capacity strategies in the four cases
and compare the advantages of the strategies. Last, based on our results, we
draw several implications for investors in a competitive market.
3.7.1 Optimal ISD investment strategies in the container ship-
ping market
We use the demand and supply data of the container shipping market over a
timespan of 16 years (2000-2015). To avoid the border eﬀect in a long-term
strategy, we extend the timespan to 2017, i.e., Γ = {1, · · · , 18}. Maersk and
MSC, which are ranked as the ﬁrst and second liner operators based on their
ﬂeet capacity (Alphaliner, 2017), are chosen as the leader and the follower. At
the beginning of each year, ﬁrms observe the current demand and predict the
demand growth of this year. In order to mitigate the risk, a demand forecast
consists of several future scenarios with diﬀerent probabilities, each of which
takes into account the forecast error to a varying degree. We use a categorical
distribution as an approximation of a normal distribution to represent the
demand scenario forecast. At the beginning of 2000, the ﬁrst observed demand
ω1 is set as 1. For each t ∈ Γ, ωt+1 evolves according to the transition rule
in equation 3.17: The transition probabilities, pr, are taken from the Z-score
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ωt+1 =

ωt × (1 + µt + 2σt) with pr = 2.28%
ωt × (1 + µt + σt) with pr = 13.59%
ωt × (1 + µt) with pr = 68.26%
ωt × (1 + µt − σt) with pr = 13.59%
ωt × (1 + µt − 2σt) with pr = 2.28%
(3.17)
Figure 3.3: Realized demand growth path µ
′
t
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table. µt is the forecast of the demand growth of period t and σt is the
forecast error in period t, which is the average discrepancy between all previous
forecasts µτ and the realized demand growths µ
′
τ , ∀τ = 1, · · · , t− 1. We use a
forecast deviation in the container shipping market of 5% as the ﬁrst forecast
error σ1. The values of µt and µ
′
t are the average values based on the two
half-yearly Clarkson Shipping Review and Outlook reports. We use the same
forecast of 2015 for the artiﬁcial years 2016 and 2017, i.e., µ18 = µ17 = µ16,
and assume a zero demand growth in 2016 and 2017, i.e., µ
′
18 = µ
′
17 = µ
′
16.
(Clarkson Research Services, 2000-2015b, 2000-2015a). Figure 3.3 shows the
demand growths in practice, i.e., µ
′
1, · · · , µ
′
18.
We keep supply and investment cost parameters constant throughout the
entire timespan. In each period, we present the capacity choices available to
both ﬁrms as discrete market share values, and thus capacity decisions can
be interpreted as changes in ﬁrms' respective market shares. An upper limit
of 19 is set to both ﬁrms' capacity spaces, due to the fact that an operator's
market share (based on its ﬂeet capacity) has never exceeded 19% to date
(Alphaliner, 2017). Both ﬁrms have the same set of capacity choices: Ktl =
Ktf = {0, 1, · · · , 19}, ∀t ∈ Γ. In period t ∈ {1, · · · , 15} (i.e., 2000-2014), the
realized capacity k
′
tj of Maersk and MSC are the end-of-year capacity, which
is extracted from the yearly UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport report
(UNCTAD, 2001-2015). We obtain the two liners's realized capacity at the
end of 2015 from Alphaliner (2015). At the beginning of 2000, the market
shares of Maersk and MSC were around 12% and 5%, i.e., k0l = k
′
0l = 12 and
k0f = k
′
0f = 5 (UNCTAD, 2000).
For simplicity, we assume that in each period t ∈ Γ, both ﬁrms' capac-
ity utilization parameters equal 1, i.e., atj = 1, and utilization cost functions
Htj(·) take the following form: if atjqtj ≤ ktj , Htj(qtj , ktj) = 0; otherwise,
Htj(qtj , ktj) = ∞. Since the freight rate ﬂuctuates heavily with capacity
investments of dominant ﬁrms in the shipping market, we use a linear market-
clearing price: qtj = ktj and pt = Pt(ktl, ktf , ωt) = α · ωt − ktl − ktf , ∀t ∈ Γ.
α > 0 is a given market parameter, representing the marginal impact of de-
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mand on price. We determine the value of α using the historical freight rates
(dollars per TEU), demand and supply data (both in thousand TEUs) on the
three major liner trade routes, i.e., transpaciﬁc, Europe-Asia, and transat-
lantic. Using the linear market-clearing price, the marginal demand impact
on freight rate ranged from 1.2 to 2.1 on the three routes at the beginning of
2000 (UNCTAD, 2001). We choose the average value of 1.5 as the marginal
demand eﬀect. However, since we use single-digit demand values (e.g., ω1 = 1)
and double-digit capacity choices (e.g., k0l = 12), we scale the marginal de-
mand eﬀect by multiplying it by 10 and thus set α = 15. As atj = 1 and
qtj = ktj , Htj(qtj , ktj) = 0. Therefore, ﬁrm j's operating proﬁt function is:
pitj(ktl, ktf , ωt) = (α ·ωt−ktl−ktf )×ktj , ∀t ∈ Γ. We use the same form for the
salvage value function, i.e., Fj(kT l, kTf , ωT+1) = (α ·ωT+1− kT l− kTf )× kTj .
Assumptions 3.1 and 3.3 are satisﬁed with these functions. In addition, as
pt < 0 is possible, a ﬁrm can have negative proﬁts for a period. This is con-
sistent with the common practice in the shipping industry, i.e., in order to
remain active in the market, shipping lines continue to operate even if they
are facing a loss. With this proﬁt function, the product price pt can be seen
as the marginal proﬁt of a unit capacity. A ﬁrm beneﬁts from all its capacity
if the marginal proﬁt of a unit capacity is positive, and suﬀers losses from all
its capacity if the marginal proﬁt is negative, i.e., if market supply exceeds
demand.
Based on the vessel prices in Maersk's container market weekly report
(Maersk, 2015), which states that the average second-hand vessel price is
$4, 837 per TEU and the average newbuilding vessel price is $10, 741 per
TEU, we set both ﬁrms' investment cost parameters as ctl = ctf = 10.7
and rtl = rtf = 4.8, ∀t ∈ Γ. Notice that these are not the prices of chang-
ing 1% market share, however, the diﬀerence between c and r represents the
investment irreversibility level in the container shipping market. We adopt
a discount rate of 0.89 as this value is frequently used by shipping ﬁrms to
calculate the present value of future earnings (Gullaksen, 2012; Greenwood
and Hanson, 2013).
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We compute the leader's and the follower's optimal value functions (see
equations (3.7) and (3.8)) using a backward induction method and in ech pe-
riod we determine a ﬁrm's optimal capacity based on its current capacity and
the corresponding ISD policy as discussed in Sections 3.5 and 3.6. Using the
same demand path as shown in Figure 3.3, the two players' optimal capac-
ity and proﬁts in the four cases are presented in Figure 3.4. In Figure 3.4a,
the red dashed line represents the leader's (Maersk) realized capacity, while
the green dashed line represents the follower's (MSC) realized capacity. The
ﬁgure shows that the realized capacity of the two liner operators is matched
by diﬀerent competitive strategies from the booming economy phase (t ≤ 8)
to the (post-)crisis phase (8 ≤ t ≤ 16). During the ﬁrst either periods, the
leader's realized capacity (ReL) is close to AL in terms of value and adjust-
ment pattern. Although the values of the follower's realized capacity (ReF )
are close to RF and OF, the adjustment pattern of ReF is more similar to AF.
The deviation between the values of AF and ReF results from the diﬀerence
in the ﬁrst period. During the later either periods, the realized capacity of the
two players is matched by OL and OF (or RL and RF ) in terms of value and
adjustment pattern. At the end of 2015 (t = 16), the capacity of the two liner
operators grew by 22.5% and 164%, respectively, reaching market shares of
14.7% and 13.2% (Alphaliner, 2015), which are best matched by OL and OF .
While the dominant players followed their respective competitive strategies,
other players were squeezed out of the market. Søndergaard and Eismark
(2012) reported that a large-scale consolidation in the shipping industry be-
tween 2004 and 2011, e.g., the top ﬁve operators increased their total market
share by 9.5%.
3.7.2 Underlying structures of the ISD strategies
Figure 3.5 shows the underlying structures of investment strategies in the
four cases. Abbreviations are used to refer to a player in a speciﬁc case,
e.g., the leader (L) in the stayput case (S ) is abbreviated as SL and the
follower (F ) in the stayput case (S ) is abbreviated as SF. The black, green, and
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(a) Capacity (b) Proﬁt
Figure 3.4: Optimal capacity and proﬁt of leader and follower
blue boxes indicate the ﬁrst, second, and third stayput intervals, respectively.
The purple crosses indicate the investment threshold between two consecutive
intervals. Note that all investment thresholds are located at a boundary of a
stayput interval in our example. According to Corollary 3.2, capacity below
the threshold should be adjusted downward to the upperbound of the lower
interval, and capacity above the threshold should be adjusted upward to the
lowerbound of the upper interval. In this example, only AL at t = 12 has a
third interval, and all the second and third intervals contain only one value,
thus showing as a single line. In each subﬁgure, the red solid line depicts
the optimal capacity of the leader and the follower in the corresponding case
(same as the optimal capacity in Figure 3.4a). Taking subﬁgure (a) SL as an
example, at the beginning of period 4 with k3l = 9, the leader's stayput region
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in this period contains two intervals: {9, 9} and {11, 11}, with a threshold at
11. Hence, it is optimal for the leader to stay put at its current capacity, i.e.,
k4l = 9. If k3l = 10, the optimal decision in period 4 is then k
∗
4l = 11.
As discussed in previous sections, proactive thinking leads a player (e.g.,
SL) to have separate stayput intervals that correspond to the opponent's re-
sponses. An ISD policy with multiple short intervals is highly responsive to
the opponent's strategy. In Figure 3.5, comparing subﬁgure (a)-(d) with (e)-
(h), the leader has more and shorter stayput intervals in each period than the
follower. The diﬀerence between the two players' stayput intervals is especially
obvious in the asymmetric cases (comparing case (a) with (e) and comparing
case (b) with (f)), where the leader possesses either a higher level of proactive
thinking (case (a)) or more eﬀective proactive thinking (case b). In our exam-
ple of demand paths and investment costs, a more proactive planning clearly
brings beneﬁts: in the asymmetric cases, the leader (SL and AL) holds more
capacity than the follower (SF and AF ) in each period. Here higher capacity
leads to more proﬁts (see Figure 3.4b). By adopting a proactive strategy, the
leader has more capacity and proﬁts in any proactive case (SL, AL and OL),
than in the reactive case (RL). It also means that the leader's ﬁrst mover
advantage is ampliﬁed only when adopting a proactive strategy in a long-term
investment race.
Figure 3.4a shows that the follower beneﬁts from responding proactively
to the leader's proactive strategy. If we compare the capacity of OF and AF
with the capacity of SF, we see that OF acquires a higher capacity than SF,
and the capacity of AF gradually surpasses the capacity of SF starting from
t = 8. Compared to SF, OF has multiple stayput intervals due to its proactive
thinking (see Figure 3.5), which lead to a higher capacity. In the adversarial
case where the follower has inaccurate information on the leader's strategy,
the follower still beneﬁts from proactive thinking as it constrains the leader's
strategy. Figure 3.5 shows that AL has larger intervals than SL, indicating
that the strategic responsiveness of AL is restrained. It also explains why AL
has lower capacity than SL (see Figure 3.4a).
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Figure 3.5: Stayput region of leader and follower
3.7.3 Managerial insights
It is crucial to act ﬁrst in the competition as the ﬁrst entrant usually gains a
competitive advantage through control of resources. However, our case study
shows that the key to success in a long-term investment race is to collect as
much information as possible on the competitor's strategy and plan invest-
ments proactively. Using the real industry data, we show that the leader can
gain up to 20.2% more proﬁts in 18 years when adopting a proactive strategy
(SL, AL, and OL), compared to when both players are reactive in the compe-
tition (RL). The follower can gain 30% more proﬁts if it responds proactively
to the leader's proactive strategy (OF ) rather than being reactive (SF ). Even
in the case where the follower has inaccurate information about the leader's
strategy, the follower can still gain approximately 3.6% more proﬁts by acting
3.7. CASE STUDY ON THE CONTAINER SHIPPING MARKET 65
proactively (AF ). Therefore, a general recommendation for competing ﬁrms is
to act proactively at the earliest opportunity and to make this visible
in the competition . The essence of a proactive strategy is for a ﬁrm to
realize that its actions can inﬂuence other ﬁrms' future plans. Regardless of
how accurately the ﬁrm knows its impact, if it is able to convey the message
that its strategy considers its rivals' potential responses, then the proactive
strategy serves as a credible threat. This may alter rivals' expectations of the
ﬁrm's future actions, and thereby induce them to take favorable actions, or
deter them from making harmful moves. Our method provides a useful tool
for both leader and follower ﬁrms to plan their long-term capacity investments
under competition. Based on our results, we formulate the following four steps
for achieving an eﬀective competitive investment strategy.
1. Find the most relevant competitor. The relevance of a competitor is
judged based on the impact of its capacity decisions on the product price.
In the example of the container shipping industry, a liner operator's most
relevant competitor is the shipping line that operates on the same routes
and has a similar ﬂeet size.
2. Set the competitive goal(s). A competitive goal is a ﬁrm's vision on
how its action will interact with the competitor's future capacity growth.
In general, there are three types of competitive goals: submissive, neu-
tral and aggressive. An appropriate competitive goal is set based on
the current market situation, i.e., demand (growth), the competitor's
capacity and costs. Our single-shot analysis shows that a high level of
investment irreversibility leads to a neutral goal, and that a low demand
value or high capacity level of the competitor suggest a more aggressive
goal. If the market is highly volatile, a ﬁrm should always make plans
for several feasible goals, which helps it cope better with the rapidly
changing market.
3. Identify good investment options for each competitive goal. Based
on the investment costs and the competitor's current capacity, a ﬁrm can
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identify good investment options for each competitive goal. Notice that
a good option for a speciﬁc goal may not exist. For instance, if the
competitor's current capacity is small or if the disinvestment unit price
is low, it may not be beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm to choose any investment
option which is suitable to an aggressive goal.
4. Find the best option by comparing options that are close to
the current capacity. An optimal ISD policy directs a ﬁrm's current
capacity to a close-by interval. This implies that when considering the
best investment plan, a ﬁrm should ﬁrst evaluate the competitive goal
and investment options that are easy to reach from the current position,
and later decide how much further it can use its competitive strength
based on the current investment costs. The approach of comparing close
plans is sensible as there could still be sizable economies to be gained
from adjusting the plan slightly, while overextending is highly risky.
Diﬀerent from a perfect market where investments are solely driven by
a ﬁrm's current capacity, demand and investment costs, dynamics in a com-
petitive market challenges ﬁrms to evaluate their options from a competitive
point of view. This means that a ﬁrm should consider the value of an action
in terms of the value of the opponent's response, i.e., whether it is beneﬁcial
to take a certain action to trigger a speciﬁc response. This may lead to some
non-obvious decisions in practice. For instance, holding more assets in
the competition may trigger investments, while having fewer assets
may trigger disinvestments. In some market positions, investing to reach a
higher market share can put oﬀ rivals' future investments and lead to a higher
proﬁt. In this situation, the optimal decision is to invest, even if the current
capacity is high. With a lower market share, it may be better to stay at the
current capacity or even fall back since the amount of investment required to
hold back rivals' investments may be so large that the plan is unrewarding.
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3.8 Conclusion
We study a competitive capacity investment problem under demand uncer-
tainty and derive the optimal strategy in the form of an ISD policy. Diﬀerent
from the majority of oligopoly capacity models in the literature, which focus
on a single-shot investment or timing of investment decisions only, we inves-
tigate a long-term problem where two ﬁrms sequentially adjust their capacity
in each period to respond to each other's decisions. Our focus is on the im-
pact of competition on the dynamics and attributes of a long-term strategy.
Moreover, by allowing ﬂexible capacity choices, our optimal strategy deter-
mines both the timing of capacity adjustments and the size of an optimal
investment. A ﬁrm can either proactively or reactively plan its investments.
We derive the reactive ISD policy in closed form and develop the Decomposi-
tion Algorithm to eﬃciently compute the proactive ISD policy in a long-term
setting.
We illustrate the optimal ISD investment strategies using long-term de-
tailed data from the container shipping market. Our results show that the
realized investments, which are questioned to be irrational decisions, followed
a competitive structure. In addition, ﬁrms' overinvestments during a market
downturn are also shown to be optimal according to their long-term strategies.
The 2008 global recession was the turning point when shipping lines, espe-
cially follower ﬁrms, changed their investment strategies. Our results show
that although both leader and follower ﬁrms adopted proactive strategies, the
follower had inaccurate information on the leader's strategy before 2008. Since
2008, the follower's proactive strategy utilizes full information on the leader's
future investments. An explanation could be that market downturns attract
extra attention on the leader's moves, making the leader's strategy transparent
to the follower. In our case study, the leader generally performs better than
the follower in terms of capacity and proﬁt, and the leader enhances its ﬁrst
mover advantage by adopting a proactive rather than a reactive competitive
strategy. The follower's best response to the leader's proactive strategy is also
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to be proactive. The reason why a proactive strategy brings more beneﬁts in
a long run is because it gives a ﬁrm strategic responsiveness to the opponent's
strategy. Despite the eﬀectiveness of a ﬁrm's proactive strategy, the ﬁrm can
beneﬁt from proactive thinking since it also restrains the responsiveness of the
opponent's strategy.
Our results provide insights into the structure of an optimal competitive
investment policy. We show that in a competitive investment environment,
the optimal proactive player deploys an SNA strategy, considering various
competitive goals (submissive, netural, aggresive). Therefore, a proactive ISD
policy can contain multiple separate stayput intervals, leading to a Multi-ISD
decision rule. We discover the core of a competitive strategy by revealing the
meanings behind diﬀerent stayput intervals. Investment in practice is complex.
The competition often involves more than two ﬁrms, and a third player can
adopt either a leader, follower, or mixed strategy. A direction for future
research is to investigate the optimal policy of the third player. Moreover,
ﬁrms can learn from previous experience and update their information on
the competitors' strategies, and thus their own strategies or the opponent's
strategy may change as time proceeds. Future research should address the
optimal structure of an evolving competitive investment strategy.
Chapter 4
Launching Next-Generation
Products (NGP) in a
Competitive Market
4.1 Introduction
The business environment today is characterized by increasing product vari-
ety and diversity in consumer taste. Successful product diﬀerentiation can
generate a ﬁrm proﬁt as the ﬁrm can cater better consumer wishes. Quality
is often the most distinct characteristic which diﬀerentiates a product from
other products. Therefore, an eﬀective diﬀerentiation strategy of a ﬁrm is to
provide a better version of an existing product in terms of quality. We refer
to this quality upgrade as a next-generation product (NGP). Christensen and
Raynor (2003) and Christensen et al. (2004) referred to NGP as a sustain-
ing innovation: "a new product that is better in the eyes of a ﬁrm's existing
customers". An NGP does not create new markets but only extends existing
ones with better values, allowing ﬁrms to compete against improved products
of other ﬁrms. An example of an NGP is the Intel Core i7 relative to the Intel
Core i5, where the new faster generation of processor is more attractive to
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most consumers. The improvements in an NGP can be incremental advances
or major breakthroughs. Successive generations of a product can also be in-
troduced by diﬀerent ﬁrms and the ﬁrm which satisﬁes consumer needs at the
right time can detract the market from the competitors (Schmidt and Druehl,
2008).
An NGP launch is a challenging and complex process. Research shows that
40% of product transitions have failed, and some have led to company failure
(Lee, 2002). Since consumers always desire a better product, an NGP directly
competes against a ﬁrm's own existing product and cannibalizes it, starting at
the high end of the market and diﬀusing downwards. The success of an NGP
depends on its quality and whether enough consumers appreciate a better
quality product and are willing to pay a suﬃciently higher price. Quality
can only improve over time and consumer taste is highly uncertain until the
very late stage of a new product development project. However, postponing
a product launch can lead to lost sales. Cohen et al. (1996) showed that
companies can lose 33% proﬁt if they ship products six months late. In the
history of NGP launches, "bad timing" is often mentioned as one of the main
reasons for NGP failure. For example, Microsoft Zune failed to compete with
Apple iPod mainly because it was launched ﬁve years later than iPod (Manjoo,
2012), whereas Microsoft SPOT Watch failed to compete with Apple Watch
because it was launched too early (Nguyen, 2016). HTC First (also known as
the Facebook phone) lost the battle against Samsung Galaxy S4 and market
researchers attribute this defeat to its launch timing, which is the same time
as Samsung (Cheng, 2013). Our research investigates the optimal NGP launch
timing, considering both consumer interest and ﬁrm competition.
We investigate two main capacity decisions of two competing ﬁrms dur-
ing an NGP launch: (1) when to build capacity for the NGP and (2) how to
optimally allocate the total available capacity to the two products. The ﬁrst
decision aims to balance the risks of premature entry (investing too early)
and the problems of missed opportunities (investing too late). Since the two
products diﬀer along an evolutionary feature, i.e., quality, they share the same
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production resource and the second capacity question is essentially a capacity
mix problem. In contrast to a standard product portfolio problem, in which
trade-oﬀs besides costs do not necessarily occur when building capacity for a
product, a capacity mix problem requires a ﬁrm to divide a single resource
among diﬀerent products. Here the trade-oﬀ is internal: allocating more ca-
pacity to the NGP means less capacity for the existing product. For instance,
during the launch of a new iPhone series, Apple gradually changes the existing
production lines that are used for previous iPhone series into manufacturing
the new series and eventually discontinues the aging series (Smith, 2016). As
pricing strategies depend on the available capacity of each product in the
portfolio, the capacity mix problem directly aﬀects a ﬁrm's total proﬁt.
We focus on the impact of a two-dimensional competition on a ﬁrm's opti-
mal timing for an NGP launch and the subsequent optimal capacity. The ﬁrst
dimension of competition is the internal competition between the NGP and
the existing product. For instance, due to consumer utility for product quality
and price, launching "too much" capacity of a far-advanced NGP may jeopar-
dize a currently proﬁtable product and decrease the price of the NGP. In an
ideal situation, a ﬁrm delays investment until consumer taste is clear and then
allocates its capacity to the two products. The second dimension of compe-
tition, which is the external competition between the two ﬁrms for their own
total proﬁt, makes waiting risky. In the duopoly, the early-moving ﬁrm may
have the ﬁrst-mover advantage. However, as consumer taste becomes clearer
over time and the quality could also improve later, the ﬁrst-mover faces two
potential risks. (1) If the ﬁrst-mover concentrated its capacity on the prod-
uct which later turns out to be less-favored by consumers than expected, the
late-comer can then seize the opportunity and reserve more capacity for the
favored product. (2) If product quality improved since the ﬁrst-mover's in-
vestment, the late-comer can provide a better quality NGP which outperforms
the NGP of the ﬁrst-mover, and can thus exclusively capture the highest-value
consumer segment.
Our research extends both the literature on new product development by
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incorporating the competition between the two ﬁrms and the literature on
capacity competition by considering evolutionary product innovation. In addi-
tion, we consider both demand uncertainty at the early stage and a potential
product quality upgrade at the late stage in the NGP launch decision. We
integrate these aspects of the NGP launch decision and show how it impacts
the dimensionality of the decision space and the outcomes. Our ﬁndings con-
tribute to both theory and practice in three ways. First, in a competitive
market with demand uncertainty, a ﬁrm's optimal timing for an NGP launch
should consider the trade-oﬀ between demand risk and competition. To mea-
sure the impact of demand risk in a speciﬁc market, a ﬁrm should measure the
correlation between the average consumer taste and the density of consumer
taste. A strong correlation indicates a large exposure to demand risk in the
market. Second, a ﬁrm's competitive advantage and disadvantage can be
evaluated based on a two-dimensional scale. The ﬁrst dimension measures its
competitor's gain from oﬀering the quality upgrade, and the second dimension
measures the ﬁrm's investment cost advantage over its competitor. A ﬁrm has
a competitive edge only if its cost advantage exceeds a certain threshold related
to its competitor's gain from oﬀering the quality upgrade, and this edge can
lead the ﬁrm to invest earlier than its competitor. Third, we distinguish two
non-exclusive situations of a ﬁrm: (1) a stand-still situation based on both
ﬁrms' competitive advantage and the exposure to demand risk, and (2) a risky
situation based on the ﬁrm's competitive advantage, the other ﬁrm's compet-
itive disadvantage, and the exposure to demand risk. We derive the optimal
investment strategy of the ﬁrm in each scenario: in a stand-still situation, the
ﬁrm should invest at the same time as its competitor; in a risky situation, the
ﬁrm should postpone the investment; otherwise, the ﬁrm should invest early.
4.2 Related literature
Our model belongs to strategical and tactical capacity investment models. It
is related to the extensive operations literature on this topic; see the com-
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prehensive review by Van Mieghem (2003). In addition, our work is closely
related to the economics literature on market entry timing and product portfo-
lio determination, and to the strategic management literature on new product
development.
At the strategic level, competitive capacity planning focuses on the ca-
pacity investment timing of competing ﬁrms and on the trade-oﬀ between
commitment and ﬂexibility. Each ﬁrm has an incentive to delay its invest-
ment until it receives more precise information about the proﬁtability of the
market, but if it does so it risks being preempted by its rival (Weeds, 2002;
Pacheco-de Almeida and Zemsky, 2003). Such a trade-oﬀ can lead two ex-ante
identical ﬁrms to asymmetric equilibria, in which one ﬁrm chooses a preemp-
tive strategy and the other follows a ﬂexible, wait-and-see strategy (Maggi,
1996). Swinney et al. (2011) analyzed the capacity investment timing deci-
sions of two competing ﬁrms with diﬀerent objectives: a start-up whose goal
is to maximize the probability of survival, and an established ﬁrm whose goal
is to maximize expected proﬁts. They found that when demand uncertainty
is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the start-up ﬁrm takes
the leadership and invests in capacity ﬁrst, while the established ﬁrm follows.
Models in this research stream consider a single product and focus on the
competition between ﬁrms for the product. However, a high degree of prod-
uct diversity has become the norm across all industries in recent years since
companies have found that oﬀering a diverse product portfolio is essential for
remaining competitive. Thus, competitive capacity planning models should
not only consider the competition between ﬁrms but also the trade-oﬀ between
products.
At the tactical level, competitive capacity planning focuses on capac-
ity expansion tactics related to the operational aspects of competing ﬁrms.
Anupindi and Jiang (2008) studied the eﬀect of production postponement on
two competing ﬁrms' capacity and pricing decisions, which are taken both
ex-ante and ex-post demand realization. They found ﬂexibility in production
beneﬁts both the ﬁrm and its customers by allowing the ﬁrm to increase ca-
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pacity and by keeping the price in a narrower range. Some existing tactical
capacity models consider a collection of products in a competitive market.
For example, Anand and Girotra (2007) and Kouvelis and Tian (2014) ana-
lyzed the value of delayed diﬀerentiation for a two-product portfolio problem
in a competitive market and demonstrated that the strategic eﬀects can sig-
niﬁcantly diminish the value of a production postponement strategy. These
models study a product mix problem, in which products compete for a ﬁnite
set of resources but do not consider the competition between products due to
consumer-driven substitution.
The literature on market entry timing typically considers the choice of
introducing an incrementally better, safe, new product early or a superior,
yet highly risky, product later. Bhaskaran and Ramachandran (2011) stud-
ied the technology performance vs. time-to-market trade-oﬀ in a competitive
setting, where two ﬁrms select technologies and invest in improving the suc-
cess probability of the riskier advanced technology if they decide to pursue it.
Kirshner et al. (2017) investigated a ﬁrm's optimal timing of upgrades for a
durable product in the presence of stochastic technology advancements. They
derived the optimal upgrade strategy as a threshold policy based on the level
of pent-up demand for their next-generation product. These studies focused
on R&D investment rather than on a ﬁrm's capacity investment. In contrast
to studies on product improvement and the introduction of improved prod-
ucts, researchers have also studied market entry from the low end through a
low-cost and low-quality version of the existing product. Pun and DeYong
(2017) studied how a manufacturer competes with a copycat who may enter
the market later by providing a low-cost version of the manufacturer's prod-
uct. They found that customers' strategic behaviors may negatively aﬀect the
copycat's proﬁt. Groznik and Heese (2010) studied store brand introductions
by two competing retailers who sell a national brand product. They found
that under a law that prohibits price discrimination, both retailers prefer a
store brand introduction by the competitor. The existing models on market
entry timing focus on the competition between ﬁrms which inﬁltrate diﬀerent
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ends of the market. However, they do not consider the competition between
ﬁrms in both low and high ends of the market or the optimal allocation of
their resources in these two market segments.
The literature on product portfolio studies the optimal inventory levels
and assortment for products under demand substitution. A number of papers
study such problems under stockout-based substitution, which means that
customers may substitute a similar product for their ﬁrst-choice product if
it is out of stock (Smith and Agrawal, 2000; Mahajan and Van Ryzin, 2001;
Netessine and Rudi, 2003; Honhon et al., 2010). Another stream of research
on product portfolio employs choice models and captures customer behavior
explicitly (Gaur and Honhon, 2006; Rusmevichientong et al., 2010, 2014). For
instance, Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004) studied a product assortment problem,
in which the probability of purchase for each product depends on the set
of products oﬀered. Lacourbe et al. (2009) examined the optimal product
portfolio for a monopolist ﬁrm in a market where consumers exhibit vertical
diﬀerentiation for product quality and horizontal diﬀerentiation for product
feature. The majority of existing product portfolio models only examine a
single-ﬁrm case and thus neglect the strategic eﬀect on ﬁrms' product portfolio
choices.
Selecting the right products to develop and managing risk in the develop-
ment process are critical challenges in new product development (NPD) and
have received considerable attention in the strategic management literature
on NPD. Christensen and Bower (1996) diﬀerentiated two types of product
innovation, i.e., sustaining and disruptive innovation, and used an example of
the disk drive industry to show that leading ﬁrms were successful in develop-
ing sustaining innovation, whereas entrant ﬁrms were successful in developing
disruptive innovation. Uncertainty is endemic to NPD in demand forecast and
performance of the new product. Ahmadi and Wang (1999) provided optimal
policies for allocating resources across various development phases to control
risk.
The aforementioned models on new product launch consider either the
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competition between two ﬁrms (in a market segment or at diﬀerent ends of a
market) or the competition between two products of a ﬁrm. However, they
do not investigate the impact of both dimensions of competition on a ﬁrm's
launch decision. In the competition, missed sales opportunity for either the
existing product or the NGP can be reaped by the competitor. The interaction
between the two dimensions of competition aﬀects a ﬁrm's NGP launch deci-
sion, diﬀerent from the impact of each dimension of competition separately.
Our research considers the competition between two ﬁrms in both low and high
ends of the market. The second limitation is that the existing models consider
either the trade-oﬀ between time-to-market and demand risk or the trade-oﬀ
between time-to-market and product quality. In practice, both trade-oﬀs exist
and aﬀect a ﬁrm's timing decision. Our research ﬁlls the gap by considering
an NGP launch problem in a competitive market with two investment stages:
consumer tastes are uncertain at the early stage and the product quality may
improve at the late stage.
4.3 The model
Two competing ﬁrms (indexed as x and y) sell a series of products in a market
where consumers recognize each product by its quality and price only. We
focus on evolutionary product innovation and capacity competition between
ﬁrms, rather than on a consumer's brand choice behavior. At the very be-
ginning, both ﬁrms sell a basic product which we denote as product B. As
time proceeds, both ﬁrms have the option to launch an advanced version of
the basic product, i.e., an NGP, which we denote as product A. We denote
quality level and price of product j as Sj > 0 and pj , j = B,A. By the
deﬁnition of an NGP, product A has a higher quality compared to product B,
i.e., 4S = SA−SB > 0. We adopt a standard vertical product diﬀerentiation
demand model in which all consumers prefer better quality products, but dif-
fer in their willingness to pay for the quality. That is to say, consumers have
unanimous assessment of the relative quality of diﬀerent products, but have
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heterogeneous taste for the same product. For instance, consumers agree that
airline business class is better than economy class, but diﬀer in how much
better they perceive it (and thus how much more they are willing to pay).
This demand structure resembles a form of consumer-driven substitution since
consumers may be induced to substitute a product for another product by a
pricing strategy.
We assume that a consumer's taste t follows a uniform distribution on
the interval [0, θ], where θ is the highest consumer taste and θ > 0. For
the purpose of analytical tractability, the uniform distribution is widely used
to model consumer taste, e.g., see Shi et al. (2013). Market research has
demonstrated that two indexes are critical when characterizing a market and
developing a product: the average consumer taste, and the density of consumer
taste which indicates heterogeneity in consumer taste (Keane and Wasi, 2013;
Shi et al., 2013). Given t ∼ U [0, θ], θ2 is the average consumer taste and 1θ is
the density of consumer taste. To capture the uncertainty in both indexes3,
we model the highest consumer taste θ as a continuous random variable with
positive support [θl, θu], known distribution function F , mean θ (the expected
average consumer taste is then θ2) and variance σ
2
θ . Given a consumer taste
t̂, the consumer utility (surplus) of buying product j with quality level Sj
and price pj is then uj = t̂Sj − pj . If a consumer does not buy any product,
his utility is zero. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of a product,
based on the principle of maximizing his individual utility. Along the interval
of consumer taste [0, θ], we derive two thresholds, tB and tA, at which a
consumer is indiﬀerent between buying the basic product and not buying any
product, and between buying the NGP and the basic product, respectively. In
other words, tBSB−pB = 0 and tASA−pA = tASB−pB. The total number of
consumers is N , which is assumed to be larger than the sum of the two ﬁrms'
total capacity. Let dj denote the number of consumers who purchase product
3If a consumer's taste follows a distribution other than a uniform distribution, we can
model the average consumer taste and the density of consumer taste as two stochastic
variables, each having a distribution function with known parameters.
78 CHAPTER 4. LAUNCHING NGPS IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
j = B,A, and let d0 denote the number of consumers who do not purchase
any product, respectively. Solving for tB and tA, we ﬁnd the following three
segments of consumers in Figure 4.1.
0 θtB tA
d0 = p
B
θSB
N dB =
SBpA−SApB
θSB(SA−SB)N dA = N − p
A−pB
θ(SA−SB)N
Figure 4.1: Three segments of consumers
According to equations of dB and dA in Figure 4.1, as the density of con-
sumer taste 1θ increases, the number of consumers who purchase the basic
product increases, and the number of consumers who purchase the NGP de-
creases. The sequence of events is depicted in Figure 4.2. Both ﬁrms decide
their own investment timing and the optimal capacity of each product. We
assume that each ﬁrm can invest in the NGP at only one of two times: either
early or late. We also assume that early investment is well before product
launch and that consumer taste in the NGP is still uncertain at that point,
i.e., θ is not yet realized. In contrast, late investment is suﬃciently close to
product launch so that all uncertainty in θ is eliminated. We refer to this initial
stage when both ﬁrms decide their own investment timing as the investment
timing game and refer to later stages when ﬁrms allocate capacity to the two
products at their own chosen investment time as the capacity subgame. There
are four possible pure strategy outcomes to the investment timing game: both
ﬁrms invest early, both ﬁrms wait until the late stage, and the two asymmetric
outcomes in which one ﬁrm invests early and the other ﬁrm invests late. The
abbreviations used to refer to the outcomes to the investment timing game
are depicted in Table 4.1. We assume that ﬁrms' timing decisions are cred-
ible and irreversible. Capacity investments in the capacity subgame are also
irreversible.
Denote the capacity of ﬁrm i for product j as kji , i = x, y and j = A,B.
We refer to the competitor of ﬁrm i as ﬁrm −i, −i = x, y. Denote the total
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Firm y early Firm y late
Firm x early (E,E) (E,L)
Firm x late (L,E) (L,L)
Table 4.1: The four possible strategies in the investment timing game
available capacity of ﬁrm i as ki, i.e., ki =
∑
j
kji , which is given and ﬁxed
throughout the whole game. At the beginning of the capacity subgame, the
total capacity of each ﬁrm is reserved exclusively for the basic product. Thus,
ﬁrm i's capacity mix problem can be interpreted to determine the optimal
capacity of the NGP, i.e., k∗Ai , and the capacity of the basic product is then
k∗Bi = ki − k∗Ai . Note that ﬁrms can also decide not to launch the NGP, i.e.,
k∗Ai = 0 or not to keep the basic product, i.e., k
∗A
i = ki. We assume that
capacity decisions are publicly observable. If ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i
invests late, then ﬁrm −i observes ﬁrm i's capacity level of the NGP at the
late stage before deciding its own capacity level. A ﬁrm's total investment
cost is linear in its amount of capacity reserved for the NGP. Deﬁne ﬁrm i's
investment cost function as Ci(k
A
i ) = c
A
i k
A
i , where c
A
i > 0 is ﬁrm i's cost for
one unit capacity of the NGP. We assume that the unit cost is quadratic in
quality level: cAi = i(S
A)2, where i > 0 and 2iS
A is ﬁrm i's marginal cost
of quality. It means that the unit investment cost increases at an increasing
rate as quality is improving.
After the capacity decisions, the price pj of product j is jointly set by the
two ﬁrms based on a capacity clearance pricing strategy. That is, the price pj
is set in order to sell all available capacity of product j. Joint capacity clearing
pricing is commonly used when modeling capacity competition between ﬁrms,
e.g., see Swinney et al. (2011). Denote the total capacity of product j as kj :
kj =
∑
i
kji .
∑
i
ki =
∑
j
kj < N . Setting dj = kj in equations dB and dA
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and solving for pj , we ﬁnd:
pB =
θ
N
SB(N − kB − kA) = θ
N
SB(N − ki − k−i) (4.1)
pA =
θ
N
(NSA − SAkA − SBkB) = θ
N
(
NSA −4S(kAi + kA−i)− SB(ki + k−i)
)
(4.2)
According to equations (4.1) and (4.2), both the price of the basic product
and the price of the NGP are increasing in θ and decreasing in a ﬁrm's NGP
capacity kAi . Note that in the case where k
A
i = k
A
−i = 0, the price of the NGP
still exists: pA = θSA − θN SB(ki + k−i) > 0. It means, if the quality of a
product is known to consumers, a price exists for this product even if it is
(temporarily) unavailable in the market.
Time
ki and s
j are exogenously
determined, i = x, y,
The timing game:
Firms commit to either early
or late capacity investment
The capacity subgame:
capacity portfolio decision at
the early stage
The highest consumer
taste θ is resolved
The capacity subgame:
capacity portfolio decision at
the late stage
Product prices
are realized
and j = A,B
Figure 4.2: The sequence of events for both ﬁrms
Since excess capacity is costly, we assume that ﬁrms produce up to their
maximum capacity or build the least capacity that they plan to use. In ad-
dition, the production cost can be considered as a fraction of the investment
cost. Thus, we assume the unit production cost is zero in our model. Let
pii(k
A
i , k
A
−i, θ) denote ﬁrm i's proﬁt function:
pii(k
A
i , k
A
−i, θ) =
∑
j
pjkji − cAi kAi = pB(ki − kAi ) + pAkAi − cAi kAi (4.3)
4.3. THE MODEL 81
Substituting pB and pA (equations (4.1) and (4.2)) into equation (4.3), ﬁrm
i's proﬁt function with given k̂A−i is: pii(k
A
i , k̂
A
−i, θ) =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) +
θ
N 4 S(N − k̂A−i − kAi )kAi − cAi kAi , which is concave in its own capacity kAi .
Setting
∂pii(k
A
i ,k̂
A
−i,θ)
∂kAi
= 0 and solving for kAi , ﬁrm i's best response function
is Ri(k̂A−i) =
N
2 −
k̂A−i
2 −
cAi
2θ4SN . We derive a suﬃcient condition on a ﬁrm's
total available capacity ki, which ensures it is suﬃciently large for the ﬁrm
to respond to any decision of the other ﬁrm for any given realization of θ:
ki ≥ maxθ,k̂A−i Ri(k̂
A
−i) =
N
2 (1−
cAi
θu4S ). To make our results interpretable, we
assume that a ﬁrm's best response function Ri(k̂A−i) speciﬁes a non-negative
capacity decision for any given realization of θ, and refer to this assumption
as the non-negativity assumption:
min
θ
Ri(k̂A−i) = min
θ
{N
2
− k̂
A
−i
2
− c
A
i
2θ4 SN} =
N
2
− k̂
A
−i
2
− c
A
i
2θl 4 SN ≥ 0
(4.4)
Existing capacity models and NPD research widely assume there is no
constraint on the total amount of capacity a ﬁrm can build, e.g., see Swinney
et al. (2011). Models considering a resource constraint study ex-post produc-
tion decisions under ﬁxed capacity. Our model considers a resource constraint
by investigating the optimal capacity allocation to the two products for a
ﬁxed total capacity. In contrast to the ﬁrst assumption, the non-negativity
assumption is not innocent. In Section 4.4.3, we relax this assumption and
consider a wide range of scenarios, in which it is possible for θ to be low such
that N2 −
k̂A−i
2 −
cAi
2θ4SN < 0. In this situation, the early ﬁrm can make a
loss if it invested in the NGP, whereas the late ﬁrm can avoid losses by de-
ciding not to invest. Under the non-negativity assumption, k∗Ai = 0 only if
Ri(k̂A−i) = 0. Without the non-negativity assumption, the decision not to in-
vest results from the fact that Ri(k̂A−i) < 0 (i.e., pii(k
A
i , ·) < pii(0, ·), ∀kAi > 0).
A ﬁrm's timing decision should include the possibility that if the ﬁrm itself or
its rival waits, the optimal decision after observing θ would be not to invest to
avoid losses. Although the possible strategies in the investment timing game
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will not change (see Table 4.1), relaxing the non-negativity assumption would
lead to ﬁve special outcomes which would inﬂuence a ﬁrm's investment timing
decision: (E,LN), (LN,E), (L,LN), (LN,L), and (LN,LN), where LN is
the abbreviation for the decision not to invest at the late stage.
In the capacity subgame, both ﬁrms decide their own capacity of the NGP
to maximize their own (expected) proﬁt. Given the competitor's capacity k̂A−i,
ﬁrm i's optimal expected proﬁt from early capacity investment is:
Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k̂A−i, θ)] =
max
kAi ≥0
E
[ θ
N
SBki(N − ki − k−i) + θ
N
4 S(N − k̂A−i − kAi )kAi − cAi kAi
]
(4.5)
If ﬁrm i invests late, it observes the realization of θ, and then decides on kAi
to maximize pii(k
A
i , k̂
A
−i, θ). Given the competitor's capacity k̂
A
−i, at the phase
of the investment timing game, ﬁrm i's optimal ex-ante expected proﬁt from
late capacity investment is:
El[pi∗i (kAi , k̂A−i, θ)] =
E
[
max
kAi ≥0
( θ
N
SBki(N − ki − k−i) + θ
N
4 S(N − k̂A−i − kAi )kAi − cAi kAi
)]
(4.6)
Lemma 4.1 lists the optimal proﬁt and optimal ex-ante proﬁt of a monop-
olist from the early and late investments. Comparing the optimal (ex-ante)
proﬁts, the optimal investment timing of a monopolist depends on the value
of 1− E(1θ )E(θ), which is the covariance between the average consumer taste
θ
2 and the density of consumer taste
1
θ : Cov(
θ
2 ,
1
θ ) = 1− E(θ)E(1θ ). Note that
E(1θ ) is also the inverse of the harmonic mean
4 of the highest consumer taste θ
and E(1θ ) >
1
E(θ) . Thus, Cov(
θ
2 ,
1
θ ) < 0. Since the total number of purchasing
consumers is ﬁxed, i.e., N − d0 =
∑
i
ki, and assuming ﬁxed product prices
4The harmonic mean is the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals. For
example, the harmonic mean of 1, 2, and 4 is 11
3
( 1
1
+ 1
2
+ 1
4
)
.
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pB and pA, the number of consumers who switch from purchasing the basic
product to the NGP is decreasing in the density of consumer taste 1θ . The
prices of both products are increasing in the average consumer taste θ2 . When
uncertainty exists in the average consumer taste and in the density of con-
sumer taste, both of which inﬂuence a ﬁrm's proﬁt, the correlation between
them indicates the exposure to demand risk in a market. The stronger5 the
correlation, the higher the exposure, since if one index has an extreme value,
the other index will also have an extreme value when the two indexes are
highly related. We refer to the exposure to demand risk as:
r = −Cov(θ
2
,
1
θ
) (4.7)
Lemma 4.1. If a monopolist with a total capacity km and unit investment
cost cAm for the NGP decides to invest at the early stage, its optimal NGP
capacity is k∗Am|e =
N
2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN and its optimal proﬁt is Ee[Π
∗
m(k
A
m, θ)] =
θ
N S
Bkm(N − km) + θ4S−c
A
m
2 × (N2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN). If it decides to invest at the late
stage, its optimal NGP capacity is k∗Am|l =
N
2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN , and its optimal ex-ante
proﬁt is El[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] = θN S
Bkm(N − km) + θ4S−c
A
m
2 × (N2 − c
A
m
24SNE(
1
θ )).
In Proposition 4.1, we derive the optimal investment timing of a monop-
olist. Because of uncertainty, i.e., r > 0, and no competition pressure, a
monopolist will always postpone its investment until uncertainty is resolved
(see Figure 4.3b). A similar result can also be found in Maggi (1996) for a
single-product investment problem.
Proposition 4.1. A monopolist will always invest late.
4.4 Optimal investment timing in the competition
In this section, we investigate the optimal investment timing of two competing
ﬁrms. In the competition, a ﬁrm decides whether to invest early or wait by
5Given σθ and σ 1
θ
, the strength of the correlation can then be illustrated by the coeﬃcient
of correlation ρ = Cov
σθσ 1
θ
.
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Impact of Competition
no firm has a
competitive edge
both firms invest
at the same time
firm i invests earlier
than the competitor
competitive edge
firm i has a
(a) Duopoly without uncertainty
Impact of Demand Risk
invest late
(b) Monopoly under uncer-
tainty
Figure 4.3: Impact of competition and demand risk on a ﬁrm's optimal in-
vestment timing
evaluating the impact of demand risk, which is based on the exposure to
demand risk and on the ﬁrst-mover advantage in the competition. In the
following four lemmas, we analyze the equilibrium strategy to each of the four
capacity subgames depicted in Table 4.1. According to Lemma 4.3, a ﬁrm that
invests late may have a higher NGP capacity than its competitor who invests
early, depending on the realization of the highest consumer taste θ, and the
cost diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms.
Lemma 4.2. If both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E), then the equilibrium ca-
pacity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N , and the equilibrium expected proﬁt is Ee[pi
∗
i (k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + (N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N)(
θ4S
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3 ), ∀i = x, y.
Lemma 4.3. If ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or
(L,E), then the equilibrium capacity is k∗Ai =
N
2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N and k
∗A
−i =
N
4 +
2cAi −cA−i
4θ4S N −
cA−i
2θ4SN . The equilibrium expected proﬁts are Ee[pi
∗
i (k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ)] =
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θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+(N2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N)(
θ4S
4 +
cA−i−2cAi
4 ) and El[pi
∗
−i(k
A
−i, k
∗A
i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N − ki − k−i) + θ4S16 N −
cA−i
4 N + (2c
A
i − cA−i)(N8 +
2cAi −5cA−i
16θ4S N) +
(cA−i)
2
44S NE(
1
θ ).
Lemma 4.4. If both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L), then the equilibrium capac-
ity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N , and the equilibrium expected proﬁt is El[pi
∗
i (k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki− k−i) + θ4S9 N + 29N(cA−i− 2cAi ) +
(cA−i−2cAi )2
94S NE(
1
θ ), ∀i = x, y.
To decide the optimal NGP capacity k∗Ai , ﬁrm i needs to balance price
premium pA − pB with the marginal proﬁt loss of capacity extension cAi −
∂pA
∂kAi
k∗Ai : p
A − pB = cAi − ∂p
A
∂kAi
k∗Ai (substituting equations (4.1), (4.2), and
∂pA
∂kAi
= − θ4SN into the best response function Ri(k̂A−i)). In the equilibrium
where both ﬁrms invest at the same time, the marginal proﬁt loss of both
companies are the same. We deﬁne indexMi in equation (4.8) to represent the
expected marginal proﬁt loss of ﬁrm i due to price elasticity at the equilibrium.
In the equilibrium strategy (E,E), the optimal NGP capacity of ﬁrm i is
k∗Ai =
N
θ4SMi and Mi + c
A
i = p
A − pB. Index Mi considers two dimensions
of competition: the ﬁrst dimension of measurement is the ﬁrm's gain from
oﬀering the quality upgrade, i.e., θ 4 S − cAi , and the second dimension of
measurement is the ﬁrm's cost disadvantage, i.e., cAi − cA−i. Bounded by the
non-negativity assumption in equation (4.4), Mi > 0.
Mi =
θ4 S − cAi − (cAi − cA−i)
3
> 0 (4.8)
In equation (4.9), we derive a condition which ensures that a ﬁrm's (ex-
ante) expected optimal NGP capacity is non-negative, i.e., E[k∗Ai ] ≥ 0. This
condition is a necessary condition for the non-negativity assumption in equa-
tion (4.4). The closed-form results in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 only hold under the
non-negativity assumption in equation (4.4). The equilibrium results in Fig-
ure 4.5 are therefore bounded by the necessary condition in equation (4.9). In
Section 4.4.3, we relax the non-negativity assumption and investigate a ﬁrm's
optimal investment timing under a wide range of scenarios (See closed-form
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results in Appendix B). In Section 4.4.1 below, we ﬁrst investigate a ﬁrm's
optimal investment timing in the competition with no demand uncertainty,
then in Section 4.4.2 we incorporate uncertainty.
θ4 S ≥ max{2cA−i × (1 + r) + cA−i − 2cAi , (2cA−i − cAi )× (1 + r),∀i = x, y}
(4.9)
4.4.1 Optimal competitive investment timing with no uncer-
tainty
To compare with the analysis in Section 4.4.2, we assume that the highest
consumer taste is θ when no uncertainty exists. Comparing a ﬁrm's marginal
proﬁt loss Mi and its cost disadvantage c
A
i − cA−i, Theorem 4.1 illustrates the
equilibria of two competing ﬁrms to a timing game with no demand uncer-
tainty. The results show that the equilibrium strategy (L,L) will not exist in
such a situation. Obviously, when no uncertainty exists in the market, there
is no incentive for both ﬁrms to wait. With no demand uncertainty, a ﬁrm's
optimal investment timing depends only on the impact of competition.
Theorem 4.1. In the competition with no demand uncertainty, the following
pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing game exist:
1. If Mi >
1
7(c
A
i − cA−i), ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. If M−i ≤ 17(cA−i− cAi ), then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late.
Based on Theorem 4.1, we deﬁne two types of competition impact in equa-
tions (4.10) and (4.11), based on which ﬁrm has a competitive edge. The
equilibrium strategy of the two ﬁrms then depends on the type of competi-
tion impact: if neither ﬁrm has a competitive edge, both ﬁrms invest at the
same time; if ﬁrm i has a competitive edge, it invests earlier than the com-
petitor. Figure 4.3a presents the ﬂowchart for determining the optimal invest-
ment timing of a ﬁrm in the competition with no demand uncertainty. The
two types of competition impact are exclusive and cover the entire parameter
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space which satisﬁes the non-negativity assumption in equation (4.4). If ﬁrm
i has a competitive edge, the other ﬁrm −i has: (cAi − cA−i) < 0 ≤
7(θ4S−cA−i)
17 ,
thusMi >
1
7(c
A
i −cA−i), which implies that ﬁrm −i does not have a competitive
edge.
If Mi >
1
7
(cAi − cA−i) ∀i = x, y, no ﬁrm has a competitive edge (4.10)
If M−i ≤ 1
7
(cA−i − cAi ), ﬁrm i has a competitive edge (4.11)
As shown in equation (4.11), a cost advantage does not directly translate
into a competitive edge. A ﬁrm has a competitive edge only if its cost advantage
cA−i−cAi exceeds a certain threshold related to its competitor's marginal proﬁt
loss M−i. Since index Mi can also be interpreted as the two dimensions of
competition, the deﬁnition in equation (4.11) means that only when a ﬁrm's
cost advantage exceeds a certain threshold related to its competitor's gain from
oﬀering the quality upgrade, the ﬁrm has a competitive edge. Index M−i also
indicates the degree of ﬁrm i's competitive advantage regardless of whether it
has a competitive edge according to equation (4.11): a smaller value of M−i
indicates a larger competitive advantage. By the same token, we evaluate the
degree of ﬁrm i's competitive disadvantage by the value of M−i− 17(cA−i− cAi ):
a larger value ofM−i− 17(cA−i−cAi ) indicates a larger competitive disadvantage.
Given ﬁxed θ 4 S and cAi , the value of M−i negatively inﬂuences the value
of Mi and the value of Mi − 17(cAi − cA−i). In other words, if a ﬁrm has a
small competitive advantage, the competitor will have a small competitive
disadvantage, and vice versa.
4.4.2 Optimal competitive investment timing under uncer-
tainty
If there is uncertainty in the highest consumer taste θ at the phase of the
timing game, a ﬁrm decides its optimal investment timing by evaluating the
competitive advantageM−i and disadvantageM−i− 17(cA−i− cAi ) of both ﬁrms
and the impact of demand risk r. Using the results in Lemmas 4.2 to 4.4
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and comparing a ﬁrm's proﬁt in diﬀerent equilibrium strategies, Theorem 4.2
describes all the possible equilibria of two competing ﬁrms to the timing game.
Theorem 4.2. The following pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing
game exist:
1. If M−i ×
(
Mi − 17(cAi − cA−i)
)
> 47r ×
(
cAi
)2
, ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms
invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. If
(
Mi
)2
> 89r ×
(
cA−i − 2cAi
)2
and Mi ×
(
M−i − 17(cA−i − cAi )
)
≤ 47r ×(
cA−i
)2
, then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or
(L,E).
3. If
(
M−i
)2 ≤ 89r × (cAi − 2cA−i)2, ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest late,
i.e., (L,L).
In Theorem 4.2, we notice that the equilibrium regions are not exhaustive
in covering the parameter space, nor are they mutually exclusive. In all, there
are seven potential equilibrium regions to the timing game: one region for
each pure strategy equilibrium (E,E), (E,L), (L,E), (L,L); one region in
which (E,E) and (L,L) are both possible; one region in which (E,L) and
(L,E) are both possible; and one region in which no equilibria exist. It may
also be the case that some regions do not exist, depending on the parameter
values.
According to the condition of each equilibrium strategy in Theorem 4.2,
if no ﬁrm is expected to have a competitive edge (see equation (4.10)), the
optimal equilibrium strategy could be any of the four strategies. If ﬁrm i
is expected to have a competitive edge, i.e., M−i < 17(c
A
−i − cAi ) (see equation
(4.11) and thus
(
M−i− 17(cA−i−cAi )
)
×Mi < 0, the equilibrium strategy (E,E)
will not exist, but the optimal equilibrium strategy could be any of the other
three, i.e., (E,L), (L,E), or (L,L). This indicates that if there is demand
uncertainty, evaluating the type of competition impact alone is not enough
to determine the optimal investment timing of a ﬁrm. Based on a ﬁrm's
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competitive advantage and disadvantage i.e., Mi and Mi − 17(cAi − cA−i), and
the impact of demand risk, which is is measured by the exposure to demand
risk, i.e., r, and the investment cost or the cost diﬀerence between the two
ﬁrms, i.e., cAi or c
A
−i − 2cAi , we identify the following two situations:
If Mi ≤ 2
3
√
2r × |cA−i − 2cAi | ∀i = x, y, both ﬁrms are in a stand-still situation
(4.12)
If M−i ×
(
Mi − 1
7
(cAi − cA−i)
)
≤ 4
7
r × (cAi )2, ﬁrm i is in a risky situation
(4.13)
The two situations deﬁned above are non-exclusive to each other, which
means that a ﬁrm can be in a stand-still situation as well as in a risky situ-
ation. In addition, both ﬁrms can be in a risky situation and a ﬁrm can be
in neither situation. A stand-still situation is evaluated based on both ﬁrms'
competitive advantage and the exposure to demand risk. A risky situation
is evaluated based on a ﬁrm's competitive advantage, the other ﬁrm's com-
petitive disadvantage, and the exposure to demand risk. If there is a large
exposure to demand risk, (i.e., a large value of r), a ﬁrm would be in both a
stand-still situation and a risky situation, indicating that its competitive ad-
vantage is insuﬃcient to hedge the impact of demand risk. Both ﬁrms would
be in a stand-still situation if the values of Mi and M−i are comparable, i.e.,
the two ﬁrms are expected to have similar competitive advantage. If the com-
petitor is expected to have a competitive edge according to the criterion in
equation (4.10), then ﬁrm i is in a risky situation. If the competitor does not
have a competitive edge, ﬁrm i can still be in a risky situation if the values of
M−i andMi− 17(cAi −cA−i) are comparable, i.e., ﬁrm i's competitive advantage
is comparable to the other ﬁrm's competitive disadvantage.
Based on Theorem 2 and the conditions deﬁned in equations (4.12) and
(4.13), we present a ﬂowchart in Figure 4.4 showing how to determine the
optimal equilibrium strategy of the two ﬁrms competing under demand un-
certainty. For instance, in a market where no ﬁrm is expected to have a
competitive edge and both ﬁrms are in a stand-still situation, if any ﬁrm is in
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(L,L) (E,E)
and (L,L)
firm i
invests later
(E,E) (L,L) firm i
invests later
if any firm is in
risky situation
no firm is in
risky situation
no firm is in
risky situation
if firm i is in
risky situation
not stand-stillstand-still
stand-still
situation
not stand-still firm i is in
risky situation
no firm has
a competitive edge
firm -i has
a competitive edge
than firm −i
situation
situation
Figure 4.4: The optimal equilibrium strategy in the competition with demand
uncertainty
a risky situation, they will both invest late, i.e., (L,L); otherwise, they will in-
vest at the same time, i.e., both (E,E) and (L,L) can exist. According to the
ﬂowchart, the optimal investment timing of a ﬁrm depends on its situation:
• If the ﬁrm is in a stand-still situation, it should invest at the same time
as its competitor;
• If the ﬁrm is in a risky situation, it should postpone its investment;
• If the ﬁrm is in neither stand-still nor risky situation, the ﬁrm should
invest early.
Figure 4.5 shows an example of the equilibrium regions described in The-
orem 4.2. The speciﬁcation of parameters is listed in the box. Set γ =
y
x
,
indicating the cost ratio between ﬁrm y and ﬁrm x. The x-axis represents the
value of γ: when γ < 1, the low-cost ﬁrm is ﬁrm y; when γ > 1, the low-cost
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θ = 9,
SB = 1, SA = 2
x = 1
a: equation (12) with i = x
b: equation (12) with i = y
c: equation (13) with i = x
d: equation (13) with i = y
Figure 4.5: Equilibria to the investment timing game
ﬁrm is ﬁrm x. The y-axis represents the value of r, i.e., the exposure to de-
mand risk. Given γ, we only depict equilibrium regions in an example of the
parameter space where the value of r meets the assumption in equation (4.9).
The white area in Figure 4.5 is the area where the assumption is not met. The
regions of equilibrium strategies (E,E), (E,L), (L,E), and (L,L) are colored
in cyan (light blue), red, blue, and green, respectively. The area colored in
gradient green is a mix-strategy region of (E,E) and (L,L). Equations (4.12)
and (4.13) are shown as the dashed line a− d (see details in the speciﬁcation
box). We validate the decision rule in the ﬂowchart: (1) the area above the
dashed lines a and b is where both ﬁrms are in a stand-still situation, thus
they should invest at the same time; (2) the area above the dashed line c is
where ﬁrm x is in a risky situation, thus it should wait; (3) the area above the
dashed line d is where ﬁrm y is in a risky situation, thus it should wait; (4)
the area below the dashed lines a and c is where ﬁrm x is in neither situation,
thus it should invest early; (5) the area below the dashed lines b and d is where
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ﬁrm y is in neither situation, thus it should invest early.
4.4.3 Optimal competitive investment timing without the non-
negativity assumption
Without the non-negativity assumption in equation (4.4), ﬁrm i that invests
late will choose not to launch the NGP if its best response to the other ﬁrm's
capacity k̂A−i and the realized θ is negative, i.e.,
N
2 −
k̂A−i
2 −
cAi
2θ4SN < 0. There-
fore, if any ﬁrm decides to invest late, both ﬁrms need to consider the proba-
bility that the late ﬁrm will not invest. This decision not to invest should be
considered diﬀerently from the optimal capacity using the best response func-
tion Ri(k̂A−i). In Appendix B, we present the analysis for the investment timing
game without the non-negativity assumption. The main results in Sections
4.4.1 and 4.4.2 still hold, e.g., a ﬁrm's optimal competitive investment timing
depends on the trade-oﬀ between the impact of demand risk and the impact of
competition, which is evaluated based on the two dimensions of competition.
Relaxing the non-negativity assumption causes a higher probability that the
realized consumer taste will be unfavorable to a launch decision, thus, more
likely that both ﬁrms will wait until the uncertainty is resolved.
4.5 When quality of the NGP may improve later
In this section, we incorporate another feature of an NGP launch, that is,
a ﬁrm that invests late may launch an NGP with a better quality than the
NGP of a ﬁrm that invest early. We refer to the improved NGP as A+ and
j = B,A,A+. We consider the scenario where NGPs are provided by a third-
party institute, e.g., a research lab, and the R&D process is independent of
the capacity decisions of the two ﬁrms. We assume that with probability
pr, the quality of the NGP will improve to SA
+
(> SA) at the late stage;
with probability 1 − pr, the quality remains SA. Thus, if a ﬁrm decides to
wait, it may receive an NGP with quality SA
+
to invest and launch to the
market. The sequence of both ﬁrms' timing and capacity decisions remains the
4.5. WHEN QUALITY OF THE NGP MAY IMPROVE LATER 93
same. The summary can be found in Figure 4.6. Compared to the previous
sequence of events (see Figure 4.2), the diﬀerences in the new timeline are
colored in red. The potential quality improvement does not inﬂuence the two
ﬁrms' capacity and proﬁt outcomes if both decide to invest early. Thus, the
equilibrium capacity and expected proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in the subgame
(E,E) are the same as in Lemma 4.2. In (E,L) and (L,E): with probability
pr, three products with quality levels SB, SA, and SA
+
, exist; with probability
1 − pr, only the basic product and the NGP with quality level SA exist. In
the subgame (L,L): with probability pr, the basic product and the NGP with
quality level SA
+
exist; with probability 1 − pr, the basic product and the
NGP with quality level SA exist.
Time
ki, s
j, pr are exogenously
determined
The timing game:
Firms commit to either early
or late capacity investment
The capacity subgame:
capacity portfolio decision at
the early stage, kAi
Uncertainty in θ is resolved
The capacity subgame:
capacity portfolio decision at
the late stage, kAi or k
A+
i
Product prices
are realizedWith prob. pr, sA+ is achieved
With prob. 1− pr, sA remains
Figure 4.6: The sequence of events
Set 4S+ = SA+ − SA and S = 4S +4S+. Proposition 4.2 characterizes
the optimal investment timing of a monopolist. The impact of demand risk
is measured by r ×
(
(1 − pr)(cAm)2 + 4SS pr(cA
+
m )
2
)
, where (1 − pr)(cAm)2 +
4S
S pr(c
A+
m )
2 indicates the expected investment cost of the NGP. Diﬀerent from
the previous result where a monopolist will always postpone its investment
until the uncertainty is resolved (see Proposition 4.1), when product quality
could improve later, there are some situations where a monopolist is better oﬀ
investing early. This is because the unit investment cost is convex in product
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quality, i.e., cji = i(S
j)2. If 4S+ is very large, oﬀering the NGP with quality
SA may be better than oﬀering one with SA
+
. pr ×
(
4S
S c
A+
m (θS − cA
+
m ) −
cAm(θ4 S − cAm)− θ4 S
(
θ4 S+ − (cA+m − cAm)
))
represents the expected loss
due to launching the A+ instead of A. Thus, the economic interpretation of a
monopolist's optimal investment timing is: a monopolist should invest early
if and only if the expected loss exceeds the impact of demand risk due to
launching a more advanced NGP.
Proposition 4.2. For a monopolist with unit investment costs cAm and c
A+
m
for A and A+: if r ×
(
(1 − pr)(cAm)2 + 4SS pr(cA
+
m )
2
)
< pr ×
(
4S
S c
A+
m (θS −
cA
+
m ) − cAm(θ4 S − cAm) − θ4 S
(
θ4 S+ − (cA+m − cAm)
))
, it will invest early;
otherwise, it will invest late.
Lemma 4.5. If ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or
(L,E), then the equilibrium capacity is k∗Ai =
N
2θ(4S+4S4S+
S
pr)
×MAorA+i and
k∗A−i =
N
2 −
cA−iN
2θ4S−
k∗Ai
2 or k
∗A+
−i =
N
2 −
cA
+
−i N
2θS −
4Sk∗Ai
2S . The equilibrium expected
proﬁts are Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k∗Aor∗A
+
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+ (M
AorA+
i )
2Ns
8θ4S(s+4S+pr) and
El[pi∗−i(kAorA
+
−i , k
∗A
i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N −ki−k−i) + N4 E(1θ )[ 14S (1− pr)(cA−i)2 +
1
Spr(c
A+
−i )
2] + (1 − pr) N
θ4S (
θ4S
2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)( θ4S2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− cA−i) +
pr N
θS
( θS2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)( θS2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− cA+−i ).
Lemma 4.6. If both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L), then the equilibrium ca-
pacity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N or k
∗A+
i =
N
3 +
cA
+
−i −2cA
+
i
3θS N , and the equilib-
rium expected proﬁt is El[pi∗i (kAorA
+
i , k
∗Aor∗A+
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) +
Nθ
9 (4S+pr4S+) + 29N
(
(1−pr)(cA−i−2cAi ) +pr(cA
+
−i −2cA
+
i )
)
+ N9
(
1
4S (1−
pr)(cA−i − 2cAi )2 + 1Spr(cA
+
−i − 2cA
+
i )
2
)
E(1θ ), ∀i = x, y.
Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6 describe the equilibrium capacity and expected proﬁts
of the two ﬁrms in the subgames (E,L), (L,E), and (L,L). Similar to Mi
(see equation (4.8)), we deﬁne index MAorA
+
i for the situation when ﬁrm i
invests early and the competitor waits (thus, the investment cost of ﬁrm −i
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considers the probability of launching A+).
MAorA
+
i = θ4 S − cAi − (cAi − (1− pr)cA−i −
4S
S
prcA
+
−i ) (4.14)
To ensure that the expected optimal NGP capacity of both ﬁrms in the
four subgames is non-negative, we make the following assumptions, which are
also the necessary conditions of the non-negativity assumption in equation
(4.4):
θ4 S ≥ max{2cAi − (1− pr)cA−i −
4S
S
prcA
+
−i , (2c
A
−i − cAi )(1 + r),
cA−i(1 + r) +
MAorA
+
i
2(1 + 4S
+
S pr)
,∀i = x, y}
(4.15)
θS ≥max{(2cA+−i − cA
+
i )(1 + r), c
A+
−i (1 + r) +
MAorA
+
i
2(1 + 4S
+
S pr)
,∀i = x, y}
(4.16)
Set cAorA
+
i = (1 − pr)(cAi )2 + 4SS pr(cA
+
i )
2 and cAorA
+
−i,i = (1 − pr)(2cAi −
cA−i)
2 + 4SS pr(2c
A+
i − cA
+
−i )
2. r × cAorA+i measures the impact of demand risk
on ﬁrm i, and r × cAorA+−i,i represents the impact of demand risk on ﬁrm i
considering the cost diﬀerence between the two ﬁrms. Theorem 4.3 describes
all the possible equilibria of two competing ﬁrms to the investment timing
game. Following a similar manner as in equations (4.12) and (4.13), we can
also deﬁne diﬀerent types of situations of a ﬁrm, based on the impact of
demand risk,M−i andMAorA
+
−i . Then the optimal investment timing of a ﬁrm
depends on its situation. Figure 4.7 presents an example of the equilibrium
strategy regions described in Theorem 4.3. The speciﬁcation of parameters is
listed in the box. Compared to the results in Figure 4.5, adding the trade-oﬀ
between time-to-market and quality upgrade does not change the majority
of our previous observations, but only expands the region of the equilibrium
strategy (L,L). This result is obvious since potential quality improvement at
the late stage makes waiting more appealing to both ﬁrms.
Theorem 4.3. The following pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing
game with potential quality improvement exist:
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1. If (1 + r) × cAorA+i ≤ 49M2−i − (1 − pr)(θ 4 S −
MAorA
+
−i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)(θ 4 S −
MAorA
+
−i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− 2cAi )− 4SS pr(θS −
MAorA
+
−i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)(θS − M
AorA+
−i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− 2cA+i ),
∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. If (1 + r) × cAorA+−i ≥ 49M2i − (1 − pr)(θ 4 S −
MAorA
+
i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)(θ 4 S −
MAorA
+
i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− 2cA−i)− 4SS pr(θS −
MAorA
+
i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)(θS − MAorA
+
i
2(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− 2cA+−i )
and (1 + r)× cAorA+−i,i ≤ 98 ×
(MAorA
+
i )
2
1+4S
+
S
pr
+ θ4S
(
(1− pr)(θ4S− 2M−i) +
pr(θS−2MA+−i )
)
, then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e.,
(E,L) or (L,E).
3. If (1 + r)× cAorA+−i,i ≥ 98 ×
(MAorA
+
i )
2
1+4S
+
S
pr
+ θ4 S
(
(1− pr)(θ4 S − 2M−i) +
pr(θS − 2MA+−i )
)
, ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L).
θ = 9,
SB = 1, SA = 2
x = 1
4S+ = 0.1, pr = 45%
Figure 4.7: Equilibria to the investment timing game with potential quality
improvement
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Managerial insights
A ﬁrm launching an NGP in a competitive market faces two major challenges.
Because consumers have varied and often uncertain tastes in a market, a ﬁrm's
ﬁrst challenge is therefore to evaluate the risk associated with demand uncer-
tainty for the NGP. To characterize a target market, companies should carry
out market research to measure the following two indexes: the average con-
sumer taste and the density of consumer taste. A high density of consumer
taste indicates that few consumers will switch from purchasing the basic prod-
uct to the NGP, whereas a high average consumer taste indicates that ﬁrms
can ask high prices for both the basic product and the NGP. When consumer
tastes are uncertain and the two consumer taste indexes are stochastic, our
results show that the ﬁrm should evaluate the exposure to demand risk, which
is measured by the correlation between the average consumer taste and the
density of consumer taste. The stronger the correlation, the higher the expo-
sure, since if one index has an extreme value, the other index will also have an
extreme value when the two indexes are highly related. Thus, it indicates a
large exposure to demand risk and a large impact of demand risk on ﬁrms in
the market. Although, in practice it is not straightforward to measure the cor-
relation, it may be measured based on realized consumer data from previous
product launches in the same market.
If exposure to demand risk is large, ﬁrms should postpone their invest-
ments until the uncertainty is resolved. However, a ﬁrm may hold a cost
advantage over its competitor. Our results show that a ﬁrm can use this cost
advantage to mitigate the impact of demand risk and thus invest earlier than
its competitor, beneﬁting from the ﬁrst-mover advantage. The second chal-
lenge a ﬁrm faces during an NGP launch is to evaluate to what extent its
cost advantage can be transferred into an advantage in the competition. We
show that a ﬁrm's competitive advantage and disadvantage can be measured
based on the competitor's gain from oﬀering the quality upgrade and its cost
advantage over the competitor. A ﬁrm has a competitive edge only if its cost
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advantage exceeds a certain threshold related to its competitor's gain from
oﬀering the quality upgrade, and this Edge can lead the ﬁrm to invest earlier.
To decide the optimal investment timing, a ﬁrm needs to consider the com-
petitive advantage and disadvantage of both ﬁrms. If the competitor has a
competitive edge, the ﬁrm will be in a risky situation and the best strategy is
to wait. In a market where no ﬁrm has a competitive edge, if a ﬁrm's competi-
tive advantage is comparable to the other ﬁrm's competitive disadvantage, the
ﬁrm would still be in a risky situation and thus it should wait. If both ﬁrms
have similar competitive advantage, they would be in a stand-still situation
and the best strategy is to invest at the same time as its competitor. If none
of the above holds, i.e., a ﬁrm is in neither a stand-still nor risky situation,
the best strategy is to invest early.
Table 4.2 lists three examples of failed NGPs. The ﬁrst example is Mi-
crosoft Zune, which is considered to be one of the decade's 10 biggest tech
launch failures. It was launched in 2006, but never passed the single-digit
market share in music players before it was discontinued in 2011 (McIntyre,
2009). There is little evidence that Zune was of low quality. In fact, its users
enjoyed the interface and audio quality just as much as, if not more than the
rival product, i.e., Apple iPod. Microsoft attributed the failure of Zune to
bad timing i.e., launching ﬁve years later than iPod. Microsoft had access to
as much hardware development expertise as any company in the world and
the capital to support a massive marketing budget for any new product. In
hindsight, Microsoft and Apple were in a stand-still situation at that time and
Microsoft's optimal investment timing should have been at the same time as
Apple's. It is worth comparing what Microsoft experienced with Zune to the
wrest between Windows PCs and Apple's Mac. As the two ﬁrms follow each
other's new model launches closely, the outcome of this battle is still unde-
termined. The second example of a failed NGP is HTC ﬁrst, which is also
known as the ﬁrst Facebook phone (Cheng, 2013). In the market of smart-
phones, Facebook did not have much advantage compared to other ﬂagship
phone manufacturers. In hindsight, Facebook was in a risky situation at the
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Table 4.2: Examples of failed NGPs and hindsight
Failed NGP Competitor's NGP Timing of Launch Exposure to Impact of Competitive Optimal Investing
(which succeeded) (comp. competitor) Demand Risk Competition Situation Timing
Microsoft Zune Apple iPod Later Moderate
No ﬁrm has
a competitive edge
Stand-still
Same time as
the competitor
Facebook phone Samsung Galaxy S4 Nearly the same time Moderate
The competitor has
a competitive edge
Risky Late
Microsoft SPOT Apple Watch Earlier Large
No ﬁrm has
a competitive edge
Stand-still
and Risky
Same time as
the competitor
and late
time and should have waited, instead of launching at nearly the same time as
Samsung. The third example is Microsoft SPOT Watch which was launched
too early (Nguyen, 2016). Consumers were not ready to embrace the concept
of a smartwatch at that time. The realized average consumer taste was too
low and the consumer taste density was too high, both leading to a ﬂopped
product. In hindsight, the exposure to demand risk was large when SPOT
was launched, and Microsoft was in both a stand-still and a risky situation.
Therefore, Microsoft should have waited, launching at the same time as the
competitor.
In addition to bad timing, there are many other reasons, such as quality
failure, why an NGP could fail. However, in order to avoid bad timing, a ﬁrm
must identify the type of competitive situation it is in, based on the exposure
to demand risk and the impact of competition.
4.6 Conclusion
We study an NGP launch problem for two ﬁrms competing in the same mar-
ket. The challenges of an early NGP launch include imperfect information on
consumer preference and immature R&D results, therefore bearing the risk of
insuﬃcient demand for the NGP. However, an early launch promises leader-
ship beneﬁts if the other ﬁrm chooses to wait and invests later. A late launch
bears the risk of becoming the market follower, but the ﬁrm beneﬁts from
complete demand information and from the possibility of improved product
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quality and hence the follower could provide a superior version of the leader's
next-generation product. Our results show that the optimal NGP investment
timing of a ﬁrm depends on the impact of demand risk and the impact of
competition. The former depends on the exposure to demand risk, which is
measured by the correlation between the average consumer taste and the den-
sity of consumer taste. The latter depends on the competition between the
two products and the competition between the two ﬁrms. In addition to de-
mand risk and competition, there are many other factors which can inﬂuence
the success of a product launch. For example, the strategic behavior of con-
sumers may lead a ﬁrm to postpone its new product launch. Moreover, our
research considers a situation where the new product is provided by a third
party. In practice, the new product is often owned by a ﬁrm who launches
it later. The ﬁrm can then decide whether to license the technology to the
competitor, which will inﬂuence the optimal NGP investment strategies of
both ﬁrms. Future research should take into account the existence of strategic
consumers and the possibility of technology licensing between ﬁrms.
Chapter 5
Combating Strategic
Cross-Border (CB)
Counterfeiters: Public and/or
Private Responsibility?
5.1 Introduction
In today's business world, ﬁrms often ﬁnd themselves in the thick of com-
petition. While healthy competition encourages ﬁrms to improve the quality
of goods and services they sell and create a wider choice for consumers, vi-
cious competition such as counterfeiting harms both legitimate business and
consumers. Counterfeiting in its broadest sense is deﬁned as "any manufac-
turing of a product which so closely imitates the appearance of the product of
another to mislead a consumer that it is the product of another" (Vithlani,
1998). The key elements of this deﬁnition are if the product is similar and
if there is deception of the consumer. Although it is diﬃcult to obtain accu-
rate statistics on counterfeiting because of the clandestine nature, it is widely
agreed that counterfeiting has become a prevalent issue in industries such as
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clothing, pharmaceutical, and spare-parts industries (Lewis, 2009; Stevenson
and Busby, 2015; Frontier Economics, 2016). According to a governmental
report prepared for the Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy
and the International Trademark Association, the value of international and
domestic trade in counterfeit and pirated goods in 2013 was estimated to be
$710 -$917 billion (Frontier Economics, 2016).
Not only counterfeiting hurts reputation and proﬁtability of legitimate
ﬁrms, but it also exposes unsuspecting consumers to ineﬀective and danger-
ous products. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that coun-
terfeits comprise 10-30% of drug sales in some developing countries and some
have estimated that one out of every hundred pharmaceuticals in the United
States is counterfeit (Teresko, 2008; Lewis, 2009; Frontier Economics, 2016).
According to the WHO, 1 million people die each year as a result of taking
counterfeit medicines (Wi¦cªawski, 2018).
Almost 70% of all counterfeits seized worldwide come from China (Tur-
nage, 2013) and other low-wage countries where intellectual property (IP)
protection is weak (Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009; Cai et al., 2010). It is
diﬃcult to obstruct counterfeiting activities in those countries due to cultural
and political reasons, however, it would be a plausible solution to hinder the
entrance of counterfeits into ﬁnal markets. Customs, as the entry point of
shipments of products to a market, plays a prominent role in ﬁghting against
counterfeiting. In 2016, EU Customs seized over 41 million fake goods at EU
borders (European Commission, 2017). Unfortunately, Customs cannot solve
the problem on its own. The eﬀectiveness of the Customs act against counter-
feiting depends on the information shared by the rights holders. If ﬁrms make
their supply chain and product related information visible to Customs, it could
be eﬀortless for Customs to thwart counterfeit products (Vithlani, 1998). In
recent years, we have seen a number of public-private partnerships (PPP),
in which information is shared between governmental authorities and private
enterprises, being formed to combat counterfeiting at the borders. A good
example is the cooperation agreement between the British American Tobacco
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(BAT) and the European Commission (EC) (BAT, 2010). This agreement
involves a $200 million investment of BAT in sharing intelligence, providing
expanded support and implementing far-reaching product-tracking procedures
to help EC and the law enforcement authorities of the Member States tackle
illicit tobacco trade (European Commission, 2010). In 2016, Alibaba formed a
task force together with the Chinese government, in which legitimate brands
can work proactively by tipping oﬀ the police and e-commerce ﬁrms to coun-
terfeiters (Chen et al., 2018). A PPP can also be initiated and funded by
governmental authorities. For example, in 2011 the World Customs Organi-
zation (WCO) developed the Interface Public Member (IPM) platform, i.e., an
online platform where rights holders can communicate brand operational data
to Customs oﬃcers, facilitating the identiﬁcation of counterfeit goods. This
tool is currently freely used by one third of the WCO Members (WCO, 2015).
Another example is the enforcement database (EDB), which is initiated by
the European Union Intellectual Property Oﬃce. Any IP rights holder can be
part of it by entering information about their products into the database, and
it then becomes available to enforcement authorities and helps them identify
counterfeits and take actions.
Enabling information sharing between diﬀerent parties requires infrastruc-
ture, which can be costly to build. For instance, ﬁrms can adopt blockchain
technology to enable Customs and related supply chain parties to exchange
and store information in encrypted format, however it requires the entire sup-
ply chain to revolutionize the information system. Therefore, an important
question is when forming a PPP as an anti-counterfeiting strategy,
which party should be responsible for the investment in the infor-
mation sharing infrastructure? Should it be the legitimate OEM as it
beneﬁts from removing counterfeits from the market, or the government as
the existence of counterfeits will bring societal challenges? In addition to the
PPP, legitimate ﬁrms can also resort to pricing to compete against counter-
feiters in the market. Our paper investigates the question how should a
legitimate ﬁrm combat counterfeiting. Should it join (or initiate) the
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PPP or rely solely on pricing? To address these questions, we consider two
types of counterfeits: non-deceptive and deceptive, where the diﬀerence is that
consumers can distinguish non-deceptive counterfeits from authentic products
at the time of purchase, while they cannot in the other case. Non-deceptive
counterfeits compete with authentic products on price and quality, whereas de-
ceptive counterfeits inﬁltrate the licit distribution channel of legitimate ﬁrms
and are sold as authentic products at the same price. We study the impact of
the type of counterfeits on a ﬁrm's anti-counterfeiting strategy, as well as the
strategy of the government.
We model the problem as a multi-stage game with three players, i.e., Cus-
toms, a legitimate OEM, and a counterfeiter. In the game, Customs de-
cides whether to initiate a PPP, i.e., whether to invest in the public-private
information-sharing mechanism, the OEM decides whether to join the PPP if
Customs has initiated it or initiate it if needed, and the counterfeiter decides
whether to disguise the nature of its shipments to escape the detection by
Customs. Deriving the optimal equilibrium strategy to the game, we ﬁrst
show that compared to the situation without any counterfeit, the existence
of non-deceptive counterfeits could lead the OEM to increase the price of au-
thentic products and earn more proﬁt if the PPP is formed. However, when
Customs does not bear the costs of information sharing, initiating the PPP by
the OEM on its own will lead the counterfeiter to increase its price and even
potentially capture a higher market share than the OEM. It possibly explains
why some legitimate manufacturers do not join such a partnership with the
government to combat counterfeiting. For instance, while there are almost
two million active federal trademark registrations and many more copyright
registrations that are eligible for enhanced protection against illicit imports,
only 32,000 or so have been recorded with US Customs and Border Protection
for border enforcement (Botts, 2014).
Second, we ﬁnd that in the non-deceptive case, the optimal equilibrium
strategy of each player depends on the damage to the society, the penalty to
the counterfeiter and the quality of counterfeits. When the damage to the
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society is below a certain threshold deﬁned as a function of the penalty to
the counterfeiter and the quality of counterfeits, Customs does not have the
incentive to initiate the PPP either because the penalty can already serve
as an eﬀective counterfeiting deterrence tool or because the damage to the
society when a counterfeit enters the market is minor. The government plays
an important role in initiating the partnership with private enterprises in the
ﬁght against non-deceptive counterfeiter. Because if Customs does not initiate
the PPP, the OEM will likely also choose not to initiate it, especially when
the penalty is either very large or very small. When the penalty is small,
the counterfeiter can still provide a low-price product even after paying the
penalty. Thus, to maintain a competitive price of authentic product, the OEM
may choose not to invest in the PPP. Besides the reason that large penalty is
eﬀective in deterring the entry of counterfeits, another reason why the OEM
will likely not initiate the PPP when the penalty is large is that under such a
condition, the counterfeiter will disguise even if the PPP is formed.
Third, we ﬁnd that the OEM should play a bigger role in initiating the
PPP to combat deceptive counterfeiting, compared to his role in the non-
deceptive case. The OEM could choose a higher price than that without any
counterfeit only if it initiates the PPP, and the market seize of the deceptive
counterfeiter is decreasing in the price of authentic products in such a situ-
ation. Lastly, we show that, unlike what the literature suggests, the entry
of non-deceptive counterfeits does not always improve consumer surplus. In
particular, when the quality of counterfeits exceeds a certain proportion of the
quality of authentic products, it could be better for consumers if the OEM
initiates the PPP to hinder the entry of counterfeits. In the deceptive case,
which party initiates the PPP could yield diﬀerent outcomes in terms of con-
sumer welfare: it could be better for consumers if Customs initiates the PPP,
compared to the situation where the OEM initiates the PPP. In addition,
when the quality of counterfeits is suﬃciently low, it is better for consumers
if the PPP is formed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents
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a literature review in related areas; In Section 5.3, we describe the detention
process of counterfeits at Customs and the PPP model between Customs and
the legitimate OEM; In Sections 5.4, we present the analysis for the multi-stage
model in the non-deceptive case; In Section 5.5, we explore the situation when
the counterfeiter is being deceptive and present results which are diﬀerent
from the non-deceptive case. Finally, we conclude our research in Section 5.6.
5.2 Related literature
Our paper relates to three streams of literature: the industrial organization
literature on entry deterrence, the marketing literature on consumer behav-
ior towards counterfeiting, and the operations literature on a ﬁrm's anti-
counterfeiting strategies, and on the competition between brand-name prod-
ucts and other alternatives.
Entry-deterrence models study the eﬀect of the incumbent's investment-
level decisions, e.g., pricing and advertising selections, on the entrant's proﬁt
(Srinivasan, 1991; Wilson, 1992) and the impact of the entrant's entry strate-
gies on the incumbent's proﬁt (Balachander, 2001). For the incumbent, the
most commonly used strategy to deter a proﬁtable entry is pricing. For in-
stance, Bagwell (2007) considered whether a privately informed incumbent
can deter proﬁtable entry by pricing below the monopoly price and increasing
its level of advertising. He showed that proﬁtable entry may be deterred if
the incumbent knows about the entrant's cost type and whether the entrant
is long- or short-termism. For the entrant, product quality is one of the most
important factors that determines the success of its entry. Balachander (2001)
considered a market with an incumbent, whose quality is known to consumers,
and an entrant, whose quality is unknown to consumers. The entrant signals
its quality to consumers through warranty. They showed that signaling be-
havior leads to an outcome where the less reliable product may carry the
longer warranty, which is consistent with the empirical phenomenon. Using
a game-theoretic model, Gao et al. (2016) considered a situation where the
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entrant is a copycat, whose products show physical resemblance to genuine
products of the incumbent. They showed that copycats with a high physical
resemblance but low product quality are more likely to successfully enter the
market by defying the pricing deterrence of the incumbent. To a certain ex-
tent, a counterfeiter is an entrant to an existing market. Our research relates
to entry-deterrence models in the sense that we study the eﬀect of the legit-
imate manufacturer's pricing on the counterfeiter's entry and the impact of
the quality of counterfeits on the manufacturer's optimal anti-counterfeiting
strategy. The existing entry-deterrence models see the entrant as a regular
competitor of the incumbent, and ignore legal aspects of the market entry.
However, these aspects are crucial in the case where the entrant free rides on
the incumbent's investments in research and product development to oﬀer a
comparable product at a cheaper price. Our research considers legal aspects
of counterfeiting and investigates anti-counterfeiting strategies which rely on
government acts.
The marketing literature on counterfeiting focuses on the demand side of
counterfeits. Often through empirical studies, they try to answer the question
why consumers purchase counterfeits (e.g., Hoon Ang et al. (2001); Eisend and
Schuchert-Güler (2006); Qian and Xie (2013)). Using results from a consumer
survey, Prendergast et al. (2002) found that quality is an important factor to
consumers who are apt to buy pirated goods and thus suggested brand man-
ufacturers ensure that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the authentic
product and the counterfeit. Using data from Chinese shoe companies, Qian
(2014) examines how counterfeits of various qualities aﬀect the consumer's
purchase decision. The study showed that fake products can beneﬁt a manu-
facturer of high-quality products during the early stage of brand development,
while a manufacturer of low-quality products would be severely aﬀected by the
existence of a counterfeiter. These marketing studies focus on non-deceptive
counterfeits, which consumers can distinguish from authentic products at the
time of purchase. The root of the non-deceptive counterfeiting problem stems
from the willingness of consumers to purchase fakes (Prendergast et al., 2002),
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thus the goal of this stream of research is to provide implications to policy
makers and legitimate manufacturers regarding how to educate consumers not
to purchase fakes. Our research considers both the non-deceptive and decep-
tive counterfeits, and we investigate how legitimate manufacturers can resort
to operations strategies to ﬁght against each type of counterfeits.
The operations literature links the counterfeiting risk to operations issues
such as supplier involvement in new product development (Handﬁeld et al.,
1999; Parker et al., 2008), oﬀ-shore outsourcing (Choi et al., 2004; Chopra and
Sodhi, 2004), and relocation of a ﬁrm's operations (Klassen and Whybark,
1994). The majority of the existing research on managing the counterfeiting
risk is conceptual and descriptive (e.g., Haley (2003); Christopher and Peck
(2004)). They provide frameworks for ﬁghting against counterfeiting, usually
based on case studies (e.g., Staake and Fleisch (2008a)). Research on strategic
implications of a ﬁrm's decisions in the presence of counterfeits is still lacking.
Our research is mostly related to the operations models on the competi-
tion between high-quality (high-cost) brand-name products and low-quality
(low-cost) alternatives provided by another seller. These alternatives can be
a store-brand version of the manufacturer's product (Heese, 2010; Groznik
and Heese, 2010) or a copycat product that resembles physical attributes of
the genuine branded product (Grossman and Shapiro, 1986, 1988; Pun and
DeYong, 2017). Similar to the entry-deterrence models in the industrial orga-
nization literature, these operations models consider the competition between
brand-name products and alternatives as a regular price and quality competi-
tion, and focus on the interactions among supply chain partners. The role of
the government in ﬁghting against counterfeiting is usually ignored. Stevenson
and Busby (2015) identiﬁed strategies employed by counterfeiters in their ex-
ploitation of legitimate supply chains. Their empirical results suggested that
counter-measures for increasing the resilience of supply chains must involve
actors both within and outside the supply chains and the counterfeiting risk
is more controllable with suitable governance arrangements. Another limita-
tion in the majority of the existing anti-counterfeiting operations models is
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that they consider only non-deceptive counterfeits, and ignore the fundamen-
tal diﬀerence between non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits. Therefore,
the anti-counterfeiting strategies they recommend may only be eﬀective for
one type of counterfeits.
Our model is closely related to the work of Cho et al. (2015), which ex-
amined the eﬀectiveness of anti-counterfeiting strategies against two types of
counterfeits: non-deceptive counterfeits which are sold in an illicit channel,
and deceptive counterfeits which inﬁltrate a licit distributor. They found
that strategies such as reducing price or improving quality, which are eﬀec-
tive against non-deceptive counterfeits, do not work well against deceptive
ones. Like other operations models on counterfeiting, their research considers
counterfeiting as a problem of the legitimate OEM only and focuses on the
interaction between the manufacturer and the retailer. In reality, the eﬀects
of counterfeiting are felt throughout the society. Thus, responses to the prob-
lem should come from all levels, including both legislators and companies.
Current practices have also demonstrated the eﬀectiveness of a public-private
partnership in ﬁghting against counterfeiting. Our research ﬁlls the gap in the
literature by considering a partnership between Customs and the legitimate
OEM as an anti-counterfeiting strategy. We consider both non-deceptive and
deceptive counterfeits, and study the conditions under which the OEM should
resort to the partnership to combat diﬀerent types of counterfeits and the role
of the government in the ﬁght against counterfeiting.
5.3 The public-private partnership (PPP) model
In a global supply chain, all shipments have to pass through Customs inspec-
tion before reaching ﬁnal consumers. Once a shipment arrives at Customs, it
will undergo a primary inquiry which is based on processing shipment related
data, including manifest documents, bill of lading, etc (CBP, 2013). Customs
can use intelligence from a number of sources, e.g., data provided by pri-
vate enterprises, to perform cargo examinations more selectively and identify
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high-risk shipments more eﬃciently (CBP, 2017). We model a public-private
partnership (PPP) as an information-sharing platform where the legitimate
OEM shares IP related information with Customs to assist it in identifying
and detaining counterfeit shipments. This platform can be initiated by either
Customs or the OEM. Whether the PPP will be successfully formed depends
on whether it is initiated and whether the OEM joins, i.e., sharing data with
Customs on the platform.
We model the decisions of Customs and the OEM towards the PPP as
follows. Customs decides whether to initiate the PPP, i.e., investing in the
information-sharing mechanism. We denote this decision as α: α ∈ {0, 1},
where α = 1 indicates that Customs will bear the costs of information sharing
(similar to the IPM and the EDB examples), and α = 0 otherwise. The OEM
decides whether to join the PPP (or initiate it if needed). We denote this
decision as κ: κ ∈ {0, 1}, where κ = 1 indicates that the OEM decides to join
(or initiate) the PPP, and κ = 0 otherwise. If α = 0 and κ = 1, it is the OEM
who initiates the PPP, i.e., bearing the costs of information sharing (similar
to the BAT and the Alibaba examples). Note that regardless of the value of
κ, if α = 1, Customs will bear the costs of initiating the PPP. However, if
α = 1 and κ = 0, the PPP is not eﬀective since the OEM decides not to join.
Thus, κ = 1 is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the PPP to be formed.
The total investment in the PPP, i.e., annual costs of information sharing, can
be averaged on the annual production quantity of authentic products. Thus,
we assume that it costs Co per unit of authentic product to share information
between Customs and the OEM.
The counterfeiter can disguise the nature of its shipments to escape the
detection by Customs. For example, the counterfeiter can use free-trade zones
(FTZ) to sanitize shipping documents in a way that it disguises the original
point of manufacture (United Nations, 2018). Another example is that rather
than using cheap ocean-going vessel shipping, counterfeiters can use more ex-
pensive postal service, mailing in small packages in target countries, to limit
traceability and the size of a seizure if intercepted (Elings, 2017). We denote
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the counterfeiter's decision on whether to disguise as ec: ec ∈ {0, 1}, where
ec = 1 indicates that the counterfeiter decides to disguise, and ec = 0 other-
wise. Disguise eﬀort such as using postal service costs a fee per unit of coun-
terfeit product. Thus, we assume that it costs the counterfeiter Cc per unit of
counterfeit product to disguise. Throughout the paper, we use subscripts, o
and c, to represent whether the notation applies to legitimate OEM/authentic
product or counterfeiter/counterfeit. In addition, c ∈ {n, d}, where n and d
represent the non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeiter, respectively.
As intuition dictates, the likelihood of a counterfeit product being detected
when passing through Customs is increasing in the amount of information
shared between Customs and the OEM, but decreasing in the counterfeiter's
disguise eﬀort. We assume that if the PPP is not formed, Customs will be
unaware of the existence of counterfeits in the market and will not stop any
shipments on the suspicion of being a counterfeit. Moreover, the detection
probability is increasing in the rigorousness of the inspection process, but de-
creasing in the eﬀectiveness of the counterfeiter's disguise eﬀort. If the inspec-
tion process is not suﬃciently rigorous, more counterfeits may escape. Some
disguise eﬀort such as producing in a speciﬁc FTZ might be more eﬀective
than others such as forging a bill of lading, in the sense that it makes it more
diﬃcult for Customs to detect counterfeits. We use the following function
to model the detection, red-ﬂagging, probability, meeting all the previously
mentioned properties:
Prc(κ, ec) = P{red ﬂag|counterfeit} = (β1 − β2ec)κ (5.1)
where 1 − β1 represents the probability of not detecting a counterfeit (type
II error of the inspection process) and β2 captures the eﬀect factor of the
counterfeiter's disguise eﬀort. We set 0 < β1 − β2 < 1, 0 < β1 < 1, and
0 < β2 < 1. The red-ﬂagging function means that even if the PPP is formed
and the counterfeiter does not disguise, a portion of counterfeits, i.e., 1− β1,
will be leaked to the market due to type II error of the inspection process.
If the counterfeiter exerts eﬀort to disguise, more but not all counterfeits,
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i.e., 1 − β1 + β2, will pass Customs inspection without raising a red ﬂag.
Additionally, we assume that the detention probability of authentic products
(type I error of the inspection process) is negligible and thus set to zero, i.e.,
Pro(κ, ec) = P{red ﬂag|authentic} = 0.
Denote the market shares of authentic products and counterfeits as mo
and mc. The total production quantity of authentic products therefore equals
mo, and the total production quantity of counterfeits is
mc
1−Prc(κ,ec) . If a coun-
terfeit is detected and detained at Customs, a penalty, Lf , is charged on the
counterfeiter. In practice, if an OEM shares information and ﬁles an IP watch
notice with Customs then Customs will inform her if a shipment suspicious
of violating OEM's IP rights is detected. In this case, the OEM has to pay
the Customs' inspection cost for services such as examining the samples, pro-
viding evidences, etc. (Schwab et al., 2017). The inspection fee usually runs
from $80 to $1000 per container, whereas the penalty for importing counter-
feit goods can amount to twice the manufacturer's suggested retail price of
genuine goods (Flexport, 2018), which can easily exceed a million dollars. In
addition, this inspection fee is negligible compared to the investment in the
PPP. Thus, for the sake of brevity, we assume that the inspection fee is zero.
For the same reason, we also set the production costs of the OEM and the
counterfeiter to zero. For the OEM, having a non-zero production cost will not
aﬀect its optimal decisions (i.e., p∗o and κ∗) structurally since Customs inspec-
tion does not inﬂuence shipments of authentic products. For the counterfeiter,
the detention by Customs would cost extra production costs if it is not zero,
in addition to the penalty. However, the counterfeiter's production cost is
usually much smaller than the penalty since the counterfeiter uses cheap labor
and technologies in substandard working conditions and often avoids paying
taxes.
As a governmental agency, Customs is responsible for the safety and se-
curity of the society, and therefore we assume that if a counterfeit escapes
the detection by Customs, it imposes a cost Le to Customs, representing the
cost to the society. Although it is diﬃcult to quantify this cost Le in prac-
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tice, it is clear that diﬀerent types of counterfeits result in diﬀerent emotional
responses from the public and trigger diﬀerent actions of government. For
instance, deceptive counterfeit medications can cause deaths of patients, and
the government reacts strongly to this type of counterfeiting due to salience
of the issue, whereas non-deceptive counterfeit handbags only harm business
and the government may take mild countermeasures. Incorporating the cost
of counterfeits to the society in our model allows us to identify the optimal
strategy of Customs in diﬀerent situations. Table 5.1 summarizes the notation
used in our model.
Notation Description
α decision of Customs on whether to initiate the PPP
κ decision of the OEM on whether to join (or initiate) the PPP
ec, c ∈ {n, d} decision of the non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeiter on whether to disguise
Co information-sharing cost per unit of authentic product
Cc, c ∈ {n, d} disguise-eﬀort cost per unit of non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeit
Prc(κ, ec), c ∈ {n, d} probability function that a product will be red ﬂagged, given that it is
a non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeit
β1 indicator of inspection rigorousness at Customs
β2 eﬀect factor of the counterfeiter's disguise eﬀort
Lf penalty to the counterfeiter if a counterfeit is found
Le cost to the society if a counterfeit is leaked to the market
qc, c ∈ {n, d} quality of non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeits
t taste of a consumer
tn taste of the consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing the non-deceptive
counterfeit and not purchasing any product
to taste of the consumer who is indiﬀerent between purchasing the authentic product
and the non-deceptive counterfeit
po, pc, c ∈ {n, d} prices of authentic products and non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeits
mo, mc, c ∈ {n, d} market shares of authentic products and non-deceptive or deceptive counterfeits
s market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter
S inﬁltration cost per unit of deceptive counterfeits
Table 5.1: Model speciﬁcation
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5.4 Combating non-deceptive counterfeits
We ﬁrst consider non-deceptive counterfeits, i.e., the type of counterfeits which
consumers can distinguish from authentic products at the time of purchase.
Non-deceptive counterfeits usually have an inferior observable quality and are
oﬀered at a price which is remarkably lower than the authentic product. Sim-
ilar to any other competitor's products, once non-deceptive counterfeits are
leaked to the market, they compete with authentic products on price and
quality. Denote the quality and the price of non-deceptive counterfeits or au-
thentic products as qi and pi, i ∈ {n, o}, where 0 < qn < qo. For simplicity,
we set the quality of authentic products to one, i.e., qo = 1.
Consumers have heterogeneous tastes, which we assume to follow a uni-
form distribution on the interval [0, 1]. All consumers prefer a high quality
product, but a consumer with a higher taste is willing to pay more for it.
Given the price pi and quality qi of every product, a consumer with taste
t purchases at most one product based on the principle of maximization of
his/her individual utility: max
i∈{0,n,o}
{tqi − pi}, where tq0 − p0 = 0 if the con-
sumer chooses not to buy any product, i.e., i = 0. The market is divided into
three segments (see Figure 5.1): the ﬁrst (right) segment consists of consumers
who buy authentic products; the second (middle) segment contains consumers
purchasing counterfeits; and the third (left) segment contains consumers who
are not buying any products. The consumer, who is indiﬀerent between pur-
chasing the authentic product and the counterfeit, has the taste to = po−pn1−qn ,
which solves to − po = toqn − pn. Similarly, the consumer, who is indiﬀerent
between purchasing the counterfeit and not purchasing any product, has the
taste tn = pnqn . Assuming the total number of consumers in the market to one
and solving
∑
i∈{n,o}mi = 1 − pnqn , we list the market shares of counterfeits
and authentic products, i.e., mn and mo, in Figure 5.1.
Although the competition between the non-deceptive counterfeiter and the
legitimate OEM is analogous to a duopoly in a vertically diﬀerentiated market,
it is not the same because the counterfeiter bears legal risks associated with
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0 1tn to
1−mn −mo mn = po−pn1−qn −
pn
qn
mo = 1− po−pn1−qn
Figure 5.1: Three segments of consumers (non-deceptive case)
counterfeiting and thus the OEM can utilize the help from the government to
ﬁght against the counterfeiter. We model the interaction between Customs,
the OEM, and the counterfeiter using a three-stage model (see the timeline of
events in Figure 5.2). Since decisions of governmental authorities are usually
announced in advance of ﬁrms' decisions in practice, we assume that at the
ﬁrst stage, Customs decides whether to initiate the PPP, i.e., α. At the second
stage, the OEM and the counterfeiter observe the decision of Customs. Then,
the OEM decides whether to join the PPP (or initiate it if needed), i.e., κ,
while the counterfeiter decides whether to disguise, i.e., en. The red-ﬂagging
probability of counterfeit shipments is then realized (see equation (5.1)). At
the third stage, both the OEM and the counterfeiter learn the red-ﬂagging
probability and simultaneously set their own market-clearing price, i.e., po
and pn. In Sections 5.4.1-5.4.2, we solve the game backwards, starting with
the Bertrand price competition at the third stage.
Time
OEM decides 𝜅, while 
counterfeiter decides 𝑒𝑛.
OEM sets 𝑝𝑜, while 
Counterfeiter sets 𝑝𝑛.
Demand is 
realized
Customs decides 𝛼.
Figure 5.2: Timing of events and decisions (non-deceptive case)
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5.4.1 Bertrand price competition in each subgame (κ, en)
At the third stage, the OEM and the non-deceptive counterfeiter observe the
decision of Customs from the ﬁrst stage, i.e., α, and each other's decision from
the second stage, i.e., κ and en. Then, they set their own price, following a
Bertrand price competition. The OEM's proﬁt function is as follows:
max
po
Πo =
(
po − Co(1− α)κ
)
mo (5.2)
pomo calculates the OEM's revenue, and Co(1−α)κmo calculates the OEM's
investment in the PPP. Similarly, the proﬁt function of the non-deceptive
counterfeiter is:
max
pn
Πn = (pn − Cnen
1− Prn(κ, en)
)mn − P
r
n(κ, en)
1− Prn(κ, en)
Lfmn (5.3)
The ﬁrst term (pn− Cnen1−Prn(κ,en))mn calculates the counterfeiter's revenue after
paying for disguise eﬀort and the second term P
r
n(κ,en)
1−Prn(κ,en)Lfmn calculates the
penalty that the non-deceptive counterfeiter incurs due to the detention by
Customs.
Lemma 5.1. At the third stage, there exist unique optimal prices of authen-
tic products and non-deceptive counterfeits, i.e., p∗o and p∗n, which are derived
by substituting the OEM's optimal response function Ro(pn) into the coun-
terfeiter's optimal response function Rn(po); Ro(pn) and Rn(po) satisfy the
ﬁrst-order derivative conditions: (∂Πo∂po ) |po=Ro(pn)= 0 and (∂Πn∂pn ) |pn=Rn(po)= 0.
According to Lemma 5.1, unique optimal prices of authentic products and
non-deceptive counterfeits exist in each subgame (κ, en). The optimal market
shares of non-deceptive counterfeits and authentic products, i.e., m∗n and m∗o,
are derived by substituting the optimal prices, i.e., p∗n and p∗o, into mn and mo
(see equations in Figure 5.1). To avoid trivial solutions, we assume that the
optimal prices speciﬁed in Lemma 5.1 are larger or equal to a player's total cost
(i.e., investment cost for the OEM and the sum of disguise cost and penalty
for the non-deceptive counterfeiter), and thus the resulting optimal market
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shares satisfy: 0 ≤ m∗n ≤ 1, 0 ≤ m∗o ≤ 1 and m∗n + m∗o ≤ 1. It requires that
parameters e.g., qn and Lf , are bounded such that
p∗n
qn
≤ p∗o ≤ 1−qn+p∗n. The
optimal proﬁts of the OEM and the non-deceptive counterfeiter are derived
by substituting p∗o and m∗o into Πo (see equation (5.2)) and substituting p∗n
and m∗n into Πn (see equations (5.3)).
5.4.2 Optimal equilibrium strategy of the three players
The optimal equilibrium strategies at the second stage can be derived by com-
paring each player's proﬁt in diﬀerent subgames. At the ﬁrst stage, Customs
decides whether to initiate the PPP, considering the optimal responses, i.e.,
the optimal equilibrium strategies of the OEM and the non-deceptive coun-
terfeiter from the second stage. The optimization problem of Customs is as
follows:
max
α∈{0,1}
Πb = (
Prn(κ∗, e∗n)
1− Prn(κ∗, e∗n)
Lf − Le)mn − Coακ∗mo (5.4)
Prn(κ∗,e∗n)
1−Prn(κ∗,e∗n)Lfmn calculates the penalty collected by Customs, Lemn calculates
the damage to the society because of the leaked non-deceptive counterfeits,
and Coακ
∗mo calculates the investment in the PPP paid by Customs.
Comparing each player's proﬁt in diﬀerent strategy, we derive ﬁve Nash
equilibrium strategies (α∗, κ∗, e∗n) to the complete game in Proposition 5.1.
The conditions under which each equilibrium strategy exists is speciﬁed in
Appendix A. Because we assume that Customs will be unaware of the existence
of counterfeits in the market if the PPP is not formed (see equation 5.1),
the strategy where the PPP is not formed but the counterfeiter disguises,
i.e., (α∗, κ∗, e∗n) = (−, 0, 1), is a dominated strategy since the counterfeiter is
always better oﬀ in the equilibrium strategy (−, 0, 0) than in (−, 0, 1). The
strategy where Customs initiates the PPP but the OEM does not join, i.e.,
(α∗, κ∗, e∗n) = (1, 0,−), is also a dominated strategy since Customs is always
better oﬀ in the equilibrium strategy (0, 0,−) than in (1, 0,−). According
to the conditions of each equilibrium strategy (see Appendix A), except that
(0, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 1) may overlap, any two equilibrium strategies are mutually
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exclusive.
Proposition 5.1. Based on the optimal decision of Customs, α∗, the OEM's
optimal (response) decision, κ∗, and the non-deceptive counterfeiter's optimal
(response) decision e∗n, the following ﬁve Nash equilibrium strategies exist at
the ﬁrst stage:
(α∗, κ∗, e∗n) =

(0, 0, 0) OEM resorts to pricing only
(0, 1, 0) OEM initiates the PPP & counterfeiter does not disguise
(1, 1, 0) Customs initiates the PPP & counterfeiter does not disguise
(0, 1, 1) OEM initiates the PPP & counterfeiter disguises
(1, 1, 1) Customs initiates the PPP & counterfeiter disguises
(5.5)
(a) Lf ∈ [0.001, 0.01] (b) Lf ∈ [0.01, 0.1]
Figure 5.3: Equilibrium strategy region at the ﬁrst stage, non-deceptive case
(Cn = 0.004, Co = 0.009, Le = 0.13, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.1)
Figure 5.3 shows two examples of the optimal equilibrium strategies. The
equilibriums (0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1), and (1, 1, 1) are colored in
blue, red, green, yellow, and magenta, respectively. In each example, we
observe that the ﬁve equilibriums do not cover the entire parameter space.
Areas where no equilibrium exists remain as white. In addition, areas where
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the non-triviality assumptions are not met are marked with shade and are not
considered.
Proposition 5.2 illustrates the conditions under which Customs will not
initiate the PPP: Customs will not bear the costs of setting up an information
sharing mechanism if either the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits, qn, or
the cost to the society, Le, drops below a certain threshold.
Proposition 5.2. In the non-deceptive case, Customs will not initiate the
PPP, i.e., neither the equilibrium strategy (1, 1, 0) nor (1, 1, 1) exists at the
ﬁrst stage, if either of the following conditions hold:
• qn ≤ 1− 12 max{Le − 2β11−β1Lf , Le −
2(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2Lf − Cn1−β1+β2 },
• Le ≤ β1−β21−β1+β2Lf .
Regardless of the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits, if the damage of
counterfeits to the society without the PPP is smaller than the least amount
of penalty with the PPP, i.e., Le ≤ β1−β21−β1+β2Lf , then there is no incentive for
Customs to initiate the PPP. This is either because the damage to the society
will be trivial even if a counterfeit escapes Customs inspection or because
the penalty alone serves as an eﬀective counterfeiting deterrence tool. If this
condition does not hold, i.e., Le >
β1−β2
1−β1+β2Lf , Customs will still decide not
to initiate the PPP when the quality of counterfeits qn is low such that qn ≤
1 − 12 max{Le − 2β11−β1Lf , Le −
2(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2Lf − Cn1−β1+β2 }. This is because when
qn is low (and Lf is small), only a small amount of consumers will buy low-
quality counterfeits and the societal impact would be limited. In addition, the
OEM can win the competition against low-quality counterfeits in the market
through pricing. In Figure 3, we observe that the equilibrium strategies where
Customs initiates the PPP, i.e., (1, 1, 0) or (1, 1, 1), only appear in the top-
right part of Figure 5.3a and in the top-left part of Figure 5.3b. It indicates
that Customs will likely initiate the PPP when qn is high. This result also
signiﬁes that the higher the quality of counterfeits, the more important the role
of the government becomes in the ﬁght against non-deceptive counterfeiting.
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In Proposition 5.3, we show that if Customs does not initiate the PPP, the
OEM will possibly also choose not to initiate it when Lf is either too large or
too small. In the two examples in Figure 5.3, the equilibrium strategy where
the PPP is not formed, i.e, (0, 0, 0), only appears in the left part of Figure
5.3a, i.e., when Lf is small.
Proposition 5.3. Set G(Lf ) = Π∗o|(0,0,0) − Πo|(0,1,0). In the presence of a
non-deceptive counterfeiter, there exist two thresholds for Lf , i.e., the lower-
bound Llof = max{0, arg minLf {G(Lf ) = 0}}, and the upperbound Luof =
max{0, arg maxLf {G(Lf ) = 0}} such that when Llof < Lf < Luof , the out-
come where the PPP is not formed will never happen, i.e., the equilibrium
strategy (0, 0, 0) will not exist at the ﬁrst stage.
When Lf is small, the non-deceptive counterfeiter can still provide a low-
price product even after paying the penalty. Thus, to maintain a competitive
price of authentic product, the OEM may choose not to initiate the PPP since
it will incur extra cost that will be carried over to the selling price. This re-
sult is consistent with the empirical phenomenon: in countries where the legal
consequence of counterfeiting is mild, legitimate OEMs rarely take the initia-
tive in forming a partnership with the government to combat counterfeiting
since there lacks force to prevent a recurrence of the counterfeiting problem
(KPMG, 2005). In general, non-deceptive counterfeiters' loss from Customs
detention is small because many of them are small workshops selling products
through street vendors or Internet sites and when they get caught, they tend
to close their stores temporarily to avoid penalty (Cho et al., 2015). Therefore,
Proposition 5.3 also indicates that the government should play a bigger role
in initiating the PPP to combat non-deceptive counterfeits because the OEM
will likely not take the initiative in such a situation.
Same reason as Customs, when the penalty is large, there is no incentive
for the OEM to initiate the PPP since large penalty is eﬀective in deterring
the entry of counterfeits. According to Proposition 5.4, another reason why
the OEM will likely not initiate the PPP when Lf is very large is that under
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such a condition, the non-deceptive counterfeiter will disguise even if the PPP
is formed. In Figure 5.3, we observe that the equilibrium strategies where
the counterfeiter disguises, i.e., (0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 1), only appears in the right
part of Figure 5.3a and covers the entire space where an equilibrium strategy
exists in 5.3b. It shows that the non-deceptive counterfeiter would disguise if
Lf is large. This result is reasonable since the counterfeiter will disguise to
avoid paying penalty if the penalty is high. It also shows that the government
should not rely solely on penalty to combat counterfeiting since it may result
in undesirable counteraction.
Proposition 5.4. Set H(Lf ) = Π∗n|(α,1,0)−Π∗n|(α,1,1), where α is the given deci-
sion of Customs. In the presence of a non-deceptive counterfeiter, suppose the
PPP is formed, there exist a threshold for Lf , i.e., L
uc
f = arg maxLf {H(Lf ) =
0}, such that if Lf > Lucf , the counterfeiter will disguise, i.e., e∗n = 1.
5.4.3 Eﬀectiveness of the anti-counterfeiting strategies
We ﬁrst examine the impact of the OEM's anti-counterfeiting strategies by
comparing the OEM's price and proﬁt with and without non-deceptive coun-
terfeiter. Proposition 5.5 shows that compared to the situation without any
counterfeit, the existence of non-deceptive counterfeits could lead the OEM
to earn more proﬁt if the PPP is formed. To combat counterfeiting, initiating
or joining the PPP would allow the OEM to choose a higher price than that
without any counterfeit, and thus the OEM could earn more proﬁt; However,
without the PPP, the OEM's only anti-counterfeiting strategy is pricing and
to remain competitive, he should lower its price.
Proposition 5.5. To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter:
1. the OEM should choose a lower price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is not formed;
2. the OEM should choose a higher price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is formed and 32qn−2(1−α)Co ≤ min{ β11−β1Lf ,
β1−β2
1−β1+β2Lf +
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Cn
1−β1+β2 } , where α is the given decision of Customs;
3. compared to the situation without any counterfeit, the OEM earns more
proﬁt if the PPP is formed; without the PPP, the OEM earns less proﬁt
than that without any counterfeit.
According to Proposition 5.5.2, if the PPP is formed, it is more likely for
the OEM to increase its price when the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits
is low. Existing literature on counterfeiting has demonstrated similar results:
the existence of non-deceptive counterfeits can beneﬁt a manufacturer of high-
quality products (Qian, 2014). Here we show that this beneﬁt can be realized
through the combined PPP and pricing strategy.
Next, we examine the eﬀectiveness of the OEM's anti-counterfeiting strate-
gies by comparing the market share and price of authentic products with those
of non-deceptive counterfeits. Proposition 5.6 shows that when only using pric-
ing to combat counterfeiting, the OEM captures a higher market share than
the non-deceptive counterfeiter. Thus, it is guaranteed that the OEM will
earn more proﬁt than the counterfeiter since the price of authentic products
is always higher than that of counterfeits. When the PPP is formed, under
certain conditions6 related to the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits, the
counterfeiter may capture a higher market share than the OEM. When the
counterfeiter captures a higher market share, it is possible that it also earns
more proﬁts than the OEM. These results are stated in Proposition 5.6 .
Proposition 5.6. To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter:
1. when only using pricing, the OEM captures a higher market share than
the counterfeiter;
2. with the PPP, the OEM captures a higher market share than the coun-
terfeiter if Customs initiates the PPP; if the OEM initiates the PPP,
6For the sake of brevity, these conditions are only stated in Proposition 5.5 in the ap-
pendix.
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under certain conditions related to the quality of counterfeit product, the
market share of counterfeiter may exceed the market share of the OEM;
3. when Customs decides not to initiate the PPP, the OEM's investment in
the PPP will result in an increase in both prices of authentic and counter-
feit product, i.e., min{p∗o|(0,1,0), p∗o|(0,1,1)} > p∗o|(0,0,0) and min{p∗n|(0,1,0), p∗n|(0,1,1)} >
p∗n|(0,0,0);
4. when ( β11−β1 −
β1−β2
1−β1+β2 )Lf <
Cn
1−β1+β2 , the non-deceptive counterfeiter's
disguise eﬀort will result in an increase in the price of authentic product,
i.e., p∗o|(α,1,1) > p
∗
o|(α,1,0), where α is the given decision of Customs.
When Customs does not bear the costs of information sharing, initiating
the PPP by the OEM on its own will lead to an increase in the price of
non-deceptive counterfeits. Proposition 5.6.1-5.6.3 possibly explain why some
legitimate manufacturers do not form a partnership with Customs to combat
non-deceptive counterfeits: it may lead the counterfeiter to increase its price
compared to the situation where the PPP is not formed, capture a higher
market share than the OEM, and earn more proﬁts than the OEM. When
Customs initiates the PPP, the OEM will capture a higher market share than
the counterfeiter and thus it is guaranteed that the OEM will gain more proﬁts.
It again signiﬁes the importance of the government in initiating the PPP
to combat non-deceptive counterfeits. Lastly, in Proposition 5.6.4, we show
that when the penalty saved due to disguise eﬀort is smaller than the cost of
exerting disguise eﬀort, i.e., ( β11−β1−
β1−β2
1−β1+β2 )Lf <
Cn
1−β1+β2 , the counterfeiter's
disguise eﬀort will lead to an increase in the price of authentic products since
the counterfeiter will increase its selling price to cover the cost in this situation
and thus the OEM can also increase the price of authentic products.
Last, we investigate the impact of anti-counterfeiting strategies on con-
sumer welfare. We deﬁne consumer welfare when no counterfeit exists as
CSo =
∫ 1
p (t − p)dt, where p is the price of authentic products in a market
with no counterfeits. Using the ﬁrst order condition we have optimal p equal
to 12 . Similarly, we deﬁne consumer welfare in a market where non-deceptive
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counterfeits coexist with authentic products as follows:
CSn =
∫ to
tn
(tqn − pn)dt+
∫ 1
to
(t− po)dt (5.6)
where to = po−pn1−qn and t
n = pnqn (see Figure 5.1). The ﬁrst term of CSn
represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase the non-deceptive
counterfeit; the second term represents the surplus of those consumers who
purchase the authentic product. Considering the chances that non-deceptive
counterfeits do not reach the market due to Customs detention, we deﬁne
ECSn as the expected consumer welfare as follows:
ECSn = (1− Prn(κ, en))CSn + Prn(κ, en)CSo (5.7)
The same deﬁnitions of consumer welfare and expected consumer welfare
are used in Cho et al. (2015). It is conventional wisdom that the entry of non-
deceptive counterfeits would improve consumer surplus since the presence of
counterfeits will enable consumers with a lower taste to gain access to the
counterfeit product at a lower price, instead of the authentic product which
they may be unable to aﬀord or unwilling to buy (Gao et al., 2016).
In Proposition 5.7.1, we show that when the quality of non-deceptive coun-
terfeits exceeds a certain threshold, the expected consumer welfare is decreas-
ing in the quality regardless of which anti-counterfeiting strategy the OEM
adopts. It is because, in this situation, more consumers with a lower taste
will end up with buying nothing. However, we show in Proposition 5.7.2 and
3 that when the quality of counterfeiters exceeds a certain proportion of the
quality of authentic products, the OEM's establishing the PPP to hinder the
entry of counterfeits could improve the expected consumer welfare compared
to a situation where a PPP is not formed.
Proposition 5.7. The following results on the expected consumer welfare
ECSn hold:
1. In each strategy (α, κ, en), there exists a unique q
∗
n|(α,κ,en) such that the
expected consumer welfare ECSn|(α,κ,en) is decreasing as qn is exceeding
q∗n|(α,κ,en).
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2. A necessary condition for ECSn to be higher in the situation where the
PPP is formed than that without the PPP is when the PPP is initiated
by the OEM and qn >
1
2 .
3. A suﬃcient condition for ECSn to be higher in the situation where the
PPP is not formed than that with the PPP is when qn <
1
3 .
Figure 5.4 shows an example of the consumer welfare in the ﬁve strategies
(see the dash lines). In this example, consumer welfare is the highest when the
PPP is not formed, i.e., in the strategy (0, 0, 0), until the quality of counterfeits
exceeds 0.65. It veriﬁes Proposition 5.7.2. The solid line in Figure 5.4 is the
consumer welfare which corresponds to the optimal equilibrium strategy, given
the value of qn. In this example, when the quality of counterfeits is above
0.65, the optimal equilibrium strategy, i.e., (0, 0, 0), does not yield the highest
consumer welfare, compared to other strategies. Earlier work, such as Cho
et al. (2015), has also shown that strategies which improve the proﬁt of the
OEM may hurt consumer welfare. Therefore, the government and ﬁrms should
carefully consider a trade-oﬀ among diﬀerent objectives in implementing an
anti-counterfeiting strategy.
So far, we have investigated in the non-deceptive case, the impact of the
penalty Lf and the quality of counterfeits qn on the optimal strategies of Cus-
toms and the OEM, and the impact of diﬀerent anti-counterfeiting strategies
on the market shares and prices of authentic products and counterfeits, and
on consumer welfare. Next, we explore the situation when counterfeits are
deceptive, i.e., the type of counterfeits which consumers cannot distinguish
from authentic products, to see whether results will deviate from those in the
non-deceptive case.
5.5 Combating deceptive counterfeits
We assume that shipment inspection and detention at Customs is the same
for both non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits. The diﬀerence between
the two cases lies in the ﬁnal market: consumers cannot distinguish deceptive
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Figure 5.4: Expected consumer welfare, non-deceptive case (Co = 0.09, Cn =
0.04, Lf = 0.01, β1 = 0.06, β2 = 0.01)
counterfeits from authentic products at the time of purchase, whereas they
can in the case of non-deceptive counterfeits. Using the same licit distribution
channel, deceptive counterfeits are sold as authentic products, commanding
the same price (Fang, 2014; Stevenson and Busby, 2015). With the presence
of non-deceptive counterfeit products, some consumers may downgrade the
perceived quality for all products in the market if they believe they may have
paid unfair price for counterfeits (Akerlof, 1978; Cho et al., 2015). This down-
graded perceived quality for authentic products is a form of damage to brand
image and this type of consumers is referred to as proactive consumers in
the literature of deceptive counterfeits (e.g., see Cho et al. (2015)). Proactive
consumers take into account the likelihood of receiving deceptive counterfeits
unknowingly, and thus perceive the quality of any product in the market as a
weighted average of the quality of authentic products and deceptive counter-
feits: (1 − ξ)qo + ξqd, where ξ denotes the consumer's expectation about the
fraction of deceptive counterfeits in the market. Non-proactive consumers do
not consider the likelihood of purchasing counterfeit at legitimate stores and
thus perceive the quality of any product in the market as qo = 1. We denote
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the portion of proactive consumers among all consumers as λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
In each consumer group (proactive or non-proactive), consumers either
purchase a product or not. The market thus only consists of two segments.
Denote the total number of consumers who purchase as D. Among those
consumers who purchase a product, a fraction s of them receive deceptive
counterfeits unknowingly. Thus, the market share of counterfeits is md = sD,
and the market share of authentic products is the portion of consumers who
purchase and receive authentic products, i.e., mo = (1 − s)D. We assume
that consumers are rational and thus the proactive consumers' expectation
on the fraction of deceptive counterfeits equals the fraction of all consumers
who make purchases and receive counterfeits: ξ = s. This notion of rational
expectations equilibrium is also used in Cho et al. (2015). Given the price of
authentic products po, which is also the price of deceptive counterfeits, the
total number of consumers who purchase is:
D = λ(1− po
1− s+ sqd ) + (1− λ)(1− po) (5.8)
The total number of purchasing consumers D is decreasing in the portion
of proactive consumers λ (see equation (5.8)). The interaction among Cus-
toms, the OEM, and the deceptive counterfeiter still takes place through three
stages (see Figure 5.5). At the ﬁrst stage, Customs decides whether to initiate
the PPP, i.e., α. At the second stage, the OEM and the deceptive counterfeiter
observe the decision of Customs, and then decide whether to join the PPP (or
initiate it if needed), i.e., κ, and whether to disguise, i.e., ed, respectively. At
the third stage, the OEM decides the price of authentic products po. The
deceptive counterfeiter observes po and then decides s, i.e., the portion of the
market which the counterfeiter will seize from the OEM. In practice, decep-
tive counterfeits often target products which are long established and in high
demand. Thus, the price of authentic products are observed by the deceptive
counterfeiter before it plans its market seize. Our sequential setting at the
third stage resembles the reality in the deceptive case. The price po is still
a market-clearing price, i.e., the production quantity of authentic products
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equals the total number of consumers who purchase, i.e., mo +md = D.
In order to sell counterfeits in the market, the deceptive counterfeiter needs
to pay for inﬁltrating the distribution channel, for example, paying bribes, and
share proﬁt with the licit distributor (Staake and Fleisch, 2008b). We assume
that the inﬁltration cost is increasing in the market seize of the counterfeiter,
i.e., s and it costs S per unit of counterfeits. The lost proﬁt due to proﬁt shar-
ing with the licit distributor is also increasing in the market share of coun-
terfeits because the more counterfeits the distributor decides to sell among
all products sold through the same channel, the more proﬁt of the counter-
feiter will be asked to shift to the distributor. A similar way of modeling the
deceptive counterfeiter's costs has been used in Cho et al. (2015).
When deceptive counterfeits exist, the OEM will lose part of the market,
due to either damage to brand image if proactive consumers exist or breach in
the licit distribution channel. It is diﬀerent from the competition with the non-
deceptive counterfeiter, which leads the OEM to capture higher-end consumer
segments and potentially earn more than that without any counterfeit (see
Proposition 5.5). Below we solve the three-stage game backwards, same as in
the non-deceptive case, and bring up results which deviate from those in the
non-deceptive case.
Time
OEM decides 𝜅, while 
counterfeiter decides 𝑒𝑑.
OEM sets 𝑝𝑜
Demand is 
realized
Customs decides 𝛼.
Counterfeiter sets 𝑠
Figure 5.5: Timing of events and decisions (deceptive case)
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5.5.1 Optimal price(s) and unique optimal market seize in
each subgame (κ, ed)
Given decisions from the ﬁrst and second stages, i.e., α, κ, and ed (thus, given
Prd(κ, ed)), the OEM ﬁrst decides the optimal price p∗o and then deceptive
counterfeiter decides the optimal market seize s∗. At the third stage, the
optimization problems of the OEM and the deceptive counterfeiter are:
max
po
Πo = (po − Co(1− α)κ)mo (5.9)
max
s
Πd = (1− s)(po − Cded
1− Prd(κ, ed)
− P
r
d(κ, ed)
1− Prd(κ, ed)
Lf )md − sS (5.10)
The OEM's problem in equation (5.9) is the same as in the non-deceptive
case (see equation (5.2)). In the deceptive counterfeiter's problem in equation
(5.10): in the ﬁrst term, (po − Cded1−Prd(κ,ed) −
Prd(κ,ed)
1−Prd(κ,ed)Lf )md calculates the
revenue after paying for disguise eﬀort and the penalty imposed by Customs
due to detention, and (1− s) is the counterfeiter's share in the proﬁt-sharing
agreement with the licit distributor; and the second term sS calculates the
inﬁltration cost.
Previously we showed that there exists a unique optimal price of authen-
tic products when the OEM competes with the non-deceptive counterfeiter.
When the counterfeiter is deceptive in a market with no proactive consumers,
i.e., λ = 0, Lemma 5.2.1 shows that there may exist more than one optimal
price of authentic products, while there exists a unique optimal market seize
of the deceptive counterfeiter. For the general case, i.e., λ ∈ [0, 1], we show in
Lemma 5.2.2 that if certain conditions are met, there exists a unique optimal
market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter. while there may exist multiple
optimal prices of authentic products. Set C =
Prd(κ,ed)
1−Prd(κ,ed)Lf +
Cded
1−Prd(κ,ed) , which
represents the counterfeiter's cost, including both penalty and disguise eﬀort.
Lemma 5.2. In the presence of a deceptive counterfeiter:
1. when no consumer is proactive (i.e., λ = 0), the deceptive counterfeiter's
optimal market seize is: if p∗o|λ=0 < C, s
∗
λ=0 = 0; otherwise, s
∗ =
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2 − S2(p∗o−C)(1−p∗o) ,. The optimal price(s) for authentic products is p
∗
o =
arg maxpo Πo = (po − Co(1− α)κ)(1−po2 + S2(po−C)).
2. for λ ∈ [0, 1], if p∗o < (1− s∗+ s∗qd)2, there exists a unique market seize
s∗ of the deceptive counterfeiter, which solves ∂Πd∂s = 0. The optimal
price(s) of authentic product is p∗o = arg maxpo Πo.
The optimal proﬁts of the OEM and the deceptive counterfeiter in each
subgame can be computed by substituting the optimal price(s) and the op-
timal market seize into equations (5.9) and (5.10). The optimal equilibrium
strategies at the second stage can be computed by comparing each player's
proﬁt in diﬀerent subgames. At the ﬁrst stage, the optimization problem of
Customs is the same as the one in the non-deceptive case (see equation (5.4)).
There are ﬁve Nash equilibrium strategies to the full game, which are the
same ones as in the non-deceptive case (see Proposition 5.1). Figure 5.6 show
two examples of the optimal equilibrium strategies to the full game in the
deceptive case with no proactive consumers, i.e., λ = 0. In the two examples,
the OEM initiates the PPP when the penalty to the counterfeiter, i.e., Lf , is
large, and the disguise cost, i.e., Cd, is small. Because the optimal price(s) of
authentic products at the third stage do not have closed forms, the closed-form
expressions for the conditions of each equilibrium strategy cannot be obtained.
Thus, it is analytically intractable to prove the impact of parameter values on
the equilibrium strategy, like what we did in the non-deceptive case. Our fo-
cus is then to generate insights on the eﬀectiveness of the anti-counterfeiting
strategies in the deceptive case.
5.5.2 Eﬀectiveness of the anti-counterfeiting strategies
According to Proposition 5.8 , if the OEM initiates the PPP to combat decep-
tive counterfeits in a market with no proactive consumers and the investment
in the PPP is larger than the counterfeiter's cost (including both penalty and
disguise cost), the OEM should choose a higher price than that without any
counterfeit. When the PPP is not formed or when Customs initiates the PPP,
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(a) Lf ∈ [0.001, 0.01] (b) Lf ∈ [0.01, 0.1]
Figure 5.6: Equilibrium strategy region at the ﬁrst stage, deceptive case (Co =
0.009, Le = 0.13, β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.1, S = 0.05)
the OEM should lower its price. This ﬁnding is diﬀerent from the one in
the non-deceptive case, where the OEM could increase its price when it ei-
ther initiates or joins the PPP (see Proposition 5.5.2). The importance of
considering the type of counterfeits in the OEM's optimal anti-counterfeiting
strategy is also discussed in Cho et al. (2015). They found that in a game
with a brand-name OEM, a potential counterfeiter, and a distributor, the
OEM should lower its price in the non-deceptive case, but increase its price
in the deceptive case, in which no consumers are proactive. Our results are
in line with their ﬁnding and we show that when combating deceptive coun-
terfeiting, the OEM's initiative in the PPP could enable the OEM to increase
its selling price.
Proposition 5.8. In a market where no consumer is proactive, i.e., λ = 0,
to combat the deceptive counterfeiter:
1. the OEM should choose a lower price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is initiated by Customs or if the PPP is not formed;
2. the OEM should choose a higher price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co.
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Increasing the price of authentic products does not always reduce the de-
ceptive counterfeiter's market share since it increases the counterfeiter's mar-
gin from selling deceptive counterfeits (Cho et al., 2015). Thus, in implement-
ing this pricing strategy one should carefully consider the trade-oﬀs. When
part of deceptive counterfeits would get detained at the border before they
reach the market, because of the penalty imposed by Customs and the dis-
guise cost (if incurred), the counterfeiter's optimal market seize is decreasing in
the price of authentic products once it exceeds a certain threshold. In Lemma
5.3, we show that if the PPP is initiated by Customs or if the PPP is not
formed, the optimal market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter is increasing
in the price of authentic products, and if the PPP is initiated by the OEM,
the optimal market seize is decreasing in the price of authentic products. On
the one hand, this result explains the results in Proposition 5.8, i.e., when
the PPP is initiated by Customs or when the PPP is not formed, the OEM
chooses a lower price than that when the PPP is initiated by the OEM and
C < Co so that the deceptive counterfeiter's market seize is constrained. On
the other hand, it signiﬁes the importance of private enterprises in initiating
the partnership with the government in the ﬁght against deceptive counter-
feiting. When the OEM initiates the PPP, it could choose a higher price and
the counterfeiter's market seize is decreasing in the price of authentic products
in such a situation.
Lemma 5.3. In the presence of a deceptive counterfeiter, when no consumer
is proactive, i.e., λ = 0:
• if the PPP is initiated by Customs or if the PPP is not formed, the
optimal market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter s∗ is increasing in
the price of authentic products po;
• if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co, the optimal market seize
of the deceptive counterfeiter s∗ is decreasing in the price of authentic
products po.
5.5. COMBATING DECEPTIVE COUNTERFEITS 133
Lastly, we investigate the impact of anti-counterfeiting strategies on con-
sumer welfare in the deceptive case. We deﬁne CSd as consumer welfare in
a market where deceptive counterfeits coexist with authentic products as fol-
lows:
CSd = s
∫ 1
θ
(θqd − po)dθ + (1− s)
∫ 1
θ
(θ − po)dθ (5.11)
where θ = λpo(1−s)+sqd + (1− λ)po. The ﬁrst term of CSd represents the surplus
of those consumers who are cheated and receive the deceptive counterfeit, and
the second term represents the surplus of those consumers who purchase and
receive the brand-name product.
Considering the chances that counterfeits do not reach the market due
to detention by Customs, we deﬁne ECSd as the expected consumer welfare
when the counterfeiter is deceptive, as follows:
ECSd = (1− Prd(κ, ed))CSn + Prd(κ, ed)CSo (5.12)
When no proactive consumers exist in the market, we show in Proposition
5.9 that Customs initiating the PPP would lead to a higher consumer welfare
than that if the OEM initiates the PPP. In addition, when the quality of
deceptive counterfeits is suﬃciently low, it is better for consumers if the PPP
is formed, than that if the PPP is not formed. These results are diﬀerent
from those in the non-deceptive case, where forming the PPP would increase
the consumer welfare only if the OEM initiates the PPP, and not forming the
PPP is better for consumers when the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits is
low (see Proposition 5.7). These diﬀerences again demonstrate the importance
of diﬀerentiating the two types of counterfeits when deciding the right anti-
counterfeiting strategy.
Proposition 5.9. In a market where no consumer is proactive, i.e., λ = 0:
• given the same disguise eﬀort of the deceptive counterfeiter, the expected
consumer welfare ECSd is higher if the PPP is initiated by Customs,
than that if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co;
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• if the quality of deceptive counterfeits is suﬃciently low, the expected
consumer welfare ECSd is higher if the PPP is formed, than that if the
PPP is not formed.
5.6 Conclusion
Counterfeiting has damaging impacts on both business and the society. We
study how the government and private enterprises can build a partnership to
combat counterfeiting. More speciﬁcally, we investigate which party should
initiate the partnership, i.e., investing in the information-sharing infrastruc-
ture, and the optimal anti-counterfeiting strategy of each party in diﬀerent
situations. We consider two types of counterfeits, i.e., non-deceptive and de-
ceptive counterfeits. Our results show that the existence of non-deceptive
counterfeits is not always bad to the OEM, if it chooses the right strategy.
Compared to the situation without any counterfeit, if the OEM either joins
or initiates the partnership with Customs, in the presence of a non-deceptive
counterfeiter, it might increase the price of authentic products and earn more
proﬁt.
However, forming the partnership with Customs to combat non-deceptive
counterfeiter does not bring the OEM beneﬁts in all aspects. When Customs
does not initiate the partnership, especially in the situation where the quality
of counterfeits is high, initiating it by the OEM on its own will lead the coun-
terfeiting to increase the price of counterfeits and even potentially capture a
higher market share than the OEM. It possibly explains why in practice some
legitimate ﬁrms do not join such a partnership with the government. We show
that if Customs initiates the PPP, it is guaranteed that the OEM will earn
more proﬁt than the counterfeiter. We also show that the government should
play a bigger role in initiating the PPP when the penalty to the non-deceptive
counterfeiter is small, because the OEM will likely not take the initiative in
such a situation. Our results signify the importance of the government in
initiating the partnership with enterprises to combat non-deceptive counter-
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feiting, especially when the quality of counterfeits is high and the penalty to
the counterfeiter is small.
Compared to the non-deceptive case, we found that private enterprises
should play a bigger role in initiating the partnership with the government in
the ﬁght against deceptive counterfeiting. The OEM could set a higher price
than that without any counterfeit only if it initiates the PPP, and the mar-
ket seize of the deceptive counterfeiter is decreasing in the price of authentic
products in such a situation. Our results also demonstrate the importance
of diﬀerentiating the two types of counterfeits when deciding the right anti-
counterfeiting strategy.
Despite investigative powers of Customs, ﬁghting counterfeit products at
ports of entry is still a case of limited resources targeted far too late in the sup-
ply chain to make a signiﬁcant impact on the problem. For this reason, ﬁrms
should recognize that relying solely on Customs is a poor strategy. In today's
business environment, combating counterfeiting requires ﬁrms to consider all
aspects of a global supply chain, e.g., production, distribution and sales, and
use all resources at disposal, e.g., help from governmental agencies or business
associations. Future research could consider a similar partnership model as an
anti-counterfeiting strategy in other phases of a global supply chain, e.g., in
the manufacturing phase. In addition, future research could study the most
eﬀective supply chain phase to form such a partnership, e.g., should it be in
the upstream supply chain phases or phases where products are closer to the
ﬁnal market.
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Chapter 6
Assessing End-of-Supply Risk of
Spare Parts Using the
Proportional Hazard Model
(PHM)
This chapter was accepted by Decision Sciences in 2016 (Volume 47, Issue 2);
see Li et al. (2016a).
6.1 Introduction
In sectors like aerospace, shipping, and defense, manufacturers and customers
are focused on sustaining their products for prolonged periods. This is due to
the high costs and long time horizons associated with new product develop-
ment. As a result, the lifecycle of systems in these sectors often spans over
20, 30, or even more than 40 years (Rojo et al., 2010). One of the main prob-
lems that these long ﬁeld-life systems face during their lifetime is that parts of
their system components are not supplied anymore. The procurement life of
components, especially of electronic parts, is usually signiﬁcantly shorter than
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the lifetime of the overall systems that they are built into, which poses great
challenges of maintainability and sustainability (Bartels et al., 2012). For long
ﬁeld-life systems, lifecycle mismatch between the system and its components
has become one of the main costs. For instance, end-of-supply of spare parts
for United States Navy systems has been estimated to cost up to 750 million
dollars per year (Adams, 2005).
The main causes for ending supply of spare parts are technological de-
velopments and demand falls. Consequences can be mitigated by predicting,
assessing, and actively managing end-of-supply risk. In this way, companies
can decide to keep larger stock of parts that face ending supply but remain
crucial for current business. Threat advisory systems for ending supply are
very valuable, because it can be very expensive to ﬁnd proper replacements
at short notice (Craighead et al., 2007). Therefore, evaluating end-of-supply
risk of spare parts is the key factor in proactive management and strategic
lifecycle planning for systems with long ﬁeld-life.
This article describes a methodology to assess end-of-supply risk of spare
parts using quantiﬁed upstream supply chain conditions. The methodology is
developed from the perspective of purchasing ﬁrms, that is, ﬁrms that pur-
chase parts, especially ﬁrms of long ﬁeld-life systems. Such ﬁrms typically have
only very limited access to the downstream supply chain information that is
available to the parts manufacturers, such as parts sales data to perform lifecy-
cle analysis. Indicators of end-of-supply risk are derived from information on
the ﬂow of spare parts from suppliers to downstream companies in the supply
chain. Both demand and supply side factors are considered from the company
perspective, as is common in the supply chain literature (Craighead et al.,
2007). The aim is to develop indicators for ending supply of spare parts and
to quantify the associated supply risks in order to assist organizations in their
inventory management and in using long ﬁeld-life products more eﬀectively.
Four supply chain indicators are taken into account, that is, price and lead
time that represent risks originating at the supply side, and cycle time and
throughput that represent risks from the demand side. The methodology is
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demonstrated on data collected from a maintenance and repair organization
(MRO) in the aviation industry. The results show that our methodology based
on up-stream supply information available to purchasing ﬁrms provides them
with a helpful tool to reduce the risk of unforeseen ending supply of spare
parts that are essential for their operation. Moreover, the joint incorporation
of several risk indicators provides substantial gains over approaches based on
a single risk indicator, stressing the importance of the joint analysis of big
data.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews current
methods for predicting end-of-supply and presents the research hypotheses.
Section 6.3 presents the methodology for assessing end-of-supply risk and the
type of data required for this analysis, and Section 6.4 illustrates the method-
ology and evaluates its performance, both in-sample and out-of-sample. Last,
Section 6.5 provides discussions and conclusions.
6.2 Literature and research hypotheses
This section gives a brief review of literature related to end-of-supply risk.
Previous studies mostly focus on manufacturers and supply factors, whereas
the current study considers end-of-supply risk from the perspective of purchas-
ing ﬁrms. After identifying potentially relevant supply and demand factors,
four hypotheses are formulated to assist purchasing ﬁrms of spare parts in
their timely detection of increased end-of-supply risk.
For purchasing ﬁrms, possibly the most straightforward way of assessing
end-of-supply risk is to simply ask the part manufacturers when supply will be
discontinued. Sandborn et al. (2011) refer to a survey conducted for electronic
parts showing considerable inaccuracies in the procurement lifetime reported
by manufacturers. As manufacturers realize that revealing their procurement
outlook can lead to self-fulﬁlling prophecies, they may be hesitant to share
their views with customers. Zsidisin et al. (2000) conclude from interviews
with purchasing professionals that ﬁrms are inclined to form single sourcing
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alliances with suppliers to reduce costs. Supply risk might be mitigated by
multiple sourcing, but this is often not possible for highly specialized parts.
Solomon et al. (2000) predict a part's lifecycle stage and the remaining time
until supply ends from part sales curves. Application of such lifecycle models
is limited to part manufacturers, because part purchasing ﬁrms largely lack
the required sales information. Sandborn et al. (2011) present a methodology
based on failure times, assuming that past failure trends can be extrapolated
to the future. In cases where products have short lifecycles because of contin-
uing innovations, Meixell and Wu (2001) propose the use of leading indicators
for advance warning of major demand changes. As an example, for a given
cluster of products, some products may provide advance indication of demand
patterns for the rest of the cluster (Wu et al., 2006). Leading indicator meth-
ods usually predict demand patterns from two to eight months ahead, making
them unsuitable for long ﬁeld-life systems that have much longer planning
horizons. Further, several authors have expressed concerns on neglected infor-
mation in end-of-supply forecasting (Sandborn et al., 2007, 2011), as current
methods mainly focus on sales data and technological characteristics of parts
whereas supply chain conditions are usually ignored.
In our study, we consider supply loss of spare parts used by maintenance
ﬁrms in out-of production high-capital equipment, such as ageing aircraft.
When an aircraft type is still in production, it is relatively easy and proﬁtable
to produce aircraft-speciﬁc spare parts by increasing lot sizes in production
runs. When production of the aircraft stops, it becomes much more diﬃcult
to produce such parts because of high set-up costs, hence requiring substantial
lot sizes. With further aging of the aircraft type, the install base (number in
use) will decline, and abandoned aircraft can be dismantled for spare parts
(Kennedy et al., 2002). This all leads to less frequent sales and smaller order
quantities for the manufacturer of such parts. To compensate for the set-up
costs, the manufacturer will often wait to combine several customer orders into
a larger lot size. The manufacturer may also concentrate on other parts for
newer planes, so that replacement orders for old parts get lower priority. As a
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result, lead times tend to increase and to show more ﬂuctuations (Chopra and
Sodhi, 2004; Bogataj and Bogataj, 2007; Blackhurst et al., 2008). Further,
because production becomes less proﬁtable, the manufacturer may change
prices to keep his production economical (Zsidisin et al., 2004; Blackhurst
et al., 2008).
In addition to the above supply-related risk indicators, other relevant in-
dicators stem from the demand side. From a supply chain perspective, supply
and demand risks describe directions of potential disruptive eﬀects (Jüttner,
2005) that are often interconnected (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004). Demand risk
has been discussed by Johnson (2001), Cattani and Souza (2003), and Solomon
et al. (2000), among others. End-of-supply risk may be related to demand pat-
terns, in particular, cycle time and throughput. When seen from the perspec-
tive of a purchasing ﬁrm, these demand data pertain to the ﬁrm itself and are
generally unavailable for other ﬁrms. Still, the demand patterns of this single
ﬁrm may have predictive power for end-of-supply risk, for example, if the ﬁrm
is itself a major purchaser or if its demand trends are shared by other ﬁrms.
Cycle time is deﬁned as the period between successive orders. Longer order
intervals for a part might lead to a higher probability of supply failure since
it may represent the underlying market trend of this part. Further, for parts
with long cycle time, the purchasing ﬁrm gets no update on the availability of
the part over long periods of time, thereby increasing the risk that supply of
the part has meanwhile been ended. Throughput is deﬁned as order quantity
divided by the cycle time. Throughput tends to decrease when a part reaches
the end of its lifecycle.
Summarizing, we formulate the following four research hypotheses on end-
of-supply risk indicators, that is, factors that indicate the risk that manufac-
turers stop production of parts. This risk becomes larger if
• the lead-time increases;
• the price increases;
• the cycle time increases;
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• the throughput decreases.
If the above hypotheses hold true, the managerial implication is that com-
panies buying spare parts can assess end-of-supply risk from studying their
purchasing records. The main aim of this article is to propose a methodology
incorporating combined information on the above risk indicators in order to
provide practical tools for ﬁrms in their management of end-of-supply risk of
spare parts.
6.3 Methodology
This section discusses the spare part data used in the empirical analysis and
the statistical model to express end-of-supply risk in terms of four groups of
risk indicators: lead time, price, cycle time, and throughput.
Spare Part Data
The data are collected from an MRO in the aviation industry. The MRO acts
as intermediary between its clients, the owners of aircraft, and its suppliers,
the parts manufacturers. The main interest of the MRO lies in high quality
support by guaranteed delivery of all parts that their clients need for the
continued operation of their systems. The aircraft maintained by this MRO
are composed of more than thirty thousand parts. Many of the aircraft are
already out of production and have entered the last phase of their lifecycles.
The MRO needs to pay close attention to supply problems, as it increasingly
operates under performance-based contracts that make part availability even
more critical. Further, unavailability of spare parts may lead to abandonment
of the aircraft with large loss for the MRO. In order to achieve the availability
targets for long ﬁeld-life systems, it is necessary to have high enough stocks for
spare parts. Being farseeing and proactive about end-of-supply risk is critical
to maintain fully capable products and systems and to satisfy customers.
The data have been collected from databases maintained by the technical
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support group of the MRO. We will use the terminology of the MRO and call a
part obsolete if it is no longer supplied and healthy if its supply continues. One
of the databases of the MRO is the obsolescence database, which contains the
part number, obsolescence date, reason of obsolescence, and its solution, for all
parts of which supply ended during the observation interval between May 2006
and June 2013. The considered parts consist of vendor parts, as ﬁrm speciﬁc
parts are easier to monitor whereas the supply risk of vendor parts is much
more uncertain. Each time the MRO receives an end-of-supply notiﬁcation
from a supplier, the cause of ending their supply is requested. Manufacturers
may discontinue a product due to unavailability of a critical part. If the part in
question is revealed by the supplier, the MRO adds the number of the obsolete
part, instead of the higher assembly (module), to the database. In total, the
database contains 700 obsolete parts, with obsolescence dates ranging from
October 2006 to March 2013. A total of 7767 higher assemblies are linked to
these parts.
The MRO also has a procurement database, which contains purchase his-
tories of parts from May 2006 until June 2013. In principle, each time a part is
purchased, the date of the purchase order is registered, together with the price,
quantity, and supplier information. The delivery date is added to the database
when the MRO receives the part. The database was scanned for doubtful and
irrelevant purchase data, and the following types of purchases were excluded:
canceled orders (199), purchases from once-only suppliers (709), internal deliv-
eries (474), missing delivery date (32), single purchases (182), and purchases
after obsolescence date (1015). After excluding these purchase data, a total of
180 obsolete parts remain for analysis, most of which are piece parts whereas
others are registered as higher assemblies because the supplier did not reveal
the part causing end-of-supply. The parts are clustered in four groups ac-
cording to functionality criteria provided by the MRO: airframe components,
electronics parts, interior parts, and other parts such as engine and mechanical
parts. The idea behind this classiﬁcation is that the dynamics of supply chain
characteristics may diﬀer among these four clusters.
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As the methodology intends to distinguish obsolete from healthy parts,
data on healthy parts are also considered. Even though a large number of
parts have not been indicated as obsolete yet, most of them were not purchased
during the analysis period (2006-2013). Purchase data satisfying the inclusion
criteria discussed above for obsolete parts are available for in total 1910 healthy
parts. From this subset, 186 healthy parts were randomly selected such that
each of the following criteria were met: the parts have been purchased in 2012
or 2013; they have constant suppliers in the procurement database; they have
not yet been declared obsolete by their suppliers; and the number of parts
in the healthy and obsolete groups are comparable within each of the four
clusters.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the 180 obsolete and 186 healthy parts
used to construct a statistical model for end-of-supply risk. The purpose is to
relate diﬀerences in procurement lifetimes between obsolete and healthy parts
to underlying supply and demand risk indicators. The procurement lifetime
of an obsolete part is deﬁned as the time between the obsolescence date and
the ﬁrst purchase date. For healthy parts, the procurement lifetime is right-
censored, as it is deﬁned as the time between the analysis date (July 1 of 2013)
and the ﬁrst purchase date. The lifetimes are censored, because all parts were
introduced before the start of the analysis period (May 2006). Comparison-
of-means ANOVA tests show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mean lifetimes for
the four parts clusters, neither for healthy parts (p-value 0.26) nor for obsolete
parts (p-value 0.87). The time span of the study is slightly more than seven
years, which is too short to show the longer lifetimes of airframe components
and interior parts as compared to electronics parts.
End-of-Supply Risk Indicators
The procurement database can be used to construct various variables related
to the risk indicators discussed before, that is, price, lead time, cycle time,
and throughput. Discussions with MRO personnel provided motivation to
consider 13 risk factors in total. This subsection ﬁrst discusses the deﬁnition
6.3. METHODOLOGY 145
Percentage Shares Mean Life Time (Days)
Parts Sample All Healthy Obsolete All Healthy Obsolete
Airframe 23 6.28 2.73 3.55 1750 2552 1133
Electronic 59 16.12 8.20 7.92 1868 2514 1200
Interior 12 3.28 1.91 1.37 1940 2539 1102
Other 272 74.32 37.98 36.34 1820 2503 1107
All 366 100 50.82 49.18 1828 2509 1124
Table notes:
• Sample contains 186 healthy parts and 180 obsolete parts.
•The cluster of other parts includes, among others, engine and mechanical
parts, fuel systems, hydraulics, pneumatics, and landing gears.
Table 6.1: Four clusters of parts
of each risk factor, followed by comparisons between the groups of obsolete
and healthy parts.
The risk factors can be deﬁned by using the following notation for each
given part. The number of purchases of this part in the database is denoted by
n. The i-th purchase (i = 1, · · · , n) has purchase date ti (measured in days),
price pi, order quantity qi, and lead time li. The last (n-th) observation refers
to the last purchase before the obsolescence date (do) for obsolete parts and
to the last purchase before the analysis date (da) for healthy parts. The time
interval between two successive purchase dates is denoted by ci = ti˘ti−1 (i =
2, · · · , n). If the values of a risk indicator vary over time, the corresponding
risk factor is deﬁned either as an average over time or in terms of the total
change over time. This way of measurement is motivated by the fact that there
are long periods without purchases, so that a detailed analysis of purchase
patterns over time is not well possible.
The three price factors are deﬁned as price change PRC = (pn˘p1)/p1,
price change over time PRCT = PRC/(tn˘t1), and annual relative price
increase PRAI = −1 + (pn/p1)365/(tn˘t1). If parts are purchased from dif-
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ferent countries, prices are converted to euros by means of the currency rate
at the purchase date. Prices are deﬂated by an annual inﬂation rate of 2
percent, corresponding roughly to the average inﬂation rate over the observa-
tion period. Cycle time factors are the average cycle time CTA (the sample
mean of c2, · · · , cn), the change in cycle time CTC = (cn˘c2)/c2, and the
order interval since the last purchase (OILP , measured in years), deﬁned by
OILP = (d0˘tn)/365 for obsolete parts and OILP = (da˘tn)/365 for healthy
parts. The throughput factors are average throughput TPA (the sample mean
of q2/c2, · · · , qn/cn), and throughput change TPC = (qn/cn˘q2/c2)/(q2/c2).
Lead time factors include average lead time LTA (the sample mean of l1, · · · , ln),
change in lead time LTC = (ln˘l1)/l1, and change in lead time over time
LTCT = LTC/(tn˘t1). Two other lead time factors are obtained by com-
paring the most recent lead time of each part to its longest lead time in the
database (lmax): last versus longest LTLvL = (lmax˘ln)/ln, and the corre-
sponding value over time LTLvLT = LTLvL/cL where cL is the time inter-
val between the last (n-th) purchase date and the purchase date for which the
lead time was the longest of all. The motivation for the latter factor is that
supply disruptions in the far past are less harmful than recent ones.
A diagnostic test of the descriptive power of the above risk factors is ob-
tained by comparing mean levels between the groups of obsolete and healthy
parts. The results in Table 6.2 show that, at the 5% signiﬁcance level, ﬁve of
the 13 factors diﬀer signiﬁcantly: CTA and OILP for cycle time, TPA for
throughput, and LTA and LTCT for lead time. As compared to the healthy
group, parts in the obsolete group have higher cycle time, longer order interval
since last purchase, longer and more steeply increasing lead time, and smaller
throughput, in correspondence with our hypotheses. Although obsolete parts
have higher and more steeply increasing prices than healthy parts, the dif-
ferences in mean price levels are not signiﬁcant due to large price variations
caused by product heterogeneity. Price diﬀerences remain insigniﬁcant also
when considered separately per cluster of products.
Correlations between pairs of risk factors are small between groups (price,
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cycle time, throughput, and lead time), and in some cases large within these
groups. The three price factors are highly correlated (the correlations are
0.98, 0.95, and 0.90), and the group of ﬁve lead time factors show two high
correlations (0.98 and 0.66). Between diﬀerent groups of risk factors, the
highest correlations are those between TPA and CTC (0.62) and between
ALT and the three price variables (0.38, 0.37, and 0.35). Apart from the
mentioned 9 correlations, all other 69 pairs of risk factors have correlation
below 0.20. For example, the maximal correlation with other factors is 0.13 for
average cycle time (CTA) and 0.18 for the order interval since last purchase
(OILP ). The various risk factors seem to measure diﬀerent supply chain
characteristics, so that their combination may improve risk assessments.
Proportional Hazard Model (PHM)
The various risk factors can be taken into consideration jointly by means of
the proportional hazard model (PHM), introduced by Cox (1972). This model
is widely used in condition-based maintenance (Scarf, 1997), as it provides
condition-speciﬁc predictions of failure probabilities over time. For instance,
Jardine et al. (1987) proposed using PHM to combine aircraft engine-failure
data with metal concentration measurements of the engine oil. The standard
PHM speciﬁcation uses ﬁxed covariates, meaning that the value of each risk
factor is constant over time, and otherwise the PHM is called time-dependent
(Cox, 1972). The analysis of end-of-supply risk of spare parts in this arti-
cle employs standard PHM, because the value of each considered risk factor
(summarized in Table 6.2) is determined at the analysis date, either as sam-
ple average or as change over the full observation period or over a sub-period.
The practical interpretation of this choice is that risk evaluation is considered
a task to be performed at a chosen evaluation date rather than a continuous
on-line task.
The core of PHM is the hazard function, which is deﬁned as follows. Let
T be the failure time of a given part, which is considered as a random variable
as this time is not known a priori. At any given time instant (t), the hazard
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Healthy Parts Obsolete Parts
Covariate Acronym Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. P-value
Price
change PRC 0.513 1.002 0.956 5.014 0.247
change over time (×100) PRCT 0.022 0.043 0.316 2.321 0.092
annual increase PRAI 0.051 0.076 11.890 99.705 0.113
Cycle Time
average/100 CTA 1.273 1.007 2.444 2.526 0.000
change/100 CTC 0.179 0.965 0.108 0.608 0.403
order interval last purchase OILP 0.520 0.325 1.168 1.137 0.000
Throughput
average/100 TPA 1.570 8.774 0.026 0.135 0.017
change/100 TPC 0.132 1.550 0.662 7.703 0.367
Lead Time
average/100 LTA 0.389 0.229 0.695 0.706 0.000
change/100 LTC 0.008 0.027 0.077 0.538 0.089
change over time (×100) LTCT 0.037 0.117 3.470 18.897 0.016
last vs longest/100 LTLvL 0.049 0.067 0.390 3.137 0.147
last vs longest over time LTLvLT 0.005 0.011 0.270 2.808 0.207
Table notes:
• Sample contains 186 healthy parts and 180 obsolete parts.
•The factors for cycle time, throughput, and lead time are all measured
in days, except for the order interval since last purchase (OILP) that is
measured in years.
• Some factors are rescaled to prevent very small or very large coeﬃcients.
•The p-value is for the t-test of equal means in the two groups (healthy
and obsolete), not assuming equal variances in the two groups (as the
latter hypothesis is rejected for each variable).
Table 6.2: Supply risk factors in groups of healthy and obsolete parts
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rate h(t) is the marginal probability rate for the part becoming obsolete in
an inﬁnitesimally small time period between t and t + δ, given that it is still
available at time t, so
h(t) = limδ↓0Prob(t < T < t+ δ)/(δ × Prob(T > t)) (6.1)
A hazard rate implies the associated survival function S(t) = Prob(T > t) =
exp(˘
∫ t
0 h(s)ds), and end-of-life occurs in the time interval a ≤ T ≤ b with
probability S(b)˘S(a). For obsolete parts, the procurement lifetime is deﬁned
as T = do˘d1, where do is the obsolescence date and d1 is the ﬁrst purchase
date. For d1, one sometimes uses the date on which the original manufacturer
introduced the part (Sandborn et al., 2011), but this date is generally unknown
to the MRO or customer in the upstream supply chain and their ﬁrst purchases
may fall far behind introduction dates. Further, as is usual in survival analysis,
the observed life times of healthy parts are right-censored, as the failure date
is known only to fall beyond the analysis date. For healthy parts, the (right-
censored) lifetime is deﬁned as T = da˘d1, where da is the analysis date.
In PHM, the hazard rate is expressed as the product of the baseline hazard
h0(t), which depends on time only, and a positive function f(x, β) that involves
the risk factors (x) and their eﬀects (β), so that h(t) = f(x, β) × h0(t). By
far the most widely used speciﬁcation is the exponential one, which in case of
k risk factors gives
h(t) = exp(β1x1 + β2x2 + · · ·+ βkxk)× h0(t) (6.2)
If risk factor j increases by one unit, the hazard rate is multiplied by exp(βj),
and the relative eﬀect of an increase by one percent is equal to exp(βjxj/100)˘1.
Further, as log(h(t)) = β1x1 + β2x2 + · · ·+ βkxk + log(h0(t)), it follows that
βj = ∂ log(h(t))/∂xj = (∂h(t)/∂xj)/h(t) (6.3)
This means that the marginal eﬀect on the hazard rate of an increase in the
j-th risk factor is equal to βj × h(t), so that this eﬀect is proportional to
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the hazard rate h(t). Higher levels of a risk factor increase (decrease) end-of-
supply risk if they have a positive (negative) coeﬃcient.
The data used in estimation consists of the life time durations, which are
right-censored for healthy parts, and the part-speciﬁc values of the risk factors
that are included in the model. If the baseline hazard is expressed in para-
metric form, the resulting PHM in (6.2) becomes fully parametric, allowing
estimation by maximum likelihood (ML). In many cases, however, the baseline
speciﬁcation is ambiguous. The inconsistency resulting from incorrect base-
line speciﬁcation can be prevented by leaving the baseline hazard unspeciﬁed
and estimating the resulting semi-parametric model by means of the partial
likelihood approach suggested by Cox (1975). This method has the advantage
of providing consistent estimates of the coeﬃcients (β1, β2, · · · , βk) in (6.2)
and their standard errors, irrespective of the baseline hazard, at the expense
of some loss of eﬃciency as compared to ML in a correctly speciﬁed fully para-
metric model (Kumar and Klefsjö, 1994; Newby, 1994). In many applications,
this expense well outweighs the risk of wrong estimates and wrong standard
errors resulting from applying ML in a wrongly speciﬁed model. If all parts in
the dataset have diﬀerent obsolescence dates, the partial likelihood estimates
are obtained by maximizing (Cox, 1975)
L(β1, β2, · · · , βk) =
n∏
i=1
exp(β
′
xi)∑
j∈H(i) exp(β
′xj)
(6.4)
Here β
′
xi = β1x1i + β2x2i + · · ·+ βkxki, where xi = (x1i, x2i, · · · , xki) are the
scores on the k risk factors for the i-th part, n is the total number of obsolete
parts, and H(i) is the set of parts that are not (yet) obsolete at the time just
before the i-th part becomes obsolete. If the obsolescence date of the i-th
part is ti, then H(i) contains all parts that are still healthy at the end of the
observation period and all parts that become obsolete between time ti and the
end of the observation period. For each obsolescence time ti, the fraction in
(6.4) can be interpreted as the probability that it is the i-th part that fails,
given that some part does become obsolete at the time ti, and given the set of
6.3. METHODOLOGY 151
parts that has already become obsolete before time ti. A similar expression can
be derived in case some of the obsolescence times coincide (Breslow, 1974).
The partial likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotically normally
distributed with standard errors computed similar to ML, replacing the full
likelihood by the partial likelihood. A backward stepwise approach is followed
for models containing several risk factors, starting with all risk factors and
reducing the model step-by-step by deleting the least signiﬁcant factor until
all remaining factors are signiﬁcant (at 5% level). For the resulting model, each
omitted factor is considered once again, and if any is signiﬁcant, it is added to
the set of included factors. After ﬁnal selection of the included risk factors, the
resulting PHM is estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood (Kalbﬂeisch
and Prentice, 2011). As was discussed before, correlations between the four
groups of risk indicators (price, lead time, cycle time, and throughput) are
small, which simpliﬁes coeﬃcient interpretation (Kobbacy et al., 1997).
Once the parameters (β1, β2, · · · , βk) have been estimated, the baseline
hazard can be estimated by means of non-parametric procedures (Breslow,
1974). In order to estimate the probability of ending supply of a part during
a given time interval, parametric approximations of the baseline hazard may
be needed, and the Weibull distribution is a popular choice. For the empirical
application of this article, the statistical package SPSS was used, which has
a wide range of facilities for testing the model and for selecting explanatory
variables.
The dataset used to estimate the hazard models consists of the set of 366
parts summarized in Table 6.1. In this dataset, about 50 percent of the parts
become obsolete somewhere during the observation period, and the ﬁnal value
of the survival probability S(da) at the analysis date will therefore be close
to 0.5. As the set of 186 healthy parts included in the analysis is only a
small part of all healthy parts that are relevant for the MRO, the levels of
the survival function S(t) and of the baseline hazard rate h0(t) do not have a
direct interpretation. What matters most is the eﬀect of each risk factor on
the hazard rate, that is, the sign and size of the parameters (β1, β2, · · · , βk),
152 CHAPTER 6. ASSESSING END-OF-SUPPLY RISK USING PHM
and the ranking of the survival probabilities S(da) of the various parts. Note
that these parameters and rankings are not aﬀected by the baseline hazard,
because of the chosen structure of the PHM (see equation (6.2)) and the partial
likelihood method of estimation.
6.4 Results
Estimation Results
Kaplan-Meier survival plots of the four spare parts clusters are shown in Figure
6.1. In the ﬁgure, label 1 is for 23 airframe parts (long dashed line), 2 is for
59 electronic parts (short dashed line), 3 is for 12 interior parts (shaded tiny
dashed line), and 4 is for 272 other parts (continuous line). These plots do
not indicate any noticeable lifetime diﬀerences between diﬀerent clusters over
the observation period, which is in line with the ANOVA results for mean
lifetime discussed before. In all models, possible cluster eﬀects were always
investigated by including cluster dummies, and as none of these cluster eﬀects
were found signiﬁcant they are not be reported here.
The upper part of Table 6.3 shows the results obtained by including a single
risk factor in the PHM. The column `Eﬀect' shows the percentage increase in
the hazard rate if the factor increases by one percent from its mean value,
with value equal to 100(exp(b ×m/100)˘1), where m is the sample mean of
the factor and b is its coeﬃcient. Nine out of the 13 considered risk factors
are individually signiﬁcant (at 5% level), with largest size eﬀect for average
throughput. The set of signiﬁcant factors closely resembles the set of factors
with signiﬁcantly diﬀerent means between the sets of obsolete and healthy
parts in Table 6.2: the results coincide for all cycle time and throughput
factors, for two out of three price variables, and for two out of ﬁve lead time
factors. All signiﬁcant factors have the expected sign, with larger end-of-
supply risk for higher price, longer lead time, longer cycle time, and smaller
throughput. These results conﬁrm our research hypotheses.
The lower part of Table 6.3 shows the PHM with multiple factors, ob-
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tained by the backward stepwise strategy starting with all nine individually
signiﬁcant factors. The resulting model contains six risk factors: average cycle
time, order interval since last purchase, average throughput, and three lead
time factors. In this multifactor PHM, none of the three price variables has
signiﬁcant additional explanatory power, neither individually, nor jointly. The
eﬀect sizes of the included risk factors are roughly similar to those obtained
for the single-factor models, owing to the small correlations between most of
the risk factors. The results for lead time, cycle time, and throughput conﬁrm
again our research hypotheses.
Several tests are performed to check the assumptions underlying the multiple-
factor model of Table 6.3. Schoenfeld's residuals (Schoenfeld, 1982) do not
show any systematic patterns over time, and Cox-Snell residuals provide no
indication for risk factor transformations.
Cross-Validation Results
In order to evaluate how the PHM performs in out-of-sample prediction, strat-
iﬁed ﬁve-fold cross-validation is performed. The 180 obsolete parts and 186
healthy parts are partitioned into ﬁve disjoint sets of nearly equal size, each
containing roughly the same proportions of obsolete and healthy parts. Subse-
quently, ﬁve rounds of training and validation are performed. In each round,
the model is estimated from data of four of the subsets (the training set,
with 292 or 293 parts), using the same backward stepwise PHM model selec-
tion strategy and baseline estimation procedures as discussed before, and the
other subset (with 73 or 74 parts) is hold out for validation. All ﬁve rounds
resulted in the same set of six signiﬁcant risk factors that were also obtained
for the full dataset in Table 6.3, also with roughly similar coeﬃcients. In
predicting end-of-supply risk for each validation set, all parts in the valida-
tion set are considered healthy on the date of analysis, as this is the relevant
situation in actual out-of-sample prediction where the status (healthy or ob-
solete) of the predicted parts is still unknown. Therefore, for obsolete parts
in the validation set, the lifetime is adjusted accordingly. The order interval
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Covariates Mean Coeﬀ. St. Error P-value Sign. Eﬀect (%)
Single Factor
PRC 0.731 0.024 0.017 0.142 No 0.018
PRCT(×100) 0.166 0.062 0.031 0.042 Yes 0.012
PRAI 5.874 0.001 0.001 0.071 No 0.008
CTA/100 1.849 0.118 0.025 0.000 Yes 0.218
CTC/100 0.144 -0.132 0.139 0.345 No -0.019
OILP 0.839 0.327 0.060 0.000 Yes 0.275
TPA/100 0.811 -2.388 0.771 0.002 Yes -1.918
TPC/100 0.392 0.012 0.010 0.222 No 0.005
LTA/100 0.539 0.682 0.101 0.000 Yes 0.368
LTC/100 0.042 0.427 0.118 0.000 Yes 0.018
LTCT(×100) 1.725 0.034 0.005 0.000 Yes 0.058
LTLvL/100 0.217 0.102 0.023 0.000 Yes 0.022
LTLvLT 0.136 0.106 0.026 0.000 Yes 0.014
Multiple Factors
CTA/100 1.849 0.086 0.029 0.003 Yes 0.160
OILP 0.839 0.308 0.062 0.000 Yes 0.259
TPA/100 0.811 -1.877 0.698 0.007 Yes -1.511
LTA/100 0.539 0.486 0.111 0.000 Yes 0.262
LTCT(×100) 1.725 0.033 0.005 0.000 Yes 0.056
LTLvLT 0.136 0.129 0.026 0.000 Yes 0.018
Table notes:
• `Mean' is the sample mean of the factor.
• `Sign.' shows whether the factor eﬀect is signiﬁcant or not at the 5%
level.
• `Eﬀect (%)' shows the percentage increase of the hazard rate if the risk
factor increases by one percent from its mean.
Table 6.3: Estimated PHMs for single and multiple factors
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since the last purchase (OILP ) is not adjusted; if the `healthy part' formula
OILP = (da˘tn)/365 were used also for obsolete parts, instead of the `obsolete
part' formula OILP = (d0˘tn)/365, then this risk factor would be artiﬁcially
enlarged for parts with obsolescence date d0 that falls far before the analysis
date da.
Table 6.4 shows the cross-validation results, both for each single-factor
model (averaged over the ﬁve validation sets) and for the multiple-factor model
(for each individual validation set, and averaged). The average survival prob-
ability over the sample is approximately 50 percent, and high (low) end-of-
supply risk is deﬁned as survival probability below 0.3 (above 0.7). These
probabilities are partly based on the baseline hazard, and it is also of interest
to consider the set of spare parts that carry the highest end-of-supply risk, as
this set does not depend on the baseline hazard. Table 6.4 shows the results
for the 25 spare parts in the validation set (of 73 or 74 parts) that have the
highest end-of-supply risk as predicted from the training set.
The outcomes show that the multiple-factor PHM provides substantial
improvements over the single-factor models. For the top-25 risky parts, the
multiple-factor model has an average hit rate over the ﬁve validation sets
of more than 80 percent (20.2 correct and 4.8 false alarms). Averaged over
the nine signiﬁcant single-factor models of Table 6.3, the average hit rate is
below 50 percent (11.4 correct and 13.6 false alarms). The best performing
single-factor models are those with average cycle time and order interval since
last purchase (with hit rates slightly below 60 percent). The multiple-factor
model also provides more reliable results for spare parts with low survival
probabilities (0 ≤ S ≤ 0.3), as the single-factor models provide very few
predictions in this class (maximal average of 5.0 for LTA). For risky parts
with predicted survival probability below 0.3, nearly all parts identiﬁed by
the multiple-factor model are actually obsolete (on average 12.6 out of 13.2,
hit rate 95 percent). For non-risky parts with predicted survival probability
above 0.7, the hit rate is 68 percent (6.8 out of 10).
The overall conclusion is that the combination of various types of risk indi-
156 CHAPTER 6. ASSESSING END-OF-SUPPLY RISK USING PHM
cators (lead time, cycle time, and throughput) provides considerably more re-
liable out-of-sample end-of-supply assessments as compared to methods based
on a single supply chain indicator.
Out-of-Sample Risk Assessment and MRO Survey
The models and cross-validation results described before are all based on a set
of 386 parts, of which 186 are healthy and 180 have become obsolete during
the observation interval. The multiple-factor model can be used to estimate
the end-of-supply risk of any other part for which the relevant supply chain
information is available. The available procurement database contains this
information for 1724 other parts that were not included in the set of 386 parts
considered before. At the date of analysis (July 1 of 2013), all these parts
had a healthy status in the database in the sense that these parts were not
registered as being obsolete.
In order to evaluate prediction accuracy, the MRO asked its procurement
department to answer a list of survey questions measuring supply disruption
risk for parts. This survey was originally developed by Ellis et al. (2010), who
found that technological uncertainty, market thinness, item customization,
and item importance inﬂuence buyers' perceptions of overall supply disruption
risk. The survey consists of 20 questions (all measured on a seven-point scale
from low to high risk) on eight items, details of which are provided in the
Appendix C. The completion time for the questionnaire ranges from 25 to 40
minutes (Ellis et al., 2010). It is therefore infeasible to implement this survey-
based risk assessment for all purchased parts, whereas our model-based risk
score for each part can be obtained directly from the supply chain database.
The MRO answered the survey for a selection of 60 out of the 1724 parts.
These 60 parts are obtained by random selection of 30 out of the 60 most risky
parts and also 30 out of the 60 least risky parts, identiﬁed by respectively the
60 smallest and the 60 largest values of the estimated survival probabilities
S(da) at the analysis date. The average survival probability is 0.017 for the 30
selected high-risk parts and 1.000 for the 30 selected low-risk parts. The MRO
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Top-25 Risk High Risk: 0 ≤ S ≤ 0.3 Low Risk: 0.7 < S ≤ 1
Mean Obs. Hea. Mean Obs. Hea. Mean Obs. Hea.
Single factor
PRCT 0.441 9.8 15.2 0.000 0.4 0 0.764 1.2 0
CTA 0.392 14.8 10.2 0.183 2.8 0.8 0.788 1.4 0
OILP 0.375 14.2 10.8 0.204 4.8 0 0.752 2.8 0
TPA 0.407 11.0 14.0  0 0 0.909 1.8 6.6
LTA 0.348 14.0 11.0 0.168 4.8 0.2 0.768 2.4 0
LTC 0.444 9.4 15.6 0.000 0.2 0 0.816 0.6 0
LTCT 0.431 10.2 14.8 0.000 1.0 0 0.796 0.8 0
LTLvL 0.440 9.4 15.6 0.126 0.6 0 0.786 1.0 0
LTLvLT 0.440 9.8 15.2 0.097 0.6 0 0.784 1.0 0
Average 0.413 11.4 13.6 0.097 1.7 0.1 0.796 1.4 0.7
Multiple factors
Set 1 0.302 19 6 0.166 11 0 0.817 6 8
Set 2 0.239 20 5 0.166 14 1 0.900 3 3
Set 3 0.225 23 2 0.137 13 1 0.853 1 6
Set 4 0.215 21 4 0.141 15 1 0.960 2 7
Set 5 0.308 18 7 0.191 10 0 0.890 4 10
Average 0.258 20.2 4.8 0.161 12.6 0.6 0.884 3.2 6.8
Table notes:
• `Mean' shows mean probability S that spare part is still healthy (at the
moment of analysis).
• `Obs.' and `Hea.'show the mean number of respectively obsolete and
healthy parts.
•The results for single-factor models are averages over ﬁve validation sets,
and the row `Average' is the average over these nine factors. The results
for the multiple-factor model are shown both for each validation set and
as average over these ﬁve validation sets.
Table 6.4: Cross-validation results for single and multiple factor PHMs
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personnel were kept uninformed on the risk status of the part to guarantee
their independent risk evaluation.
Ellis et al. (2010) found that the question on overall disruption risk is a very
informative one. The 30 surveys for the high-risk parts have an average score of
overall supply disruption risk of 5.8 (standard error 0.3), which is signiﬁcantly
larger than the average score of 1.8 (standard error 0.2) for the 30 low-risk
parts (the t-test for equal means has p-value below 0.0005). This single survey
question is very informative on disruption risk, as 26 out of the 30 high-risk
parts have a score of 5 or higher on this question, and 28 out of the 30 low-risk
parts have a score of 2 or lower. The three survey questions on the probability
of supply disruption are almost equally informative, with mean scores of 5.8 for
high-risk parts and 2.1 for low-risk parts. Other questions are less informative,
with mean scores for high-risk and low-risk parts of respectively 4.6 and 4.2 for
item customization, 2.5 and 2.1 for technological uncertainty, 2.3 and 1.4 for
item importance, 4.3 and 3.5 for market thinness, 1.9 and 1.3 for magnitude of
supply disruption, and 1.8 and 1.2 for search for alternative source of supply.
Still, all of these questions have a higher average risk score for high-risk parts
than for low-risk parts. These results show that the model identiﬁcation of
(extreme) high and low risk parts is in accordance with the MRO expert
opinions. Later on, the MRO found that supply of 21 out of the 30 estimated
high-risk parts had actually already been ended. Further, the MRO stated
that four of the remaining nine parts are very suspicious indeed. The model
therefore showed strong out-of-sample predictive power for parts with high
end-of-supply risk. In addition, 29 of the 30 estimated low-risk parts turned
out to be healthy, whereas one of these parts was judged by the MRO to be
at risk.
Implementation at MRO
The MRO used to follow a reactive policy, contacting manufacturers after
ﬁnding out that supply of parts had ended. This strategy has recently been
transformed into a proactive one, by implementing the PHM with multiple
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factors shown in Table 6.3 as a user-friendly interface tool for risk evaluation.
The procurement database of the MRO is updated on a weekly basis and
contains information on about half a million parts. Every week, the MRO
employs the tool to assess the end-of-supply risk of parts, and it contacts
manufacturers of parts with high risk. In this way, the MRO is able to manage
end-of-supply risk in a structured and proactive way.
6.5 Discussion
Implications
Suﬃcient availability of spare parts is crucial for prolonged maintenance of
long ﬁeld-life systems. Firms that purchase spare parts often have limited
insight in the future production plans of spare part suppliers and therefore
need to resort to the supply chain information that is available to them in
their buyer's role. Potential indicators for end-of-supply risk are increasing
prices, longer lead times, longer cycle times, and smaller throughput volumes.
Price and lead time capture uncertainty from the supplier side, whereas cycle
time and throughput represent demand risk, for example, if the ﬁrm is itself
a major purchaser or if its demand trends are shared by other ﬁrms. Detailed
registration of information on price, lead time, cycle time, and throughput
volume for all parts of the maintained systems provides a big database that
can be exploited to support order and inventory policies of ﬁrms purchasing
spare parts. In particular, when the supply chain indicators show high end-of-
supply risk of a part, ﬁrms can contact their supplier for further information
and they can try to build up suﬃcient inventory for the risky part. By this kind
of proactive management, these ﬁrms may prevent high adjustment costs and
dissatisfaction of system owners because of failure to comply with contracted
maintenance.
The various end-of-supply risk indicators obtained from the database are
incorporated in an integrated methodology for risk assessment by means of
the PHM. This model provides a hazard rate function, that is, for each part
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and at each moment in time it gives the marginal increase in the end-of-
supply probability. This methodology is applied to an MRO in the aviation
industry handling over thirty thousand parts. The database of this MRO
contains relevant purchase information only for a limited number of parts,
leaving a set of about 2,000 parts available for analysis. The end-of-supply
risk of parts is modeled in terms of the information available at the analysis
date. For this MRO, signiﬁcant supply-chain risk indicators are throughput,
cycle time, and lead time, whereas price and part cluster were not found
to have additional predictive power. Higher end-of-supply risk is associated
with smaller throughput, longer average cycle time between successive orders,
longer periods since the last order in the database, longer average or recent
lead times, and steeper increase in lead time. The PHM tool is employed to
identify sets of parts with high end-of-supply risk. Cross-validation results and
out-of-sample predictions show that the proposed methodology performs very
well in identifying risky parts, with hit rates (correct identiﬁcation of end-of-
supply) of 95 percent in cross-validation and 70-80 percent out-of-sample. The
last result is obtained by comparing model predictions of highest and lowest
risk parts with evaluations made by the MRO by means of a survey asking for
the perceived disruption risk for each part.
The joint incorporation of various supply chain indicators provides a sub-
stantially better risk assessment than methods based on a single indicator,
conﬁrming the value of big data analysis as the various indicators measure
diﬀerent risk dimensions.
Although speciﬁc end-of-supply risk environments will diﬀer among ﬁrms
purchasing spare parts, the methodology can serve all. The crucial condition
is that the ﬁrm keeps track of the relevant supply chain indicators for each
part of interest. At any proposed analysis date, the big database can be
used to construct a set of end-of-supply risk indicators and the PHM can be
estimated from these data. The resulting risk scores for each part can be
scanned to identify parts at risk and to support proactive order and inventory
policies.
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Limitations and Conclusions
The methodology presented in this article can be applied in general for MRO's
keeping detailed purchasing data records, but the speciﬁc outcomes will de-
pend on the industrial sector. For long ﬁeld-life systems, purchase data need
to be registered over long periods. The observation period of this study covers
slightly more than seven years, which is relatively short as compared to the
lifetime of the considered systems. Another limitation of the analysis is that
the risk factors are measured at the analysis date, either as averages or in
terms of ﬁrst and last available purchase information, thereby neglecting the
fact that supply chain characteristics may show considerable variation within
the observation period. These limitations can be mitigated by more detailed
recording of purchase histories over longer periods to allow the use of more ad-
vanced risk assessment models, including PHM with time-varying covariates
(Cox, 1972), proportional intensity models (Vlok et al., 2004), hidden Markov
models (Bunks et al., 2000), models using delay-time concepts (Wang, 2002),
and stochastic process models (Wang et al., 2000).
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Figure 6.1: Kaplan-Meier survival plots of four spare part clusters
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Uncertainty exists in every aspect of a ﬁrm's operations. Underestimating it
can lead to strategies that neither defend a company against the threats nor
take advantage of the opportunities that higher levels of uncertainty provide.
Making systematically sound decisions under uncertainty does not require a
ﬁrm to predict all possible future scenarios, but to develop a policy according
to which it adapts its decisions to future changes. With the right insights and
strategies, ﬁrms can turn uncertainty from a liability to a leverage point. In
addition to uncertainty, competition also shapes a ﬁrm's strategy. While one
sometimes hears business executives complaining to the contrary, competition
in an industry is not bad luck. The existence of competing products can
lead a ﬁrm to earn more proﬁts by capturing higher-value consumer segments.
In my dissertation (Chapters 3-6), I study the optimal dynamic operations
strategies in the competition and I focus on three speciﬁc decisions in four
phases of a ﬁrm's operations. First, I start with the question how much
capacity should a ﬁrm build in a competitive market with changing demand.
Then, I move to the next phase where a ﬁrm decides the optimal launch timing
for its next-generation product and the optimal capacity allocation. After the
product launch phase, I look at vicious competition, i.e., the counterfeiting
issue, in the market and study how should a ﬁrm combat diﬀerent types of
counterfeiting. Lastly, I study risk management for long ﬁeld-life systems in
163
164 CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION
the operations phase. Below, I summarize the main ﬁndings and contributions
in each chapter.
Chapter 3. Dynamic Capacity Investment under Competition
This chapter studied optimal long-term investment strategies under com-
petition. We developed an algorithm to derive full optimal policies in terms
of investment timing and size for both the leader and follower ﬁrms. Our
model was validated using detailed date from the container shipping market
(2000-2015). Although the investments of shipping lines are often questioned
to be irrational, our results showed that they are close to the optimal capacity
choices determined by our proactive competitive strategies. We contributed
to the literature by providing a theory that can explain the competitive in-
vestment phenomena observed in practice, which are not fully explained by
current models. We contributed to practice by providing a practical guideline
with four steps on how to achieve an eﬀective competitive investment strategy.
Chapter 4. Launching Next-Generation Products (NGP) in a
Competitive Market
This chapter studied two main capacity decisions of two competing ﬁrms
during an NGP launch: (1) when to build capacity for the NGP, and (2) how
to optimally allocate the total capacity to the NGP and the existing prod-
uct. Our research extended both the literature on new product development
by incorporating the competition between the two ﬁrms and the literature
on capacity competition by considering evolutionary product innovation. In
addition, we considered both demand uncertainty at the early stage and a po-
tential product quality upgrade at the later stage in the NGP launch decision.
Our ﬁndings contributed to both theory and practice by showing how to mea-
sure demand risk and competitive (dis)advantage of a ﬁrm during the NGP
launch. In addition, we showed how to distinguish the competitive situation
of a ﬁrm based on advantage and disadvantage of both ﬁrms and demand risk.
A ﬁrm's optimal launch timing depends on its competitive situation.
Chapter 5. Combating Strategic Cross-Border Counterfeiters
This chapter studied optimal anti-counterfeiting strategies of a legitimate
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OEM in a global supply chain. To combat counterfeiting, the OEM can either
resort to pricing or building a public-private partnership (PPP) with Customs
in which the OEM helps Customs hinder the entry of counterfeits. Customs
can also be the one who initiates the PPP and thus the OEM can join it with
no cost. Using a game theoretic framework, we derive the optimal equilibrium
strategies of Customs and the OEM. We considered two types of counterfeit-
ing: non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeiting. We showed that the existence
of non-deceptive counterfeits is not always bad to the OEM, if it chooses the
right strategy. Compared to the situation without any counterfeit, if the OEM
either joins or initiates the PPP with Customs, it could increase the price of
authentic products and earn more proﬁt. Compared to the non-deceptive case,
we found that private enterprises should play a bigger role in initiating the
PPP in the ﬁght against deceptive counterfeiting. The OEM could choose a
higher price than that without any counterfeit, only if the OEM initiates the
PPP, and the market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter is decreasing in the
price of authentic products in such a situation.
Chapter 6. Assessing End-of-Supply Risk of Spare Parts Using
the Proportional Hazard Model (PHM)
This chapter studied end-of-supply risk management of parts of long ﬁeld-
life systems. End-of-supply risk is the risk that a part is no long supplied. Long
ﬁeld-life systems, such as airplanes, are faced with hazards in the supply of
spare parts. Using the proportional hazard model and quantiﬁed supply chain
condition data, we develop a methodology for ﬁrms purchasing spare parts
to manage end-of-supply risk. Our methodology was validated using data on
about 2,000 spare parts collected from a maintenance repair organization in the
aviation industry. Cross-validation results and out-of-sample risk assessments
show good performance of the method to identify spare parts with high end-of-
supply risk. Further validation was provided by survey results obtained from
the maintenance repair organization, which show strong agreement between
the ﬁrms' and our model's identiﬁcation of high-risk spare parts.
When planning capacity, a ﬁrm should make a long-term plan which con-
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sists of a sequence of capacity decisions and a policy according to which it
changes its capacity to adapt to the demand changes and to respond to the
competitor's capacity. When determining the new product launch timing, a
ﬁrm should consider both the competition between the new product and the
existing one, and the competition between ﬁrms for the two products. The op-
timal product launch timing depends on the competitive situation a ﬁrm is in.
When determining the optimal anti-counterfeiting strategy, a ﬁrm should take
into account the type of counterfeiting in decision making because the com-
petition mechanics is diﬀerent. When assessing risk for long ﬁeld-life systems,
a ﬁrm should monitor its supply chain and develop supply chain indicators to
proactively identify parts at risk. In Appendix D, I state my contributions in
each chapter of this dissertation (Chapters 3-6).
Dynamic decision making under competition is a broad area which requires
extensive research. Future research should focus on the interaction between
dynamic and competitive strategies, e.g., how can a ﬁrm utilize its competitive
advantage to hedge against demand uncertainty, and the impact of a combined
strategy on a ﬁrm's operations.
Appendix A
Proofs to all Corollaries,
Lemmas Propositions, and
Theorems
Proposition 3.1. Under Assumptions 1,2, and 3, if ﬁrm j adopts the reactive
strategy, the optimal value function V ∗tj is jointly concave in (kt−1j , ktj) for any
given current capacity of the opponent kti ∈ Kti or kt−1i ∈ Kt−1i (i 6= j) and
for each ωt ∈ Θ.
Proof. Follow the reasoning of Theorem 1 from Eberly and Van Mieghem
(1997): satisfying Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, they show by induction and
a concavity preservation lemma that a single ﬁrm's optimal value function
Vt(kt−1, ωt) is jointly concave in (kt−1, kt) for each ωt ∈ Θ. In the reac-
tive case with a given capacity of the opponent, kτi which is invariant for all
τ > t, ﬁrm j's optimal value function V ∗tj(kti, kt−1j , ωt) is jointly concave in
(kt−1j , ktj) for each ωt ∈ Θ.
Theorem 3.1. Given the current capacity of the opponent kti ∈ Kti (i 6=
j) and ωt ∈ Θ, if ﬁrm j's optimal value function V ∗tj is jointly concave in
(kt−1j , ktj) and there exists a unique solution to the optimization problem in
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equation (3.11) if j = f or in equation (3.12) if j = l, then the solution is an
ISD policy that is characterized by the following lowerbound and upperbound
functions:
KLtj(kti, ωt) = sup
{
{ktjo} ∪ {ktj :
∇−Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt)
∇ktj ≥ ctj , ktj ∈ Ktj}
}
(3.13)
KHtj (kti, ωt) = inf
{
{ktje} ∪ {ktj :
∇+Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt)
∇ktj ≤ rtj , ktj ∈ Ktj}
}
(3.14)
Proof. If ﬁrm j's optimization problem V ∗tj is jointly concave in (kt−1j , ktj)
for any given kti ∈ Kti and for each ωt ∈ Θ, the function Gtj(kti, ktj , ωt) is
concave in ktj under Assumption 3.1, as a sum of concave functions is concave.
The rest of the theorem then follows the reasoning of Theorem 2 in Eberly
and Van Mieghem (1997).
Corollary 3.1. Let kLtj and k
H
tj denote the lowerbound and upperbound com-
puted by the two boundary functions in Theorem 3.1, i.e., kLtj = K
L
tj(kti, ωt)
and kHtj = K
H
tj (kti, ωt): k
L
tj ≤ kHtj .
Proof. Under Assumption 3.2, which speciﬁes ctj > rtj , and concavity of the
optimization problem in equation (3.11) or (3.12), it guarantees that kLtj ≤
kHtj .
Proposition 3.2. S[ktjo ,ktje ] ⊆ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ] = [k
L
tj , k
H
tj ].
Proof. We write Gtj(k) to represent the expected NPV function Gtj(kti, ktj =
k, ωt) (see equations (9) and (10)). According to equations (13) and (14),
∇−Gtj(kLtj)
∇kLtj
≥ ctj and ∇+Gtj(k
H
tj )
∇kHtj
≤ rtj . Thus, Gtj(k)−Gtj(k
L
tj)
k−kLtj
≥ ∇−Gtj(k
L
tj)
∇kLtj
≥ ctj ,
∀k < kLtj , and
Gtj(k)−Gtj(kHtj )
k−kHtj
≤ ∇+Gtj(k
H
tj )
∇kHtj
≤ rtj , ∀k > kHtj . This means that if
the current capacity is smaller than kLtj or larger than k
H
tj , the optimal decision
is to adjust it to maximize the value of the objective function in equation (11)
or (12). If kLtj > k
H
tj , S[ktjo ,ktje ] = [k
L
tj , k
H
tj ] = ∅; if kLtj ≤ kHtj , S[ktjo ,ktje ] ⊆
[kLtj , k
H
tj ] 6= ∅. In conclusion, S[ktjo ,ktje ] ⊆ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ] = [k
L
tj , k
H
tj ].
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Proposition 3.3. kLtj and k
H
tj are the lowerbound and the upperbound of
S[ktjo ,ktje ].
Proof. Assume there exists k1 = inf{k : Gtj(k
L
tj)−Gtj(k)
kLtj−k
≥ ctj , k > kLtj} and
k2 = sup{k : Gtj(k
H
tj )−Gtj(k)
kHtj−k
≤ rtj , k < kHtj }. Thus:
Gtj(k
L
tj)−Gtj(k1)
kLtj−k1
≥
ctj ,
Gtj(k
L
tj)−Gtj(k)
kLtj−k
< ctj , ∀k : kLtj < k < k1; and
Gtj(k
H
tj )−Gtj(k2)
kHtj−k2
≤ rtj ,
Gtj(k
H
tj )−Gtj(k)
kHtj−k
> rtj , ∀k : k2 < k < kHtj . According to equations (13) and
(14),
Gtj(k)−Gtj(kLtj)
k−kLtj
≥ ∇−Gtj(k
L
tj)
∇kLtj
≥ ctj , ∀k < kLtj , and
Gtj(k)−Gtj(kHtj )
k−kHtj
≤
∇+Gtj(kHtj )
∇kHtj
≤ rtj , ∀k > kHtj . Adding the inequalities, we get the follow-
ing:
Gtj(k)−Gtj(k1)
k−k1 > ctj , ∀k : kLtj < k < k1, and
Gtj(k)−Gtj(k2)
k−k2 < rtj ,
∀k : k2 < k < kHtj ; Gtj(k)−Gtj(k1)k−k1 ≥ ctj , ∀k < kLtj , and
Gtj(k)−Gtj(k2)
k−k2 ≤ rtj ,
∀k > kHtj . Hence, Gtj(k)−Gtj(k1)k−k1 ≥ ctj , ∀k < k1, and
Gtj(k)−Gtj(k1)
k−k1 ≤ rtj ,
∀k > k2.
According to the deﬁnitions of kLtj and k
H
tj (see equations (13) and (14)),
the marginal values at k1and k2 are:
∇−Gtj(k1)
∇k1 < ctj and
∇+Gtj(k2)
∇k2 > rtj .
This contradicts the claim
Gtj(k)−Gtj(k1)
k−k1 ≥ ctj , ∀k < k1, and
Gtj(k)−Gtj(k1)
k−k1 ≤
rtj , ∀k > k2. k1 > kLtj and k2 < kHtj such that
Gtj(k
L
tj)−Gtj(k1)
kLtj−k1
≥ ctj and
Gtj(k
H
tj )−Gtj(k2)
kHtj−k2
≤ rtj does not exist. Therefore, kLtj , kHtj ∈ S[ktjo ,ktje ]. According
to Proposition 2, S[ktjo ,ktje ] ⊆ Sr[ktjo ,ktje ] = [k
L
tj , k
H
tj ]. Hence, k
L
tj and k
H
tj are
the lowerbound and the upperbound of S[ktjo ,ktje ].
Proposition 3.4. The rolling up and rolling down procedures eliminate all
non-stayput capacity values from the interval [Ino , I
n
e ].
Proof. At each iteration of the rolling up procedure, k is eliminated if k /∈
Sr[Ino ,k]
. According to Proposition 2, k /∈ S[Ino ,k] if k /∈ Sr[Ino ,k]. If k is a non-
stayput point in K , k is also a non-stayput point in any space that contains
K . Hence, k /∈ S[a,b], for any [a, b] ⊇ [Ino , k], thus k /∈ S[Ino ,Ine ]. In other
words, capacity values that are eliminated by the rolling up procedure are the
non-stayput points in the interval [Ino , I
n
e ]. By the same token, capacity values
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that are eliminated by the rolling down procedure are also the non-stayput
points.
Next, we prove that all of the remaining values are the stayput points in
the interval [Ino , I
n
e ]. At each iteration of the rolling up procedure, k is kept
if k ∈ Sr[Ino ,k]. According to Proposition 3, k ∈ S[Ino ,k] if S
r
[Ino ,k]
= [·, k]. The
rolling down procedure follows the same argument as the rolling up procedure:
k ∈ S[k,Ine ] if Sr[k,Ine ] = [k, ·]. After the rolling up and rolling down procedures,
any remaining capacity value k is a stayput point in the interval [Ino , I
n
e ] as k
should neither be adjusted to any point in [Ino , k] nor to any point in [k, I
n
e ].
Proposition 3.5. Given the stayput region in the ith terminal interval, Si =
[ksio , k
si
e ], if there exists a capacity value k1 > k
si
e satisfying k1 ∈ Sr[ksie ,k1] (or
k1 < k
si
o satisfying k1 ∈ Sr[k1,ksio ]), then k1 ∈ S[k2,k1] (or k1 ∈ S[k1,k2]), ∀k2 ∈ Si.
Proof. Given Si = [k
si
o , k
si
e ],
G(k
si
e )−G(k)
k
si
e −k > r, ∀k ∈ [k
si
o , k
si
e ). If there exists a
capacity value k1 > k
si
e satisfying k1 ∈ Sr[ksie ,k1], then k1 ∈ S[ksie ,k1] according to
Proposition 3. Thus, G(k1)−G(k
si
e )
k1−ksie > r. Adding the inequality G(k1)−G(k
si
e ) >
r(k1−ksie ) to the inequality G(ksie )−G(k) > r(ksie −k), we get: G(k1)−G(k)k1−k > r,
∀k ∈ [ksio , ksie ). In conclusion, k1 ∈ S[k2,k1], ∀k2 ∈ Si. The proof for the case
where k1 < k
si
o follows the same argument. See Figure A.1a for an illustration.
The red symbols indicate the case in the brackets.
Proposition 3.6. Given the stayput region in the ith terminal interval, Si,
if there exists k1 ∈ Si and k0 < k1 such that k1 ∈ Sr[k0,k1] (or exists k0 > k1
such that k1 ∈ Sr[k1,k0]), then k2 ∈ S[k0,k2], ∀k2 : k1 < k2 ∈ Si (or k2 ∈ S[k2,k0],
∀k2 : k1 > k2 ∈ Si).
Proof. If there exists k1 ∈ Si and k0 < k1 such that k1 ∈ Sr[k0,k1], then
k1 ∈ S[k0,k1] according to Proposition 3. Thus, G(k1)−G(k0)k1−k0 > r. ∀k2 : k1 <
k2 ∈ Si, G(k2)−G(k1)k2−k1 > r. Adding the inequality G(k1) − G(k0) > r(k1 − k0)
to the inequality G(k2) − G(k1) > r(k2 − k1), we get: ∀k2 : k1 < k2 ∈ Si,
G(k2)−G(k0)
k2−k0 > r, i.e., k2 ∈ S[k0,k2]. The proof for the case where k0 > k1
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follows the same argument. See Figure A.1b for an illustration. The red
symbols indicate the case in brackets.
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Figure A.1: Figures illustrating Propositions 5 and 6
Theorem 3.2. Given Sti, kt−1i ∈ Kt−1i (i 6= j), and ωt ∈ Θ, the solution to
ﬁrm j's optimization problem in period t (see equation (3.11) or (3.12)) can be
represented in the form of an ISD policy. The stayput region Stj(Sti, kt−i, ωt),
can be derived by the Decomposition Algorithm.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of theorem follows directly as the optimal solution to ﬁrm
j's investment problem in period t can be expressed by a set of capacity values,
of which the associated value of equation (3.11) or (3.12) cannot be improved.
According to Propositions 3.2-3.6, the set of capacity values computed by the
Decomposition Algorithm is ﬁrm j's stayput region in period t.
Proposition 3.7. Given kt−1j = k and k /∈ Stj(Sti, kt−1i, ωt) (i 6= j), if the
optimal investment policy indicated by Stj(Sti, ωt) assigns ktj = b, then no
stayput values exist in the interval [k, b), ∀k < b, or in the interval (b, k],
∀k > b. In other words, the interval [k, b) or (b, k] * Stj(Sti, kt−1i, ωt).
Proof. The optimal investment policy assigns ktj = b when kt−1j = k, thus
Gtj(b)−ctj×(b−k) ≥ Gtj(k′)−ctj×(k′−k), ∀k′ ≥ k in the case where b > k,.
Therefore,
Gtj(b)−Gtj(k′ )
b−k′ ≥ ctj , ∀k
′ ∈ [k, b). In other words, capacity values in
the interval [k, b) need to be adjusted to b in order to maximize the value of
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the objective function in equation (11) or (12), i.e., [k, b) * Stj(Sti, kt−1i, ωt).
The proof for the case where b < k follows the same argument.
Corollary 3.2. Given two consecutive stayput intervals, [kL1, kH1] and [kL2, kH2],
there exists an investment threshold k, kH1 ≤ k ≤ kL2, such that the optimal
investment policy assigns all capacity in (kH1, k) to be adjusted downwards to
the upperbound of the lower stayput interval (i.e., kH1) and assigns all capac-
ity in (k, kL2) to be adjusted upwards to the lowerbound of the higher stayput
interval (i.e., kL2). If kH1 < k < kL2, there is no diﬀerence between adjusting
k to the closet boundary of either close-by interval.
Proof. For any non-stayput capacity value k, kH1 < k < kL2, that is between
the two consecutive stayput intervals, [kL1, kH1] and [kL2, kH2], an adjust-
ment should be made to either kL2 or kH1 according to Proposition 3.7. By
comparing the expected NPV of adjusting k to kH1 with the one of adjusting
k to kL2, a decision whether to invest or disinvest can be made. Under As-
sumption 3.2, which speciﬁes rtj < ctj , the function Threshold(k, k
H1, kL2) =
Gtj(k
L2)−ctj×(kL2−k)−Gtj(kH1)−rtj×(k−kH1) is monotonously increasing
in k. The rest of corollary then follows.
Lemma 4.1. If a monopolist with a total capacity km and unit investment
cost cAm for the NGP decides to invest at the early stage, its optimal NGP
capacity is k∗Am|e =
N
2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN and its optimal proﬁt is Ee[Π
∗
m(k
A
m, θ)] =
θ
N S
Bkm(N − km) + θ4S−c
A
m
2 × (N2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN). If it decides to invest at the late
stage, its optimal NGP capacity is k∗Am|l =
N
2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN , and its optimal ex-ante
proﬁt is El[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] = θN S
Bkm(N − km) + θ4S−c
A
m
2 × (N2 − c
A
m
24SNE(
1
θ )).
Proof. Substituting k−i = k̂A−i = 0 into equations (4.5) and (4.6) and solving
for k∗Ai , respectively. The Lemma then follows.
Proposition 4.1. A monopolist will always invest late.
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Proof. Since the arithmetic mean θ is always larger than the harmonic mean
1
E( 1
θ
)
, Ee[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] > El[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] (see Lemma 4.1). Thus, a monopolist
will always postpone its investment until demand uncertainty is resolved.
Lemma 4.2. If both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E), then the equilibrium ca-
pacity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N , and the equilibrium expected proﬁt is Ee[pi
∗
i (k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + (N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N)(
θ4S
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3 ), ∀i = x, y.
Proof. In the equilibrium strategy where both ﬁrms invest simultaneously,
k∗Ai = Ri(k
∗A
−i ) and k
∗A
−i = R−i(k
∗A
i ). Substituting the best response function
of the other ﬁrm, i.e., R−i(k∗Ai ) =
N
2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN , into k
∗A
i and taking the
expected value of θ, ﬁrm i's optimal NGP capacity at the early investment
stage is: k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N . Firm i's optimal expected proﬁt is then
Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki− k−i) + (N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N)(
θ4S
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3 ).
Lemma 4.3. If ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or
(L,E), then the equilibrium capacity is k∗Ai =
N
2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N and k
∗A
−i =
N
4 +
2cAi −cA−i
4θ4S N −
cA−i
2θ4SN . The equilibrium expected proﬁts are Ee[pi
∗
i (k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+(N2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N)(
θ4S
4 +
cA−i−2cAi
4 ) and El[pi
∗
−i(k
A
−i, k
∗A
i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N − ki − k−i) + θ4S16 N −
cA−i
4 N + (2c
A
i − cA−i)(N8 +
2cAi −5cA−i
16θ4S N) +
(cA−i)
2
44S NE(
1
θ ).
Proof. If ﬁrm i moves ﬁrst, we substitute the best response function of the
other ﬁrm, i.e., R−i(kAi ) =
N
2 −
kAi
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN , into ﬁrm i's proﬁt function:
pii(k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ) =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+ θN 4SkAi (N2 −
kAi
2 )+
cA−i−2cAi
2 k
A
i , which
is concave in kAi . Taking the expected value of θ, ﬁrm i's optimal NGP capacity
at the early investment stage is k∗Ai =
N
2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N and the optimal expected
proﬁt is Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + (N2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N)(
θ4S
4 +
cA−i−2cAi
4 ). If ﬁrm i moves second in the competition, its optimal NGP capacity
is derived by substituting the optimal NGP capacity of the ﬁrst mover into
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the best response function of ﬁrm i: k∗Ai =
N
4 +
2cA−i−cAi
4θ4S N −
cAi
2θ4SN . Firm i's
optimal ex-ante expected proﬁt is then El[pi∗i (kA−i, k∗Ai , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki −
k−i) + θ4S16 N −
cAi
4 N + (2c
A
−i − cAi )(N8 +
2cA−i−5cAi
16θ4S N) +
(cAi )
2
44S NE(
1
θ ).
Lemma 4.4. If both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L), then the equilibrium capac-
ity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N , and the equilibrium expected proﬁt is El[pi
∗
i (k
A
i , k
∗A
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki− k−i) + θ4S9 N + 29N(cA−i− 2cAi ) +
(cA−i−2cAi )2
94S NE(
1
θ ), ∀i = x, y.
Proof. In the equilibrium strategy where both ﬁrms invest simultaneously,
k∗Ai = Ri(k
∗A
−i ) and k
∗A
−i = R−i(k
∗A
i ). Substituting the best response function
of the other ﬁrm, i.e., R−i(k∗Ai ) =
N
2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN , into k
∗A
i , ﬁrm i's optimal
NGP capacity at the late investment stage is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N . Firm i's
optimal ex-ante expected proﬁt is then El[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki −
k−i) + θ4S9 N +
2
9N(c
A
−i − 2cAi ) +
(cA−i−2cAi )2
94S NE(
1
θ ).
Theorem 4.1. In the competition with no demand uncertainty, the following
pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing game exist:
1. If Mi >
1
7(c
A
i − cA−i), ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. If M−i ≤ 17(cA−i− cAi ), then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late.
Proof. Substituting E(1θ ) =
1
overlineθ into a ﬁrm's equilibrium (ex-ante) ex-
pected proﬁt described in Lemmas 4.2-4.4 and comparing the proﬁt of ﬁrm x
or ﬁrm y in diﬀerent equilibrium strategies, we ﬁnd: (i) if
((
θ 4 S − cAy
) −
(cAy − cAx )
)
×
((
θ 4 S − cAy
) − 177 (cAx − cAy )) > 0 and ((θ 4 S − cAx ) −
(Ax−cAy )
)
×
((
θ 4 S − cAx
) − 177 (cAy − cAx )) > 0, then both ﬁrms invest early,
i.e., (E,E); (ii)
((
θ4S− cAy
)−2(cAx − cAy ))2 ≥ 0, which will always hold, and((
θ4S−cAx
)−(cAx−cAy ))×((θ4S−cAx )− 177 (cAy −cAx )) ≤ 0, then ﬁrm x invests
early and ﬁrm y invests late, i.e., (E,L); (iii) if
((
θ4S − cAy
)− (cAy − cAx ))×((
θ4S−cAy
)− 177 (cAx −cAy )) ≤ 0 and ((θ4S−cAx )−2(cAy −cAx ))2 ≥ 0, which
will always hold, then ﬁrm x waits and ﬁrm y invests early, i.e., (L,E); (iv)
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since
((
θ4S− cAy
)−2(cAx − cAy ))2 < 0 and ((θ4S− cAx )−2(cAy − cAx ))2 < 0,
will never hold, the equilibrium strategy where both ﬁrms invest late, i.e.,
(L,L), will not exist.
The function g =
((
θ 4 S − cAy
) − ×(cAy − cAx )) × ((θ 4 S − cAy ) − 177 ×
(cAx − cAy )
)
is concave in (cAy − cAx ). Let the function g equals 0, we get:
cAx − cAy = 717 × (θ 4 S − cAy ) or cAy − cAx = 12 × (θ 4 S − cAx ). The function
f =
((
θ4S− cAx
)−×(cAx − cAy ))×((θ4S− cAx )− 177 × (cAy − cAx )) is concave
in (cAy − cAx ). Let the function f equals 0, we get: cAx − cAy = 12 × (θ4 S − cAy )
or cAy − cAx = 717 × (θ4 S − cAx ). The non-negativity assumption in equation
(4.4) speciﬁes θ 4 S ≥ max{2cA−i − cAi , ∀i = x, y} (see equation (4.9)), the
theorem then follows.
Theorem 4.2. The following pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing
game exist:
1. If M−i ×
(
Mi − 17(cAi − cA−i)
)
> 47r ×
(
cAi
)2
, ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms
invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. If
(
Mi
)2
> 89r ×
(
cA−i − 2cAi
)2
and Mi ×
(
M−i − 17(cA−i − cAi )
)
≤ 47r ×(
cA−i
)2
, then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or
(L,E).
3. If
(
M−i
)2 ≤ 89r × (cAi − 2cA−i)2, ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest late,
i.e., (L,L).
Proof. Comparing the proﬁt of ﬁrm x or ﬁrm y in each equilibrium strategy
(see Lemmas 4.2-4.4), we ﬁnd: (i) if
(
cAx
)2 × (−Cov) < 736 × ((θ4 S − cAx )−
2(cAy − cAx )
)
×
((
θ4S− cAy
)− 177 (cAx − cAy )) and (cAy )2× (−Cov) < 736 ×((θ4
S−cAy
)−2(Ax−cAy ))×((θ4S−cAx )− 177 (cAy −cAx )), then both ﬁrms invest early,
i.e., (E,E); (ii)
(
cAy − 2cAx
)2 × (−Cov) < 18((θ4 S − cAy )− 2(cAx − cAy ))2 and(
cAy
)2×(−Cov) ≥ 736×((θ4S−cAy )−2(cAx−cAy ))×((θ4S−cAx )− 177 (cAy −cAx )),
then ﬁrm x invests early and ﬁrm y invests late, i.e., (E,L); (iii) if
(
cAx
)2 ×
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(−Cov) ≥ 736×
((
θ4S−cAx
)−2(cAy −cAx ))×((θ4S−cAy )− 177 (cAx −cAy )) and(
cAx −2cAy
)2× (−Cov) < 18((θ4S−cAx )−2(cAy −cAx ))2, then ﬁrm x waits and
ﬁrm y invests early, i.e., (L,E); (iv) if
(
cAy − 2cAx
)2 × (−Cov) ≥ 18((θ4 S −
cAy
)−2(cAx −cAy ))2 and (cAx −2cAy )2×(−Cov) ≥ 18((θ4S−cAx )−2(cAy −cAx ))2,
then both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L).
Proposition 4.2. For a monopolist with unit investment costs cAm and c
A+
m
for A and A+: if r ×
(
(1 − pr)(cAm)2 + 4SS pr(cA
+
m )
2
)
< pr ×
(
4S
S c
A+
m (θS −
cA
+
m ) − cAm(θ4 S − cAm) − θ4 S
(
θ4 S+ − (cA+m − cAm)
))
, it will invest early;
otherwise, it will invest late.
Proof. If a monopolist decides to invest early, its optimal NGP capacity is
k∗Am =
θ4S−cAm
2θ4S N and the optimal proﬁt is Ee[Π
∗
m(k
A
m, θ)] =
θ
N S
Bkm(N −
km) +
θ4S−cAm
2 × (N2 − c
A
m
2θ4SN). If it decides to invest late, its optimal NGP
capacity is k∗Am =
θ4S−cAm
2θ4S N or k
∗A+
m =
θS−cA+m
2θS N and its optimal ex-ante
proﬁt is El[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] = (1 − pr) ×
(
θ
N S
Bkm(N − km) + θ4S−c
A
m
2 × (N2 −
cAm
24SNE(
1
θ ))
)
+ pr ×
(
θ
N S
Bkm(N − km) + θS−c
A+
m
2 × (N2 − c
A+
m
2S NE(
1
θ ))
)
. If
r ×
(
(1− pr)(cAm)2 + 4SS pr(cA
+
m )
2
)
< pr ×
(
4S
S c
A+
m (θS − cA
+
m )− cAm(θ4 S −
cAm) − θ 4 S
(
θ 4 S+ − (cA+m − cAm)
))
, Ee[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] > El[Π∗m(kAm, θ)], i.e., it
should invest early. Otherwise, Ee[Π∗m(kAm, θ)] ≤ El[Π∗m(kAm, θ)], i.e., it should
wait.
Lemma 4.5. If ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or
(L,E), then the equilibrium capacity is k∗Ai =
N
2θ(4S+4S4S+
S
pr)
×MAorA+i and
k∗A−i =
N
2 −
cA−iN
2θ4S−
k∗Ai
2 or k
∗A+
−i =
N
2 −
cA
+
−i N
2θS −
4Sk∗Ai
2S . The equilibrium expected
proﬁts are Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k∗Aor∗A
+
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+ (M
AorA+
i )
2Ns
8θ4S(s+4S+pr) and
El[pi∗−i(kAorA
+
−i , k
∗A
i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N −ki−k−i) + N4 E(1θ )[ 14S (1− pr)(cA−i)2 +
1
Spr(c
A+
−i )
2] + (1 − pr) N
θ4S (
θ4S
2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)( θ4S2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− cA−i) +
177
pr N
θS
( θS2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
)( θS2 −
MAorA
+
i
4(1+4S
+
S
pr)
− cA+−i ).
Proof. If ﬁrm i moves ﬁrst, with probability 1− pr, its optimal NGP capacity
is kAi =
N
2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N based on Lemma 4.3. With probability pr, the other
ﬁrm will launch A+ and all three products (B, A and A+) exist in the market.
Same as in Figure 4.1, we can derive the demand of each product based on
the quality Sj and price pj . Based on the joint capacity clearing prices, we
set dB = kBi + k
B
−i, d
A = kAi , d
A+ = kA
+
−i , and solve for p
j : pB = θN S
B(N −
ki−k−i), pA = θN
(
NSA−4S(kAi +kA
+
−i )−SB(ki+k−i)
)
, pA
+
= θN
(
NSA
+−
4S+kA+−i −4S(kAi +kA
+
−i )−SB(ki+k−i)
)
. Given kAi , ﬁrm −i's proﬁt function
Π−i(kA
+
−i , k
A
i , θ) = p
BkB−i + p
A+kA
+
−i − cA
+
−i k
A+
−i is concave in k
A+
−i and thus
the best response function is RA
+
−i (k
A
i ) =
N
2 − 4S2S kAi − N2θS cA
+
−i . Substituting
RA
+
−i (k
A
i ) into the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i, i.e., Πi(k
A
i , k
A+
−i , θ), which is concave
in kAi . Taking the expected value of θ, ﬁrm i's optimal NGP capacity is
k∗Ai =
S
2S−4S (
N
2 +
N
2θS
cA
+
−i − Nθ4S cAi ). Considering both scenarios, ﬁrm i's
optimal NGP capacity at the early investment stage is k∗Ai = (1 − pr) ×(
N
2 +
cA−i−2cAi
2θ4S N
)
+pr×
(
S
2S−4S (
N
2 +
N
2θS
cA
+
−i − Nθ4S cAi )
)
= N
2θ(4S+4S4S+
S
pr)
×
MAorA
+
i . The Lemma then follows.
Lemma 4.6. If both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L), then the equilibrium ca-
pacity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N or k
∗A+
i =
N
3 +
cA
+
−i −2cA
+
i
3θS N , and the equilib-
rium expected proﬁt is El[pi∗i (kAorA
+
i , k
∗Aor∗A+
−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) +
Nθ
9 (4S+pr4S+) + 29N
(
(1−pr)(cA−i−2cAi ) +pr(cA
+
−i −2cA
+
i )
)
+ N9
(
1
4S (1−
pr)(cA−i − 2cAi )2 + 1Spr(cA
+
−i − 2cA
+
i )
2
)
E(1θ ), ∀i = x, y.
Proof. If both ﬁrms invest late: with probability 1 − pr, the equilibrium
capacity is k∗Ai =
N
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N based on Lemma 4.4; with probability
pr, they launch A+ instead of A, and the equilibrium capacity is k∗A+i =
N
3 +
cA
+
−i −2cA
+
i
3θS N . According to Lemma 4.4, the equilibrium expected proﬁt
when only B and A exist is: θN S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + θ4S9 N + 29N(cA−i −
2cAi ) +
(cA−i−2cAi )2
94S NE(
1
θ ). When either B and A, or B and A
+ exist, the equi-
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librium ex-ante expected proﬁt is El[pi∗i (kAorA
+
i , k
∗Aor∗A+
−i , θ)] = (1 − pr) ×(
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + θ4S9 N + 29N(cA−i − 2cAi ) +
(cA−i−2cAi )2
94S NE(
1
θ )
)
+ pr×(
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + θS9 N + 29N(cA
+
−i − 2cA
+
i ) +
(cA
+
−i −2cA
+
i )
2
9S NE(
1
θ )
)
=
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+ Nθ9 (4S+pr4S+)+ 29N
(
(1−pr)(cA−i−2cAi )+pr(cA
+
−i −
2cA
+
i )
)
+ N9
(
1
4S (1− pr)(cA−i − 2cAi )2 + 1Spr(cA
+
−i − 2cA
+
i )
2
)
E(1θ ).
Theorem 4.3. The following pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing
game with potential quality improvement exist:
1. If (1−Cov)×cAorA+i ≤ 49M2−i− (1−pr)(θ4S−2α−i,i)(θ4S−2α−i,i−
2cAi )− 4SS pr(θS−2α−i,i)(θS−2α−i,i−2cA
+
i ), ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms
invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. If (1−Cov)× cAorA+−i ≥ 49M2i − (1−pr)(θ4S−2αi,−i)(θ4S−2αi,−i−
2cA−i)− 4SS pr(θS−2αi,−i)(θS−2αi,−i−2cA
+
−i ) and (1−Cov)×cAorA
+
−i,i ≤
18(1+4S
+
S pr)(αi,−i)
2 +θ4S
(
(1−pr)(θ4S−2M−i)+pr(θS−2M+−i)
)
,
then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or (L,E).
3. If (1 − Cov) × cAorA+−i,i ≥ 18(1 + 4S
+
S pr)(αi,−i)
2 + θ 4 S
(
(1 − pr)(θ 4
S−2M−i) +pr(θS−2M+−i)
)
, ∀i = x, y, then both ﬁrms invest late, i.e.,
(L,L).
Proof. We examine the viability of each subgame. An equilibrium strategy
exists if no ﬁrm has incentive to unilaterally deviate. (i) The equilibrium
strategy where both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E), exists if ﬁrm x enjoys
greater expected proﬁt than in (L,E) and ﬁrm y enjoys greater expected
proﬁt than in (E,L). (ii) The equilibrium strategy where ﬁrm x invests early
and ﬁrm y invests late, i.e., (E,L), exists if ﬁrm x enjoys greater expected
proﬁt than in (L,L) and ﬁrm y enjoys greater expected proﬁt than in (E,E).
(iii) The equilibrium strategy where ﬁrm x invests late and ﬁrm y invests
early, i.e., (L,E), exists if ﬁrm x enjoys greater expected proﬁt than in (E,E)
and ﬁrm y enjoys greater expected proﬁt than in (L,L). (iv) The equilibrium
strategy where both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L), exists if ﬁrm x enjoys greater
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expected proﬁt than in (E,L) and ﬁrm y enjoys greater expected proﬁt than
in (L,E). Comparing the proﬁt of ﬁrm x or ﬁrm y in each equilibrium (see
Lemma 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6), the theorem then follows.
Lemma 5.1. At the third stage, there exist unique optimal prices of authen-
tic products and non-deceptive counterfeits, i.e., p∗o and p∗n, which are derived
by substituting the OEM's optimal response function Ro(pn) into the coun-
terfeiter's optimal response function Rn(po); Ro(pn) and Rn(po) satisfy the
ﬁrst-order derivative conditions: (∂Πo∂po ) |po=Ro(pn)= 0 and (∂Πn∂pn ) |pn=Rn(po)= 0.
Proof. In each subgame (κ, en), the OEM's proﬁt Πo is concave in po, given the
counterfeiter's price pn. The counterfeiter's proﬁt Πn is concave in pn, given
po. Therefore, there exists optimal response prices of authentic products and
counterfeits. The unique optimal prices can then be derived by substituting
the OEM's optimal response function into the counterfeiter's optimal response
function.
In the subgame (κ, en) = (0, 0), the optimal price of authentic products is
p∗o|(0,0) =
2−2qn
4−qn , while the optimal price of counterfeits is p
∗
n|(0,0) =
qn−q2n
4−qn . The
optimal market shares of authentic products and counterfeits are m∗o|(0,0) =
2
4−qn and m
∗
n|(0,0) =
1
4−qn .
In the subgame (κ, en) = (1, 0), the optimal price of authentic products is
p∗o|(1,0) =
2(1−qn)
4−qn +
2(1−α)Co
4−qn +
β1
1−β1
Lf
4−qn , while the optimal price of counterfeits
is p∗n|(1,0) =
qn(1−qn)
4−qn +
qn(1−α)Co
4−qn +
β1
1−β1
2Lf−qnLo
4−qn . The optimal market shares
of authentic products and counterfeits are m∗o|(1,0) =
2
4−qn −
(2−qn)(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) +
β1
1−β1
Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn) and m
∗
n|(1,0) =
1
4−qn +
(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) −
β1
1−β1
(2−qn)Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn .
In the subgame (κ, en) = (1, 1), the optimal price of authentic products
is p∗o|(1,1) =
2(1−qn)
4−qn +
2(1−α)Co
4−qn +
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
Lf
4−qn +
1
1−β1+β2
Cn
4−qn , while the op-
timal price of counterfeits is p∗n|(1,1) =
qn(1−qn)
4−qn +
qn(1−α)Co
4−qn +
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
2Lf
4−qn +
1
1−β1+β2
2Cn
4−qn . The optimal market shares of authentic products and counter-
feits arem∗o|(1,1) =
2
4−qn−
(2−qn)(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) +
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)+
1
1−β1+β2
Cn
(4−qn)(1−qn)
andm∗n|(1,1) =
1
4−qn+
(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn)−
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
(2−qn)Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn− 11−β1+β2
(2−qn)Cn
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn .
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Proposition 5.1. Based on the optimal decision of Customs α∗, the OEM's
optimal (response) decision, κ∗, and the non-deceptive counterfeiter's optimal
(response) decision e∗n, the following ﬁve Nash equilibrium strategies exist at
the ﬁrst stage:
(α∗, κ∗, e∗n) =

(0, 0, 0) OEM resorts to pricing only
(0, 1, 0) OEM initiates the PPP & counterfeiter does not disguise
(1, 1, 0) Customs initiates the PPP & counterfeiter does not disguise
(0, 1, 1) OEM initiates the PPP & counterfeiter disguises
(1, 1, 1) Customs initiates the PPP & counterfeiter disguises
(5)
Proof. The conditions under which an equilibrium strategy exists can be de-
rived by comparing the proﬁts of Customs in diﬀerent strategies, the OEM's
proﬁts in diﬀerent strategies, and the counterfeiter's proﬁts in diﬀerent strate-
gies.
Proposition 5.2. In the non-deceptive case, Customs will not initiate the
PPP, i.e., neither the equilibrium strategy (1, 1, 0) nor (1, 1, 1) exists at the
ﬁrst stage, if either of the following conditions hold:
• qn ≤ 1− 12 max{Le − 2β11−β1Lf , Le −
2(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2Lf − Cn1−β1+β2 },
• Le ≤ β1−β21−β1+β2Lf .
Proof. If 2qn ≤ 2β11−β1Lf+2−Le, then Πb|(0,1,0) ≥ Πb|(1,1,0). If 2qn ≤
2(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2Lf+
2 − Le + Cn1−β1+β2 , then Πb|(0,1,1) ≥ Πb|(1,1,1). Therefore, when max{Le −
2β1
1−β1Lf , Le −
2(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2Lf − Cn1−β1+β2 } ≤ 2(1− qn), neither (1, 1, 0) nor (1, 1, 1)
exists at the ﬁrst stage.
In addition, if Le ≤ β1−β21−β1+β2Lf , then the condition max{Le−
2β1
1−β1Lf , Le−
2(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2Lf− Cn1−β1+β2 } ≤ 2(1−qn) holds, thus neither the equilibrium strategy
(1, 1, 0) nor (1, 1, 1) exists.
Proposition 5.3. Set G(Lf ) = Π∗o|(0,0,0) − Πo|(0,1,0). In the presence of a
non-deceptive counterfeiter, there exist two thresholds for Lf , i.e., the lower-
bound Llof = max{0, arg minLf {G(Lf ) = 0}}, and the upperbound Luof =
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max{0, arg maxLf {G(Lf ) = 0}} such that when Llof < Lf < Luof , the out-
come where the PPP is not formed will never happen, i.e., the equilibrium
strategy (0, 0, 0) will not exist at the ﬁrst stage.
Proof.
∂2G(Lf )
∂L2f
= ( β11−β1 )
2 2
(4−qn)(1−qn) > 0. Thus, G(Lf ) is convex for Lf .
There exists a lower- and a upperbound in Lf : L
lo
f = max{0, arg minLf {G(Lf ) =
0}}, Luof = max{0, arg maxLf {G(Lf ) = 0}} and Llof ≤ Luof . A necessary con-
dition for the OEM to choose not to invest is when Lf < L
lo
f or Lf > L
uo
f .
The proposition then follows.
Proposition 5.4. Set H(Lf ) = Π∗n|(α,1,0)−Π∗n|(α,1,1), where α is the given deci-
sion of Customs. In the presence of a non-deceptive counterfeiter, suppose the
PPP is formed, there exist a threshold for Lf , i.e., L
uc
f = arg maxLf {H(Lf ) =
0}, such that if Lf > Lucf , the counterfeiter will disguise, i.e., e∗n = 1.
Proof. H(Lf ) is concave in Lf and H(0) > 0. Then there exists a threshold
for Lf , i.e., L
uc
f , satisfying: H(Lucf ) = 0. Therefore, ∀Lf > Lucf , H(Lf ) ≤ 0.
When H(Lf ) ≤ 0, the counterfeiter will disguise, i.e., the equilibrium strategy
(α, κ∗, e∗n) = (α, 1, 1).
Proposition 5.5. To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter:
1. the OEM should choose a lower price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is not formed;
2. the OEM should choose a higher price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is formed and 32qn−2(1−α)Co ≤ min{ β11−β1Lf ,
β1−β2
1−β1+β2Lf +
Cn
1−β1+β2 } , where α is the given decision of Customs;
3. compared to the situation without any counterfeit, the OEM could earn
more proﬁt if the PPP is formed; without the PPP, the OEM will earn
less proﬁt than that without any counterfeit.
Proof. When no counterfeits exist, the OEM's proﬁt is Πo = pomo, and the
optimal price of authentic products is 12 . According to Lemma 5.1, the optimal
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price of authentic products in the strategy (0, 0, 0) is p∗o|(0,0,0) =
2−2qn
4−qn , which
is smaller than 12 . The optimal market share of authentic products in (0, 0, 0)
is 24−qn , and the market share of authentic products in a market without any
counterfeit is 12 . The OEM's proﬁt in (0, 0, 0) is
4−4qn
(4−qn)2 , which is smaller than
1
4 , thus, the OEM will earn less proﬁt in (0, 0, 0) than that without any coun-
terfeit. The optimal prices of authentic products in the strategies (α, 1, 0)
and (α, 1, 1) are p∗o|(α,1,0) =
2(1−qn)
4−qn +
2(1−α)Co
4−qn +
β1
1−β1
Lf
4−qn and p
∗
o|(α,1,1) =
2(1−qn)
4−qn +
2(1−α)Co
4−qn +
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
Lf
4−qn+
1
1−β1+β2
Cn
4−qn , respectively. When
3
2qn−2(1−
α)Co < min{ β11−β1Lf ,
β1−β2
1−β1+β2Lf +
Cn
1−β1+β2 }, min{p∗o|(α,1,0), p∗o|(α,1,1)} > 12 .
The optimal market shares of authentic products in the strategies (α, 1, 0)
and (α, 1, 1) are m∗o|(α,1,0) =
2
4−qn −
(2−qn)(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) +
β1
1−β1
Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn) and
m∗o|(α,1,1) =
2
4−qn −
(2−qn)(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) +
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn) +
1
1−β1+β2
Cn
(4−qn)(1−qn) ,
which can be larger than the marker share of authentic products in a market
without any counterfeit, i.e., 12 . Therefore, it is possible for the OEM to earn
more proﬁt in (α, 1, 0) and (α, 1, 1) than that without any counterfeit.
Proposition 5.6. To combat the non-deceptive counterfeiter:
1. when only using pricing, the OEM captures a higher market share than
the counterfeiter;
2. with the PPP, the OEM captures a higher market share than the coun-
terfeiter if it is Customs who initiates the PPP; if the OEM initiates the
PPP, under certain conditions related to the quality of counterfeits, the
market share of counterfeits may exceed the market share of authentic
products;
• if − 14−qn +
(3−qn)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) −
β1
1−β1
2Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn > 0, then m
∗
n|(0,1,0) >
m∗o|(0,1,0);
• if − 14−qn+
(3−qn)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn)−
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
2Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn− 11−β1+β2 2Cn(4−qn)(1−qn)qn >
0, then m∗n|(0,1,1) > m
∗
o|(0,1,1);
3. when Customs decides not to initiate the PPP, the OEM's investment
in the PPP will result in an increase in both the prices of authentic
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products and counterfeits, i.e., min{p∗o|(0,1,0), p∗o|(0,1,1)} > p∗o|(0,0,0) and
min{p∗n|(0,1,0), p∗n|(0,1,1)} > p∗n|(0,0,0);
4. when ( β11−β1 −
β1−β2
1−β1+β2 )Lf <
Cn
1−β1+β2 , the non-deceptive counterfeiter's
disguise eﬀort will result in an increase in the price of authentic products,
i.e., p∗o|(α,1,1) > p
∗
o|(α,1,0), where α is the given decision of Customs.
Proof. According to Lemma 5.1,m∗o|(0,0,0) > m
∗
n|(0,0,0). Set D(α,1,0) = m
∗
n|(α,1,0)−
m∗o|(α,1,0) = − 14−qn+
(3−qn)(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) −
β1
1−β1
2Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn and D(α,1,1) = m
∗
n|(α,1,1)−
m∗o|(α,1,1) = − 14−qn+
(3−qn)(1−α)Co
(4−qn)(1−qn) −
β1−β2
1−β1+β2
2Lf
(4−qn)(1−qn)qn− 11−β1+β2 2Cn(4−qn)(1−qn)qn .
If α = 1, D(α,1,0) < 0 and D(α,1,1) < 0. If α = 0, D(α,1,0) and D(α,1,1) could be
positive values depending on the values of qn and other parameters. Accord-
ing to Lemma 5.1, min{p∗o|(0,1,0), p∗o|(0,1,1)} > p∗o|(0,0,0), min{p∗n|(0,1,0), p∗n|(0,1,1)} >
p∗n|(0,0,0), and p
∗
o|(α,1,1) > p
∗
o|(α,1,0).
Proposition 5.7. The following results on the expected consumer welfare
ECSn hold:
1. In each strategy (α, κ, en), there exists a unique q
∗
n|(α,κ,en) such that the
expected consumer welfare ECSn|(α,κ,en) is decreasing as qn is exceeding
q∗n|(α,κ,en).
2. A necessary condition for ECSn to be higher in the situation where the
PPP is formed than that without the PPP is when the PPP is initiated
by the OEM and qn >
1
2 .
3. A suﬃcient condition for ECSn to be higher in the situation where the
PPP is not formed than that with the PPP is when qn <
1
3 .
Proof. ECSn|(0,0,0) = 12 +
2qn−1
4−qn , which is concave in qn. ECSn|(α,1,0) =
1
2 −
β1
4 + (1 − β1) × 2qn−14−qn + (1 − β1) ×
(2qn−1)(1−α)Co
(1−qn)(4−qn) + β1 ×
(3qn−5)Lf
2(1−qn)(4−qn) , and
ECSn|(α,1,1) = 12− β1−β24 +(1−β1+β2)× 2qn−14−qn +(1−β1+β2)×
(2qn−1)(1−α)Co
(1−qn)(4−qn) +
(β1−β2)× (3qn−5)Lf2(1−qn)(4−qn) +
(3qn−5)Cn
2(1−qn)(4−qn) . Both ECSn|(α,1,0) and ECSn|(α,1,1) is
concave in qn. Therefore, there exists a unique q
∗
n in each strategy (α, κ, en)
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such that the expected consumer welfare is maximized; when qn exceeds the
threshold q∗n, the expected consumer welfare is decreasing in qn.
CSo =
1
4 , CSn|(0,0,0) =
1
2 +
2qn−1
4−qn , CSn|(α,1,0) =
1
2 +
2qn−1
4−qn +
(2qn−1)(1−α)Co
(1−qn)(4−qn) +
β1
1−β1
(3qn−5)Lf
2(1−qn)(4−qn) and CSn|(α,1,1) =
1
2+
2qn−1
4−qn +
(2qn−1)(1−α)Co
(1−qn)(4−qn) +
(β1−β2)
1−β1+β2
(3qn−5)Lf
2(1−qn)(4−qn)+
1
1−β1+β2
(3qn−5)Cn
2(1−qn)(4−qn) . When (1−β1)(2qn−1)Co+β1
(3qn−5)Lf
2 > β1
7qn(1−qn)
4 >
0, ECSn|(0,1,0) > ECSn|(0,0,0). When (1 − β1 + β2)(2qn − 1)Co + (β1 −
β2)
(3qn−5)Lf
2 > (β1−β2)7qn(1−qn)4 + (5−3qn)Cn2 > 0, ECSn|(0,1,1) > ECSn|(0,0,0).
Thus, a necessary condition for min
{
ECSn|(0,1,0), ECSn|(0,1,1)
}
> ECSn|(0,0,0)
is that qn >
1
2 .
In each strategy, CSn =
1
2 +
(3qn−1)po−2pn
2(1−qn) and it is decreasing in pn.
If qn <
1
3 , CSn is also decreasing in po. If qn <
1
3 , CSn is also decreas-
ing in po and p
∗
o|(0,0,0) < min
{
p∗o|(0,1,0), p
∗
o|(0,1,1), p
∗
o|(1,1,0), p
∗
o|(1,1,1)
}
, p∗n|(0,0,0) <
min
{
p∗n|(0,1,0), p
∗
n|(0,1,1), p
∗
n|(1,1,0), p
∗
n|(1,1,1)
}
. Thus, CSn is the highest in the
strategy (0, 0, 0). Because CSn|(0,0,0) > CSo = 14 , the expected consumer wel-
fare ECSn is the highest in the equilibrium (κ, en) = (0, 0, 0) when qn <
1
3 .
Lemma 5.2. In the presence of a deceptive counterfeiter:
1. when no consumer is proactive (i.e., λ = 0), the deceptive counterfeiter's
optimal market seize is: if p∗o|λ=0 < C, s
∗
λ=0 = 0; otherwise, s
∗ =
1
2 − S2(p∗o−C)(1−p∗o) ,. The optimal price(s) for authentic products is p
∗
o =
arg maxpo Πo = (po − Co(1− α)κ)(1−po2 + S2(po−C)).
2. for λ ∈ [0, 1], if p∗o < (1− s∗+ s∗qd)2, there exists a unique market seize
s∗ of the deceptive counterfeiter, which solves ∂Πd∂s = 0. The optimal
price(s) of authentic product is p∗o = arg maxpo Πo.
Proof. When λ = 0, given the price of authentic products po, if po < C, the
optimal market seize of the counterfeiter is s∗ = 0. If po ≥ C, the counter-
feiter's proﬁt function Πd is concave in s. Thus, the optimal market seize is
s∗ = 12 − S2(p∗o−C)(1−p∗o) . Substituting s
∗ into the OEM's proﬁt function, the
optimal price(s) of authentic products is the one(s) which maximizes the proﬁt
function.
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When λ ∈ [0, 1], the counterfeiter's proﬁt is Πd = (po − C)
(
(1− s)sλ(1−
po
1−s+sqd ) + (1 − s)s(1 − λ)(1 − po)
)
− sS. The second derivative is ∂2Πd
∂s2
=
(po − C)
(
− λ(1 − s) 2po(1−qd)
(1−s+sqd)3 − 2λ(1 −
po
(1−s+sqd)2 ) − 2(1 − λ)(1 − po)
)
=
2λpoqd
(1−s+sqd)3 − 2(1 − (1 − λ)po). A suﬃcient condition for
∂2Πd
∂s2
< 0 is that
po < (1− s+ sqd)2. That is to say, if po < (1− s∗+ s∗qd)2, Πd is concave in s,
i.e., there exists an unique optimal market seize s∗, which solves ∂Πd∂s = (po −
C)
(
(1−2s∗)(1− poλ1−s∗+s∗qd−po(1−λ))− po(1−qd)s∗(1−s∗)λ(1−s∗+s∗qd)2 )−S = 0. Substituting
s∗ into the OEM's proﬁt function, the optimal price(s) of authentic products
is the one(s) which maximizes the proﬁt function.
Proposition 5.8. In a market where no consumer is proactive, i.e., λ = 0,
to combat the deceptive counterfeiter:
1. the OEM should choose a lower price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is initiated by Customs or if the PPP is not formed;
2. the OEM should choose a higher price than that without any counterfeit,
if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co.
Proof. The optimal price of authentic products in a market without any coun-
terfeit is 12 . When α = 1 and κ = 1, or when κ = 0, the OEM's proﬁt function
is Πo = po
1−po
2 +
po
po−C
S
2 . The ﬁrst term is concave, and the second term
is decreasing in po. The optimal solution to the concave function po
1−po
2 is
1
2 , which is the optimal price of authentic products in a market without any
counterfeit. Adding the decreasing function popo−C
S
2 makes the optimal solution
p∗o|(α,κ,ed) ≤
1
2 .
When α = 0, κ = 1 and C < Co, Πo = (po − Co)1−po2 + po−Copo−C S2 . The
ﬁrst term is concave in po. If C < Co, the second term is increasing in po.
The optimal solution to the concave function (po − Co)1−po2 is larger than 12
since Co > 0. Adding the increasing function
po−Co
po−C
S
2 makes the new optimal
solution p∗o|(0,1,−) ≥ 12 .
Lemma 5.3. In a market where no consumer is proactive, i.e., λ = 0:
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• if the PPP is initiated by Customs or if the PPP is not formed, the
optimal market seize of the deceptive counterfeiter s∗ is increasing in
the price of authentic products po;
• if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co, the optimal market seize
of the deceptive counterfeiter s∗ is decreasing in the price of authentic
products po.
Proof. According to Lemma 5.2, the optimal market seize of the deceptive
counterfeiter in a market with no proactive consumers is s∗ = 12− S2(p∗o−C)(1−p∗o) ,
if p∗o > C. The ﬁrst derivative is
S(C−2p∗o+1)
(1−p∗o)2(p∗o−C)2 . Thus, s
∗ is increasing in p∗o
if p∗o <
C+1
2 , and decreasing otherwise. According to Proposition 5.8, if the
PPP is initiated by Customs or if the PPP is not formed, p∗o <
1
2 ≤ C+12 . If
the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co, then p
∗
o >
1+Co
2 >
1+C
2 . The
Lemma then follows.
Proposition 5.9. In a market where no consumer is proactive, i.e., λ = 0:
• given the same disguise eﬀort of the deceptive counterfeiter, the expected
consumer welfare ECSd is higher if the PPP is initiated by Customs,
than that if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co;
• if the quality of deceptive counterfeits is suﬃciently low, the expected
consumer welfare ECSd is higher if the PPP is formed, than that if the
PPP is not formed.
Proof. When λ = 0, CSd = (1 − po)(1 − s(1 − qd)) and ECSd = (1 −
Prd(κ, ed))(1 − po)(1 − s(1 − qd)) + 14Prd(κ, ed), both of which is decreasing
in po. According to Proposition 5.8, po is lower if the PPP is initiated by
Customs than that if the PPP is initiated by the OEM and C < Co. Thus,
ECSd is higher if the PPP is initiated by Customs than that if the PPP is
initiated by the OEM and C < Co, given the same disguise eﬀort of the de-
ceptive counterfeiter ed. If the PPP is not formed, ECSd|(0,0,0) = CSn|(0,0,0) =
(1− Prd(κ, ed))CSd|(0,0,0) + Prd(κ, ed)CSd|(0,0,0). There exists a suﬃciently low
qd such that CSd|(0,0,0) < CSo = 14 and ECSd|(0,0,0) < ECSd|(α,1,ed).
Appendix B
Relaxing the non-negativity
(NN) assumption (Chapter 4)
To avoid trivial results, we assume that the two ﬁrms' mutual best responses
at the early investment stage are positive: θ4S > max{2cA−i− cAi ,∀i = x, y}.
We exclude the situation where both ﬁrms choose the decision not to invest
to avoid losses at the early stage. The two ﬁrms' optimal NGP capacity and
expected proﬁts in the equilibrium strategy (E,E) are the same as in Lemma
4.2. Without the non-negativity assumption in equation (4.4), ﬁrm i that
invests late will choose not to launch the NGP if given the realized θ, its best
response to the other ﬁrm's capacity k̂A−i is negative, i.e.,
N
2 −
k̂A−i
2 −
cAi
2θ4SN < 0.
Therefore, if any ﬁrm decides to invest late, both ﬁrms need to consider the
probability that the late ﬁrm's capacity would be 0 and this decision not to
invest should be considered diﬀerently from the optimal capacity using the
best response function. At the phase of the timing game, we use the notation
L
′
to denote a ﬁrm's decision to invest at the late stage.
Lemmas B.1 and B.2 illustrate the capacity and expected proﬁts of both
ﬁrms in the equilibrium strategy where a ﬁrm invests early and the other ﬁrm
waits, and in the equilibrium strategy where both ﬁrms wait. Theorem B.1
describes all the possible equilibria of two competing ﬁrms to the timing game
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without the non-negativity assumption.
Lemma B.1. If ﬁrm i, i = x, y, invests early and the other ﬁrm invests late,
i.e., (L
′
, E) or (E,L
′
), the equilibrium capacity is k∗Ai = arg maxk Ee[pi∗i (k, k∗A−i , θ)]
and k∗A−i = max{N2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN, 0}. The equilibrium expected proﬁts are:
Ee[pi∗i (kAi , R−i(kAi ), θ)] = maxk
{
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)−cAi k+
∫ ai
θl
(
θ
N4Sk(N−
k)
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ θu
ai
(
θ
N 4 Sk(N2 − k2 ) +
cA−i
2 k
)
f(θ)dθ
}
, where ai =
cA−i
4S(1− k
N
)
;
and El[pi∗−i(k∗Ai , kA−i, θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N − ki − k−i) +
∫ θu
a∗i
(
θ4S
N (
N
2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN)
2
)
f(θ)dθ, where a∗i =
cA−i
4S(1− k
∗A
i
N
)
.
Proof. If ﬁrm i invests early and the other ﬁrm waits until it observes the real-
ized θ: if θ ≥ c
A
−i
4S(1− k
A
i
N
)
, the other ﬁrm's best response is R∗−i(k
A
i ) =
N
2 −
kAi
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN and ﬁrm i's proﬁt function is then pii(k
A
i , R−i(k
A
i ), θ) =
θ
N S
Bki(N −
ki − k−i) + θN 4 SkAi (N2 −
kAi
2 ) +
cA−i−2cAi
2 k
A
i ; if θ ≤
cA−i
4S(1− k
A
i
N
)
, R−i(kAi ) = 0
and ﬁrm i's proﬁt function is then pi(kAi , R−i(k
A
i ), θ) =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki −
k−i) + θN 4 SkAi (N − kAi ) − cAi kAi . Taking the expected value of θ, ﬁrm i's
optimal expected proﬁt function at the early stage is Ee[pi∗i (kAi , R−i(kAi ), θ)] =
maxk
{∫ ai
θl
(
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+ θN4Sk(N−k)−cAi k
)
f(θ)dθ+
∫ θu
ai
(
θ
N S
Bki(N−
ki−k−i)+ θN 4Sk(N2 − k2 )+
cA−i−2cAi
2 k
)
f(θ)dθ
}
, where ai =
cA−i
4S(1− k
N
)
. Firm i's
optimal NGP capacity is k∗Ai = arg maxk Ee[pi∗i (k, k∗A−i , θ)]. The other ﬁrm's
optimal NGP capacity is k∗A−i = max{N2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN, 0} and the opti-
mal ex-ante expected proﬁt is El[pi∗−i(k∗Ai , kA−i, θ)] =
∫ a∗i
θl
(
θ
N S
Bk−i(N − ki −
k−i)
)
f(θ)dθ+
∫ θu
a∗i
(
θ
N S
Bk−i(N−ki−k−i)+ θ4SN (N2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN)
2
)
f(θ)dθ,
where a∗i =
cA−i
4S(1− k
∗A
i
N
)
.
Lemma B.2. If both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L
′
, L
′
), and cAi ≤ cA−i, i = x, y,
the equilibrium capacity is as follows: if θ4S ≤ cAi , then k∗Ai = k∗A−i = 0, i.e.,
(LN,LN); if cAi ≤ θ4 S ≤ 2cA−i − cAi , then k∗Ai = N2 −
cAi
2θ4SN and k
∗A
−i = 0,
i.e., (L,LN); if θ 4 S ≥ 2cA−i − cAi , then k∗Ai = k∗A−i = N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N , i.e.,
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(L,L); The equilibrium expected proﬁts are El[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N −
ki−k−i)+
∫ 2cA−i−cAi
cAi
(
N
4θ4S (θ4S−cAi )2
)
f(θ)dθ+
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi
(
θ4S
9 N+
2
9N(c
A
−i−
2cAi )+
(cA−i−2cAi )2
9θ4S N
)
f(θ)dθ and El[pi∗−i(k∗Ai , kA−i, θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N−ki−k−i)+∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi
(
θ4S
9 N +
2
9N(c
A
i − 2cA−i) +
(cAi −2cA−i)2
9θ4S N
)
f(θ)dθ.
Proof. If both ﬁrms decide to wait, there are three potential outcomes after θ
is realized: neither ﬁrm invests, i.e., (LN,LN); the low-cost ﬁrm invests and
the opponent does not, i.e., (L,LN) or (LN,L); both ﬁrms invest (L,L). The
details are listed in Table B.1, where Ri(k) is ﬁrm i's best response function
to the other ﬁrm's capacity decision k.
When cAx ≤ cAy
If Rx(0) < 0, then (LN,LN)
If Rx(0) ≥ 0 and Ry(Rx(0)) < 0, then (L,LN)
If Ry(Rx(k
∗A
y )) ≥ 0, then (L,L)
When cAx ≥ cAy
If Ry(0) < 0, then (LN,LN)
If Ry(0) ≥ 0 and Rx(Ry(0)) < 0, then (LN,L)
If Rx(Ry(k
∗A
x )) ≥ 0, then (L,L)
Table B.1: Capacity subgame outcomes in the equilibrium strategy (L
′
, L
′
)
When cAi ≤ cA−i, i = x, y: (1) if θ 4 S ≤ cAi , then k∗Ai = k∗A−i = 0, i.e.,
(LN,LN); (2) if cAi ≤ θ4S ≤ 2cA−i−cAi , then k∗Ai = N2 −
cAi
2θ4SN and k
∗A
−i = 0,
i.e., (L,LN); (3) if θ4S ≥ 2cA−i− cAi , then k∗Ai = N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N , i.e., (L,L).
Firm i's and ﬁrm −i's optimal ex-ante expected proﬁts from simultaneous late
investments are El[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+
∫ 2cA−i−cAi
cAi
(
N
4θ4S (θ4
S−cAi )2
)
f(θ)dθ+
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi
(
θ4S
9 N+
2
9N(c
A
−i−2cAi )+
(cA−i−2cAi )2
9θ4S N
)
f(θ)dθ and
El[pi∗−i(k∗Ai , kA−i, θ)] =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N − ki − k−i) +
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi
(
θ4S
9 N +
2
9N(c
A
i −
2cA−i) +
(cAi −2cA−i)2
9θ4S N
)
f(θ)dθ.
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Theorem B.1. Set f1i =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + (N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N)(
θ4S
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3 ); set f
2
i =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+
∫ θu
a∗−i
(
θ4S
N (
N
2 −
k∗A−i
2 −
cAi
2θ4SN)
2
)
f(θ)dθ,
where a∗−i =
cAi
4S(1− k
∗A−i
N
)
and k∗A−i = arg maxkA−i f
3
−i; set f
3
i = maxk
{
θ
N S
Bki(N−
ki− k−i) + 4Sk(N−k)N
∫ ai
θl
θf(θ)dθ+ 4Sk(N−k)2N
∫ θu
ai
θf(θ)dθ+
cA−i
2 k
∫ θu
ai
f(θ)dθ−
cAi k
}
, where ai =
cA−i
4S(1− k
N
)
; set f4i =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+
∫ 2cA−i−cAi
cAi
(
N
θ4S (
θ4S
2 −
cAi
2 )
2
)
f(θ)dθ+N4S9
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi θf(θ)dθ+
2N(cA−i−2cAi )
9
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi f(θ)dθ+
(cA−i−2cAi )2N
94S
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi
1
θf(θ)dθ;
and set f5i =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+N4S9
∫ θu
2cAi −cA−i θf(θ)dθ+
2N(cA−i−2cAi )
9
∫ θu
2cAi −cA−i f(θ)dθ+
(cA−i−2cAi )2N
94S
∫ θu
2cAi −cA−i
1
θf(θ)dθ. Without the proﬁtability assumption, we ﬁnd
the following four equilibrium strategies to the investment timing game when
cAi ≤ cA−i, i = x, y:
1. if f1i ≥ f2i and f1−i ≥ f2−i, then both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. if f3i ≥ f4i and f1−i ≤ f2−i, then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests
late;
3. if f1i ≤ f2i and f3−i ≥ f5−i, then ﬁrm i invests late and ﬁrm −i invests
early;
4. if f3i ≤ f4i and f3−i ≤ f5−i, then both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L);
Proof. set f1i =
θ
N S
Bki(N − ki − k−i) + (N3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3θ4S N)(
θ4S
3 +
cA−i−2cAi
3 ), i =
x, y. In the equilibrium strategy (E,E), Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] = f1i , i = x, y. Set
f3i = maxk
{
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+4Sk(N−k)N
∫ ai
θl
θf(θ)dθ+4Sk(N−k)2N
∫ θu
ai
θf(θ)dθ+
cA−i
2 k
∫ θu
ai
f(θ)dθ − cAi k
}
, where ai =
cA−i
4S(1− k
N
)
; and set f2−i =
θ
N S
Bk−i(N −
k−i− ki) +
∫ θu
a∗i
(
θ4S
N (
N
2 −
k∗Ai
2 −
cA−i
2θ4SN)
2
)
f(θ)dθ, where a∗i =
cA−i
4S(1− k
∗A
i
N
)
and
k∗Ai = arg maxk f
3
i . Based on Lemma B.1, in the equilibrium strategy where
ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests late, i.e., (E,L) or (L,E), we set:
Ee[pi∗i (kAi , k∗A−i , θ)] = f3i and El[pi∗−i(kA−i, k∗Ai , θ)] = f2−i. set f4i =
θ
N S
Bki(N −
ki−k−i)+
∫ 2cA−i−cAi
cAi
(
N
θ4S (
θ4S
2 −
cAi
2 )
2
)
f(θ)dθ+N4S9
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi θf(θ)dθ+
2N(cA−i−2cAi )
9
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi f(θ)dθ+
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(cA−i−2cAi )2N
94S
∫ θu
2cA−i−cAi
1
θf(θ)dθ; and set f
5
i =
θ
N S
Bki(N−ki−k−i)+N4S9
∫ θu
2cAi −cA−i θf(θ)dθ+
2N(cA−i−2cAi )
9
∫ θu
2cAi −cA−i f(θ)dθ+
(cA−i−2cAi )2N
94S
∫ θu
2cAi −cA−i
1
θf(θ)dθ. In the equilibrium
strategy (L
′
, L
′
): if cAx ≤ cAy , we set El[pi∗x(kAx , k∗Ay , θ)] = f4x , and El[pi∗y(k∗Ax , kAy , θ)] =
f5y ; if c
A
x ≥ cAy , El[pi∗x(kAx , k∗Ay , θ)] = f5x , and El[pi∗y(k∗Ax , kAy , θ)] = f4y .
Comparing the proﬁt of ﬁrm i, i = x, y, in each equilibrium strategy, we
ﬁnd the following four equilibria to the investment timing game when cAi ≤ cA−i,
i = x, y:
1. if f1i ≥ f2i and f1−i ≥ f2−i, then both ﬁrms invest early, i.e., (E,E).
2. if f3i ≥ f4i and f1−i ≤ f2−i, then ﬁrm i invests early and ﬁrm −i invests
late;
3. if f1i ≤ f2i and f3−i ≥ f5−i, then ﬁrm i invests late and ﬁrm −i invests
early;
4. if f3i ≤ f4i and f3−i ≤ f5−i, then both ﬁrms invest late, i.e., (L,L);
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Appendix C
Survey (Chapter 6)
The survey is based on Ellis et al. (2010). Some of the survey questions (IC3,
II3, MT1, PSD1, OSR1) are reversely coded so that high scores indicate high
risk.
Survey Instruction for the procurement department of the MRO
• Answers are on a seven-point scale, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree).
• The spare part evaluated in the survey is referred to as `Item X'.
• The major supplier (manufacturer) of this spare part is referred to as
`Supplier Y'.
Item Customization (IC)
• IC1: Item X is custom built for us.
• IC2: We basically buy the same component that Supplier Y sells to
other customers.
• IC3: Item X is pretty much an oﬀ-the-shelf item.
Technological Uncertainty (TU)
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• TU1: Rapid changes in Item X's industry necessitate frequent product
modiﬁcations.
• TU2: Technology developments in Item X's industry are frequent.
• TU3: Technology changes in Item X's industry provide major opportu-
nities.
Item Importance (II)
• II1: If our company ranked all purchased items in order of importance,
Item X would be near the top of the list.
• II2: Compared to other items our company purchases, Item X is a high
priority with our company's purchasing managers.
• II3: Most other items that our company purchases are more important
than Item X.
Market Thinness (MT)
• MT1: We could purchase Item X from several other vendors (i.e. other
OEMs).
• MT2: Supplier Y is really the only supplier we could use for Item X.
• MT3: Supplier Y almost has a monopoly for Item X.
Probability of Supply Disruption (PSD)
• PSD1: It is highly unlikely that we will experience an interruption in
the supply of Item X from Supplier Y.
• PSD2: There is a high probability that Supplier Y will fail to supply
Item X to us.
• PSD3: We worry that Supplier Y may not supply Item X as speciﬁed
within our purchase agreement.
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Magnitude of Supply Disruption (MSD)
• MSD1: An interruption in the supply of Item X from Supplier Y would
have severe negative ﬁnancial consequences for our business.
• MSD2: Supplier Y's inability to supply Item X would jeopardize our
business performance.
• MSD3: We would incur signiﬁcant costs and/or losses in revenue if Sup-
plier Y failed to supply Item X.
Overall Supply Disruption Risk (ODR)
• ODR1: Overall, supply of Item X from Supplier Y is characterized by
low levels of risk.
Search for Alternate Source of Supply (SAS)
• SAS1: We are actively seeking alternate sources of Item X.
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Appendix D
Personal Contribution
Statement
• Chapter 3. Dynamic Capacity Investment under Competition
This chapter originates from a paper that shares the same title. It is coau-
thored with R. Zuidwijk, M.B.M. de Koster, and R. Dekker. As the ﬁrst
author, I am responsible for building the model, developing the algorithm,
collecting the data, and writing the manuscript. This paper is currently un-
der review at a journal and is available at SSRN; see Li et al. (2016b).
• Chapter 4. Launching Next-Generation Products (NGP) in a
Competitive Market
This chapter originates from a paper that shares the same title. It is coau-
thored with R. Zuidwijk, M.B.M. de Koster, and S. P. Sethi. As the ﬁrst
author, I am responsible for building the model, performing the analysis, pre-
senting the results, and writing the manuscript. This paper is currently under
review at a journal.
• Chapter 5. Combating Strategic Cross-Border Counterfeiters:
Public and/or Private Responsibility?
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198 APPENDIX D. PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION STATEMENT
This chapter originates from a paper that shares the same title. It is coau-
thored with M. Pourakbar. As the ﬁrst author, I am responsible for building
the model, performing the analysis, presenting the results, and writing the
manuscript. This paper is currently under review at a journal.
• Chapter 6. Assessing End-of-Supply Risk of Spare Parts Using
the Proportional Hazard Model (PHM)
This chapter originates from a paper that shares the same title. It is coau-
thored with R. Dekker, C. Heij, and M. Hekimo§lu. As the ﬁrst author, I am
responsible for developing the methodology, collecting the data, applying the
methodology, validating the results, and writing the manuscript. This paper
was accepted by Decision Sciences in 2016 (Volume 47, Issue 2); see Li et al.
(2016a).
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Summary
This dissertation studies the impact of uncertainty and competition on a ﬁrm's
decision making in the ﬁeld of operations management (OM). Chapter 2 pro-
vides an overview on dynamic and competitive strategies in OM. The re-
mainder of the dissertation focuses on three speciﬁc decisions areas of OM:
(1) capacity planning at the strategic and tactic levels (Chapters 3 and 4),
(2) anti-counterfeiting strategies at the tactic level (Chapter 5), and (3) risk
management for long ﬁeld-life systems at the operational level (Chapter 6).
In Chapter 3, we study the optimal dynamic capacity strategies under
competition. We develop an algorithm to derive full optimal policies in terms
of investment timing and size for both the leader and follower ﬁrms. We
validate our model using detailed data from the container shipping market
(2000-2015). Although the investments of shipping lines are often questioned
to be irrational, our results show that they are close to the optimal capac-
ity choices determined by proactive competitive strategies. By reviewing the
underlying structures of various strategies, we demonstrate that in nearly all
cases competing ﬁrms can gain more proﬁt and market share by adopting a
proactive strategy rather than a reactive one.
In Chapter 4, we study the optimal launch timing for next-generation
products (NGPs) in a competitive market. A ﬁrm's optimal timing considers
the trade-oﬀ between demand risk and competition. To measure the impact
of demand risk in a market, a ﬁrm should measure the correlation between
the average consumer taste and the heterogeneity in consumer taste: a strong
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correlation indicates a large exposure to demand risk. We measure a ﬁrm's
competitive advantage and disadvantage on a two-dimensional scale, which
includes the ﬁrm's capacity investment cost advantage over its competitor
and the competitor's gain from oﬀering the product quality upgrade. Based
on the competitive advantage and disadvantage of both ﬁrms and the demand
risk, we distinguish diﬀerent competitive situations of a ﬁrm, and derive the
optimal investment strategy of a ﬁrm in each situation.
In Chapter 5, we study the optimal anti-counterfeiting strategy in a global
supply chain. To combat counterfeiting, the OEM can either resort to pricing
or building a public-private partnership (PPP) with Customs, in which the
OEM helps Customs hinder the entry of counterfeits. Customs can also be
the one who initiates the PPP and thus the OEM can join it with no cost.
Using a game theoretic framework, we derive the optimal equilibrium strate-
gies of Customs and the OEM, based on their decisions towards the PPP. We
consider two types of counterfeits, non-deceptive and deceptive counterfeits.
Our results show that government should play a bigger role in combating non-
deceptive counterfeits, while the OEM should play a bigger role in combating
deceptive counterfeits.
In Chapter 6, we study how to assess end-of-supply risk of parts of long
ﬁeld-life systems. Using the proportional hazard model and quantiﬁed supply
chain condition data, we develop a methodology for ﬁrms purchasing spare
parts to manage end-of-supply risk. Our methodology is demonstrated using
data on about 2,000 spare parts collected from a maintenance repair orga-
nization in the aviation industry. Cross-validation results and out-of-sample
risk assessments show good performance of the method to identify spare parts
with high end-of-supply risk. Further validation is provided by survey re-
sults obtained from the maintenance repair organization, which show strong
agreement between the ﬁrms' and our model's identiﬁcation of high-risk spare
parts.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.
Nederlandse Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de impact van onzekerheid en concurrentie op de
besluitvorming van een bedrijf op het gebied van operations management
(OM). Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een overzicht van dynamische en concurrerende
strategieën in OM. De rest van het proefschrift richt zich op drie speciﬁeke
beslissingsgebieden van OM: (1) capaciteitsplanning op strategisch en tactisch
niveau (hoofdstuk 3 en 4), (2) strategieën ter bestrijding van namaak op tac-
tisch niveau (hoofdstuk 5), en (3) risicobeheer voor systemen met een lange
product life cycle op operationeel niveau (hoofdstuk 6).
In hoofdstuk 3 bestuderen we de optimale dynamische capaciteitsstrate-
gieën onder concurrentie. We ontwikkelen een algoritme om een volledig opti-
maal beleid af te leiden in termen van timing en investeringsomvang voor zowel
de marktleider als diens volger. We valideren ons model aan de hand van gede-
tailleerde gegevens van de containerscheepvaartmarkt (2000-2015). Hoewel de
gemaakte investeringen van scheepvaartmaatschappijen vaak als irrationeel
worden beschouwd, laten onze resultaten zien dat ze dicht bij de optimale
capaciteitsbeleid liggen volgens proactieve concurrentiestrategieën. Door de
onderliggende structuren van verschillende strategieën te herzien, laten we
zien dat concurrerende bedrijven in vrijwel alle gevallen meer winst en mark-
taandeel kunnen behalen door een proactieve strategie te volgen in plaats van
een reactieve strategie.
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In hoofdstuk 4 bestuderen we de optimale starttiming voor producten van
de volgende generatie (NGP's) in een concurrerende markt. De optimale tim-
ing van een bedrijf beschouwt de afweging tussen vraagrisico en concurrentie.
Om de impact van vraagrisico's in een markt te meten, moet een bedrijf de
correlatie meten tussen de gemiddelde consumentensmaak en de heterogeniteit
in consumentensmaak: een sterke correlatie duidt op een grote blootstelling
aan vraagrisico. We meten het concurrentievoordeel en nadeel van een bedrijf
op een tweedimensionale schaal. Dit houdt ook rekening met het invester-
ingskostenvoordeel van de onderneming ten opzichte van zijn concurrent, en
de winst van de concurrent door een betere productkwaliteit aan te bieden. Op
basis van het concurrentievoordeel en nadeel van beide bedrijven en het vraa-
grisico, onderscheiden we verschillende concurrentiesituaties van een bedrijf
en bepalen we de optimale investeringsstrategie van een bedrijf voor ieder van
deze situaties.
In hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we de optimale anti-namaakstrategie in een
globale supply chain. Om namaak tegen te gaan, kan de OEM ofwel zijn pri-
jzen veranderen of een publiek-private samenwerking (PPS) met de Douane
opzetten, waarbij de OEM de Douane helpt de invoer van namaken te belem-
meren. De Douane kan ook degene zijn die de PPS initieert waarbij de OEM
kan deelnemen zonder kosten. Met behulp van een speltheoriekader leiden we
de optimale balans voor de Douane en de OEM af op basis van hun beslissingen
aan de hand van de PPS. We beschouwen zowel niet-misleidende als mislei-
dende namaken. Onze resultaten tonen aan dat de overheid een grotere rol zou
moeten spelen in de strijd tegen niet-misleidende namaken, terwijl de OEM
een grotere rol zou moeten spelen in de strijd tegen misleidende namaken.
In hoofdstuk 6 bestuderen we hoe het end-of-supply risico kan worden
beoordeeld van onderdelen van systemen met een lange levensduur. Door
middel van een proportioneel hazard-model en gekwantiﬁceerde supply chain-
conditiegegevens, ontwikkelen we een methodologie voor bedrijven die re-
serveonderdelen kopen om het end-of-supply risico in te tomen. Onze method-
ologie wordt gedemonstreerd met behulp van gegevens van circa 2.000 re-
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serveonderdelen van een onderhoudsreparatieorganisatie in de luchtvaartin-
dustrie. Cross-validatieresultaten en out-of-sample risicobeoordelingen tonen
aan dat de methode reserveonderdelen met een hoog end-of-supply risico uit-
stekend kan identiﬁceren. Verdere validatie heeft plaatsgevonden door mid-
del van een survey bij de onderhoudsreparatieorganisatie, waarbij een sterke
overeenkomst is gevonden tussen het door het bedrijf gemaakte identiﬁcaties
van risicovolle reserveonderdelen en dat van ons model.
Hoofdstuk 7 besluit het proefschrift.
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strategies at the tactic level; and (3) risk management for long field-life systems at the operational level. 
Our main generic research questions are as follows: (a) how should a firm make its capacity investment 
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counterfeiters in a global supply chain? (c) how should a firm that purchases parts manage end-of-supply 
risk of these parts, considering the changing supply and demand?
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